Chapter IV
Registration

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Registration

4.1 General Diary

A General Diary (GD) in a Police Station is a record maintained by the police to document all incidents, complaints, or any other relevant information that comes to their attention. It serves as an official logbook where police officers record daily activities, occurrences, and actions taken. GDs are generated on sequential basis for recording events where each entry is uniquely identified, enabling an accurate count of events within a given timeframe. This sequential approach not only ensures transparency within the organisation but also enhances accountability and facilitates effective monitoring of police activities. Since the system generates sequential numbers, there should be no gaps between two consecutive GD numbers.

Further, as per Police Manual, Odisha, CCTNS was to be designed in such a way that the GD number gets reset *i.e.,* starts from serial number one every day at 08:00 AM in a Police Station. This meant that entries made in the GD for the day would be typically recorded for a specific date and time, starting from GD No. 001 at 08:00:00 AM and ending with a maximum GD number in the day at 07:59:59AM of the next day. Analysis of the database for the period from January 2018 to March 2023 revealed inconsistencies in the data recorded in CCTNS related to GD numbers, as discussed below:

4.1.1 Gaps in generation of GD Serial Number

Audit analysed the data related to GD numbers in the CCTNS database and noticed that a total of 1,71,05,648 GDs had been generated across 656 PSs of the State, during January 2018 to March 2023. The other 16 PSs had not used the GD module (these were either Energy Police Stations, working under the Human Rights Commission, CID *etc*).

There were gaps in GD Serial Numbers in 33,018 instances (with a total gap count of 1,45,619) across 579 Police Stations, as listed in ***Appendix-III***. One such instance is explained as below:

Figure 4.1: Picture depicting gaps in GD Serial Numbers



Source: CCTNS Database

Such gaps in GD Serial Numbers not only indicated the lack of application controls to ensure data integrity in incremental generation of GD Serial Numbers, but also the material risk that primary records had been deleted from the system. Deletion of records without a clear log trail has serious implications for the investigation process, as it creates avoidable scope for collusion between police personnel and the accused to conceal evidence or manipulate records. In the absence of Database Administrator (DBA) logs *i.e.,* record of activities made by the DBA in the back end as pointed out in ***Paragraph No.7.3*** responsibility for such unauthorised deletions cannot be fixed. This reflected a major control failure in the system.

Admitting the presence of gaps in GD Serial Numbers, Government attributed (September 2024), the reason to the PS users who had manoeuvred the local desktop system date and time, to record the correct date and time of GD events at subsequent periods of time. However, the Government needs to ensure that changing the local desktop system date and time at the PS level should not result in gaps in GD Serial Numbers generated by the system.

Further, Government stated that NCRB would be contacted to implement remedial controls in the system to prevent gaps in GD Serial Numbers.

4.1.2 Multiple GDs with the same GD Serial Number within the defined 24-hour period

Audit noticed that multiple GDs had been created with the same GD Serial Number within the defined 24-hour period (08:00:00 AM to 07:59:59 AM), which should not have been permitted by the system.

Out of 1.71 crore GD records created during January 2018 to March 2023, there were 1.43 lakh instances of GDs having the same GD Serial Number within the same defined 24-hour period. The number of such GDs with the same GD Serial Number ranged from 02 to 25.

This issue arose due to following two reasons:

4.1.2.1 Provision for creation of Dynamic GDs while creating FIRs without underlying GDs in the system

Creation of every FIR requires a GD Number. However, in certain cases FIRs were allowed to be directly entered (*i.e.,* without reference to a previously entered GD) into the system with the date manually specified (including prior to the current date). While creating such FIRs, the user could enter the FIR date and timestamp manually, with a provision to create a GD entry known as 'Dynamic GD'. Such 'Dynamic GDs' were recorded in the system with the same date and timestamp as the FIR. At this point, the system generated a GD Serial Number corresponding to the sequential date and timestamp for the manually entered data, instead of generating a GD Serial Number incremental to the last GD Serial Number already generated for that 24-hour period.

Such back-dated insertion of GD Serial Numbers had resulted in duplication of GD Serial Numbers in cases where there were GD Serial Numbers already recorded for the particular 24-hour period, immediately following the manually entered date and timestamp. An example describing the creation of a duplicate GD Serial Number is given in the ***Figure-4.2*** below:

Figure 4.2: Picture depicting creation of duplicate GD Serial Number due to direct FIR entries with manually entered date and timestamp



Source: GD Master Table of CCTNS Database

Government stated (September 2024) that the same GD Serial Number for multiple GDs had been created by PS users who had manually entered date and timestamps for FIRs. The response was not tenable, since the system should have enforced referential integrity in the database, by requiring generation of an incremental GD Serial Number for that 24-hour period, instead of a duplicate sequential GD Serial Number corresponding to the manually entered date and timestamp.

4.1.2.2 Irregular creation of back-dated GDs by modifying the local desktop system date and time

Apart from the creation of duplicate GD Serial Numbers as pointed out above through use of 'Dynamic GDs', there were 1.22 lakh instances of duplicate GD Serial Numbers in the database, which indicated direct back-dated entry of GDs (without them being necessitated due to FIRs requiring 'Dynamic GD'), as depicted in the picture below:

Figure 4.3: Picture depicting creation of duplicate GD Serial Numbers due to back-dated manual GD entries



Source: GD Master Table of CCTNS Database

Audit noticed that users could manually modify the local desktop system date and time and the system used that modified date and timestamp to create back-dated GDs. At this point, the system generated a GD Serial Number corresponding to the sequential date and timestamp as modified on the local desktop system, instead of generating a GD Serial Number incremental to the last GD Serial Number already generated for that 24-hour period.

Such back-dated insertion of GDs had resulted in duplication of GD Serial Numbers in cases where there were GD Serial Numbers already recorded for the particular 24-hour period, immediately following the manually entered date and timestamp. There was no provision in the Odisha Police Manual or the FRS/ URS for creation of back-dated GDs (without being necessitated due to back-dated FIRs). As such, creation

of such back-dated GDs by modifying the local desktop system date and time was highly irregular.

Government admitted the audit observation (September 2024) and stated that the reason for the duplication was modification of the local desktop date and time by PS users.

The reason given was not tenable, since the system should have enforced referential integrity in the database, by requiring generation of an incremental GD Serial Number for that 24-hour period, instead of a duplicate sequential GD Serial Number corresponding to the manually entered date and timestamp.

The duplication of GD Serial Numbers affected the integrity of CCTNS and functioning of Police Station apart from creating confusion in selection of GD entries while using different functions such as creation of arrest memos, seizure memos, FIRs etc.

4.1.3 Inconsistency in GD date and timestamp recorded in GD master table and the FIR table

Whenever a General Diary (GD) entry was created, the data was recorded in the GD master table along with the GD date and timestamp. Subsequently, when a FIR references that GD, the system was required to retrieve the GD date and timestamp from the GD master table. This control would have ensured that the GD date and timestamp in the GD master table and the FIR table would remain consistent.

Audit analysed the GD master table and FIR table in the CCTNS and noticed that there was inconsistency in GD date and timestamps recorded in the two tables in 25 cases under 16 Police Stations of the State during January 2018 to March 2023. In all the 25 cases, the GD entry date and timestamp recorded in the GD master table were earlier than the GD entry date and timestamp recorded in the FIR table, with the difference in time ranging from two minutes to 104 hours, as detailed in ***Appendix-IV***. One such instance is highlighted in ***Figure 4.4***:

Figure 4.4: Picture depicting the inconsistency of GD Date in GD Master Table and FIR Master Table



Source: CCTNS Database

The inconsistencies in the date and timestamps indicated that instead of the system retrieving the data from the GD master table when users entering data into the FIR table referenced the underlying GD Number, users were required to manually enter the GD date and timestamp. This resulted in avoidable risks to data integrity in the FIR table.

Director, SCRB stated (May 2024) stated that the inconsistency of timestamps between GD table and FIR table had happened due to changing of local desktop system date and time by PS users.

The reply indicates that the required application control of retrieving the GD date and timestamp from the master table had not been implemented.

4.1.4 Inconsistency in generation of GD Numbers in GD master table

As per system design, a GD Number should consist of 23 digits and follows a predefined format, as specified in the source code. The first eight digits represent the code for the Police Station, the next eight digits represent the date, month and year in 'DD-MM-YYYY' format, and the next four digits represent the time in 'HH:MM' format, and last three digits represent the serial number of the GD in the defined 24-hour period, as depicted in the ***Figure 4.5***:

Figure 4.5: Format of the GD numbers created in GD Master Table



Source: CCTNS Database and Information received from SCRB

Audit analysed the GD Numbers generated in CCTNS and noticed the following discrepancies:

- **Discrepancies in digits representing time in generation of GD Numbers:** The system generated GD Numbers should be of 23 digits as per the system design. Audit noticed that there were 64,952 (with 64,933 in Hinjili Police Station) GD records for the period from October 2018 to March 2023, where the GD Number had 19 digits only. This was because the four digits representing time in 'HH:MM' format were absent. This inconsistency was noted in eight Police Stations, as shown in the following table:

Table No. 4.1: Table showing list of Police Stations where length of GD Number had 19 digits during the period from January 2018 to March 2023

Sl. No.	Police Station Code	Police Station	Number of GD records where length of GD Number is 19	Total number of GDs
1.	24875055	ULUNDA	1	51,618
2.	24491019	HINJILI	64,933	65,619
3.	24504014	CHHEND	1	45,161
4.	24867006	KHANDAGIRI	1	44,290
5.	24863012	KALIMELA	1	22,247
6.	24484056	TUREIKELA	1	39,317
7.	24867016	LAXMISAGAR	11	50,387
8.	24487010	CYBER CRIME	3	3,490
	Total		**64,952**	

Source: CCTNS database

This inconsistency indicated that the system process of generating unique GD Numbers was not functioning as intended. The deficiency created avoidable risks of GD Numbers being generated in the same Police Station (eight digits)

on the same date (eight digits), being dependent on the uniqueness of GD Serial Number (three digits) to ensure uniqueness of the overall GD Number. As described in Paragraph 4.1.2 above, there were instances of duplicate GD Serial Numbers within the same defined 24-hour period noticed in the database, which indicated the material risk that the overall GD Numbers generated would themselves not be unique. Such an outcome would pose significant data integrity challenges for the users.

Figure 4.6: Picture showing generation of GD without time part in its unique GD number

682	24491019230920181959003	99	24	24491	24491019	003	2018-09-23 19:59:03.000	2449111081256940
683	24491019240920180934001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-09-24 09:34:19.000	2449111081256940
684	24491019240920181428002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-09-24 14:28:36.000	2449111081256940
685	24491019260920181828001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-09-26 18:28:48.000	2449111081256940
686	24491019260920182033002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-09-26 20:33:00.000	2449111081256940
687	2449101905102018001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-10-05 17:10:40.000	2449111081256940
688	2449101910102018001	99	24	24491	24491019	001	2018-10-10 10:57:32.000	2449111081256940
689	2449101910102018002	99	24	24491	24491019	002	2018-10-10 11:09:14.000	2449111081256940
690	2449101910102018003	99	24	24491	24491019	003	2018-10-10 11:21:35.000	2449111081256940

Source: CCTNS Database

Government accepted the inconsistency in length of GD numbers as a system flaw and stated (September 2024) that the SI is being directed to address the flaw.

4.2 First Information Report (FIR)

4.2.1 Gaps in generation of FIR Serial Number

The FIR Serial numbers are system generated in CCTNS, beginning with '0001' for each Police Station and each calendar year, to ensure their uniqueness. There should be no gap between consecutive FIR Serial Numbers in each Police Station.

Audit analysed the FIR Serial Numbers recorded in the CCTNS database and noticed that a total of 7,44,399 FIRs had been registered in all the PSs of the State during January 2018 to March 2023. However, there were 19 instances of gaps in the FIR Serial Numbers, as listed in ***Appendix-V***. One such instance is depicted in ***Figure 4.7***:

Figure 4.7: Figure showing gaps in generation of FIR number



	DISTRICT_CD	DISTRICT	PS_CD	PS	FIR_REG_NUM	REG_YEAR	FIR_SRNO	LEAD_FIR_SRNO	GAP_ANALYSIS
1	24499	MAYURBHANJ	24499		24499020210				
2	24494	BARAGARH	24494		24494009220				
3	24862	UPD. CUTTACK	24862028	Bentka (2 Mouza) PS	24862028220081	2022	81	83	
4	24505	JAGATSINGHPUR	24505018	ERSAMA	24505018210216	2021	216	218	GAP OF 217
5	24870	RAYAGADA	24870016	GUNUPUR	24870016200216	2020	216	218	GAP OF 217
6	24864	NABARANGPUR	24864027	KUNDEI	24864027220067	2022	67	69	GAP OF 68
7	24864	NABARANGPUR	24864013	DABUGAON	24864013200137	2020	137	139	GAP OF 138
8	24488	ANGUL	24488050	THAKURGARH	24488050210031	2021	31	33	GAP OF 32
9	24870	RAYAGADA	24870011	CHANDILI	24870011200055	2020	55	57	GAP OF 56
10	24482	BALASORE	24482027	KHANTAPADA	24			312	
11	24508	KENDRAPARA	24508042	MARINE	24			97	

Source: CCTNS Database

Such gaps in FIR Serial Numbers not only indicated lack of application controls to ensure data integrity in incremental generation of FIR Serial Numbers, but the material risk that primary records had been deleted from the system.

Deletion of records without a clear log trail has serious implications for the investigation process, as it creates avoidable scope for collusion between police personnel and the accused to conceal evidence or manipulate records. In the absence of DBA logs as pointed out in ***Paragraph No.7.3***, responsibility for such unauthorised deletions cannot be fixed. This reflected a major control failure in the system.

Admitting that FIRs having data entry errors had been deleted by the Database Administrator (DBA) on the basis of requests received from Superintendents of Police, the Government stated (September 2024) that gaps had also arisen due to deficiencies in the system to generate FIR Serial Numbers. This has been subsequently resolved in the new version of CCTNS, which would be implemented in the next year.

The response was not tenable, as there should be no provision for deletion of FIRs from the system (as there is no legal provision for tearing off pages from the physical FIR Register). This practice was highly irregular and the FIRs with incorrect details should have only been marked on the system as incorrect/ closed.

4.2.2 Absence of application controls to maintain integrity of date and timestamps for sequentially dependent actions in the system workflow

As per system design when a record is created the date and timestamp of the record was required to be recorded as a data field, for the purpose of maintaining an audit trail, along with details of the user who created the record.

Similarly, each time the record is updated, a separate timestamp for the update was required to be recorded. Since any update to a record can only take place after the record is created, there is sequential dependency between these actions and the timestamps are required to reflect the same, with the record update timestamp being chronologically subsequent/later than the record creation timestamp. The same logic for maintaining the correct chronological sequence was applicable for all sequentially dependent workflows in CCTNS, such as FIR Registration timestamp was to be later than the GD timestamp, and timestamps for subsequent actions such as Arrest Memo, Seizure Memo *etc.,* were to be later than FIR Registration timestamp and so on.

Audit analysed the tables related to GD entry, FIR registration, Crime Detail Forms (CDFs), and Seizure Memos and noticed that during the period January 2018-March 2023, in case of 7,079 records, pertaining to 399 Police Stations, the timestamp for record updation was recorded prior to the timestamp for record creation. The details are in the following table:

Table No. 4.2 Table showing the records in four tables where record update timestamps are earlier than the record creation timestamps

Sl. No.	Table Name	Total number of records	Number of cases where record update timestamp is earlier than record creation timestamp	Number of Police Stations involving such inconsistent timestamps	Difference in timestamps	
					Up to one hour	More than one hour
1	GD entry	45,99,878	1,166	145	111	1,055
2	FIR Register	56,813	61	35	9	52
3	Crime details	2,69,185	5,724	205	1863	3,861
4	Seizure Memo	20,250	128	14	16	112
	Total	**49,46,126**	**7,079**	**399**	**1,999**	**5,080**

Source: CCTNS database

In addition, Audit also noticed instances of sequentially dependent actions having timestamps recorded with timecodes earlier than the actions on which they were dependent, such as-

i. FIR creation timestamp preceding the underlying GD entry timestamp
ii. Crime Details timestamp preceding the FIR creation timestamp
iii. Arrest Memo and Seizure Memo timestamps preceding the FIR creation timestamp

The above inconsistencies in the timestamps data across different tables indicated significant deficiencies in the application controls implemented in CCTNS to prevent recording of incorrect date and time by users who may either have non-operational date and time (system clock not operational) or have intentionally modified the date and time on their systems.

Government stated (September 2024) that these issues were noticed where PS users changed the offline server date and time while registering FIRs. CAS 4.5 version of CCTNS provided by NCRB did not have mechanism to prevent users from modifying system date and time. However, in CAS 5.0 version of CCTNS the issue has been resolved and the new version would be rolled out soon.

The response was not acceptable as the above instances reflect lack of application controls to enforce chronological and logical sequencing in the system. As per system flow, to map the FIR being registered to an underlying GD, a list of available GDs (prior to FIR date) should have been made available to the user, and similarly for other sequentially dependent actions.

In order to prevent such anomalies in timestamps, the system administrator privileges should have been revoked from the PS users, so that they would not have any scope to modify the date and time of the local offline systems. The system should also not have permitted any data entry in case the system clock was not functional.

4.2.3 Absence of validation controls to prevent incorrect mapping of GD with FIRs

Legally FIR is the most important document and is one of the important IIF Form (Integrated Investigation Form, IIF 1). An FIR is a direct indication of crime, and the original FIR details must be preserved. Also, once the FIR is registered, the details along with GD cannot be altered.

Analysis of CCTNS database revealed that Odisha Police linked one GD with multiple FIRs during FIR registration in 1,554 cases which indicated that either the FIRs were not linked with the actual GDs created for the purpose or no GD had been created for the respective FIR and linked with another GD.

Due to wrong selection of GDs during registration of FIR, the base (*i.e.,* GD) for registration of FIR was invalid and the actual crime occurrence time/ subject matters became contradictory as there was no relation between the two different dates/ subject matters mentioned in the GD and FIR. Further, as the IPC sections were fetched from the GDs during creation of FIR, CCTNS reported wrong IPC sections against these FIRs.

This deficiency in the system was due to lack of validation controls such as generation of alerts for the users that the underlying GD had already been mapped to another FIR to prevent mapping of multiple FIRs with the same GD and provision for previewing of GD contents before mapping with an FIR. Due to this deficiency, the PS users relied on manually maintained case records for their functional work.

4.3 Deficiencies in the use of CCTNS for registration of cases of missing persons and children

Whenever a complaint is received regarding a missing person or child, an entry in GD is required to be made. In case of a missing child, the FIR registration is mandatory as directed by Hon'ble Supreme Court (2013). After GD entry is made in CCTNS, details of the missing person such as name, age, height, picture of person, address *etc.,* are required to be entered into the system.

Audit reviewed the utilisation of CCTNS in cases of missing persons and missing children and noticed the following deficiencies:

- **Incomplete registration of missing persons cases in CCTNS:** Database analysis revealed that there were 77,268 cases of missing persons complaints registered in CCTNS for the period January 2018 to December 2022. However, Audit test checked the manually maintained records in 26 Police Stations and observed that during the above period, only 3,574 out of a total of 4,062 missing person cases had been registered through CCTNS. Out of the total missing cases as per 'Man Missing Register' (MMR), GD entry and registration had not been done in case of 488 missing persons. Further, 789 missing persons had been traced, but the status of these cases had not been updated in CCTNS ***(Appendix-VI).***
- **Non-registration of FIR in cases of missing children:** Analysis of the CCTNS database revealed a total of 13,792 complaints involving missing children below the age of 18 during the period January 2018 to March 2023. Among these, 5,566 missing complaints lacked a linked FIR, while in 35 complaints, the linked FIR number was recorded as '0' indicating non-registration of FIRs against these missing child complaints, in violation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order. During test check of 68 selected Police Stations, Audit found that in one Police Station (PS Deogarh), the IO had not registered FIRs for cases of missing children in six out of 31 cases.

Due to non-registration and delayed registration of missing persons and children in CCTNS, the probability of tracing the person/ child was reduced. Further, the status of investigation into these missing persons/ children's cases could not be effectively supervised and the aim of having a common database of missing persons/ children at the State and national level could not be achieved.

Government admitted the audit observation and stated (September 2024) that necessary steps are being taken to incorporate appropriate controls in the system so that such mistakes are not repeated.

4.4 Incomplete registration of Non-Cognisable Reports (NCRs) through CCTNS

A non-cognizable report (NCR) is an offence in which police can neither register an FIR, investigate, nor effect arrest without the express permission or directions from the court. These mostly include minor offences such as abusing each other, minor scuffles without injuries, intimidation *etc.* All NCRs are provisioned to be registered and maintained through CCTNS.

However, audit analysis of the NCR table revealed that only 313 NCRs were available in CCTNS during 2018-2022. The year-wise details of the number of such NCRs in CCTNS are given in the following table:

Table No. 4.3: Statement showing year-wise number of NCRs registered in CCTNS

Sl. No.	Year	No. of NCRs registered
1.	2018	05
2.	2019	10
3.	2020	80
4.	2021	146
5.	2022	61
6.	2023 (up to June)	11
Total		**313**

Source: CCTNS Database

Audit test checked this aspect in 29 Police Stations and noticed that none of the NCRs were registered through CCTNS even though there were 9,642 NCRs in the manually maintained registers by these Police Stations as shown in ***Appendix-VII***. Due to the incomplete registration of NCRs in CCTNS, the objective of ensuring adequate accountability and effective supervision over police investigations in these cases through the system was not achieved.

Government stated (September 2024) that steps would be taken to ensure that all NCRs were registered on CCTNS.

Recommendation

Government should ensure that

- *deficiencies in GD numbering and FIR numbering should be fixed so that duplicate GD numbers and gaps in FIR numbers do not occur in the system; and*
- *chronological and logical sequencing of actions is enforced in the system, to preserve data integrity.*