

## Chapter 8

# Special Police Forces' modernisation



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Government has established several special police forces/units under Uttar Pradesh Police Force for special purposes and needs. These special police forces/units include Anti-Corruption Organisation (ACO), Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Anti-Terrorists Squad (ATS), Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC), Special Task Force (STF), etc. In this performance audit, three special police forces viz. ATS, PAC and STF were selected for detailed examination of their modernisation status. Our findings are as given below.

### 8.1 Anti-Terrorist Squad

Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) was established (November 2007) to combat and effectively control the increasing terrorist activities in the State. Objectives of the ATS are to identify the sensitive places where terrorists and anti-national elements might hide/reside; develop contacts for getting intelligence information about them; take action on intelligence information of any terrorist group's appearance/activities in the state, conduct follow-up operations; and to coordinate with Central and other States' intelligence units.



ATS can seek information from any department and units in the State and its area of operations covers the whole State. Cases registered in any police station by ATS are investigated by ATS till ADG (law and order/ crime) decides that the case is of general nature and can be investigated by the concerned police station.

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In addition to sanctioned manpower strength of 264, one company of commandos was to be provided to support ATS in achieving their assigned role and duties.

#### 8.1.1 Establishment of Commando Training School and Commando Hubs

After various terrorist attacks in the country such as Mumbai Bomb Blast, Mecca Masjid Blast in Hyderabad, and 26/11 attack in Mumbai (2008), Uttar Pradesh Police decided (June 2009) to establish a Commando unit of 2000 commandos and 'Hubs' on the line of National Security Guards (NSG). GoUP nominated (July 2009) UPRNN as construction agency for construction of buildings of ATS commando training centre at Lucknow. ATS was nominated (October 2009) as a nodal agency for commando training of commandos of ATS, STF and Security Unit, and was directed to submit a detailed proposal in this regard.

Accordingly, ATS submitted (November 2009) a detailed proposal to PHQ for sanction of ₹ 420.89 crore including ₹ 278.09 crore for buildings and infrastructure development for:

- Establishment of commando unit of a capacity of 2000, one third of the commandos were to be under training regularly for updating their skills/techniques and fitness;
- Establishment of four 'Hubs' in Agra, Lucknow, Meerut and Varanasi on the line of National Security Guards; where commandos were to be deployed after completion of their trainings for commando operation, as and when required; and
- Establishment of Centralised Commando Training School (CTS) at Lucknow and Counter Insurgency and Anti-terrorism School (Special Training Centre) at Mirzapur for Naxal/Jungle warfare training.



Against the above proposal, demand of ₹ 278.09 crore was made (December 2009) by the PHQ for the construction of buildings for 2,000 commandos. Later on UP Police decided (January 2010) to construct housing and other category infrastructure for only 200 commandos in first stage.

### **Establishment of CTS**

The State Government sanctioned (June 2011) establishment of Commando Training School (CTS) at Lucknow at a cost of ₹ 139.21 crore and decided to execute the work in two phases. In phase-I, works (construction of training block, administrative building, corner watch tower, sand model room, commando hostel of 200 capacity, four hostels of capacity of 20 each, hospital building, etc.) amounting to ₹ 70.00 crore were to be executed by UPRNN. After completion of Phase-I, work of Phase-II was to be taken up. The works of Phase-I were to be completed by September 2013.



To establish CTS as per detailed estimate/drawing and design, 44.074 hectare land was required, out of which, only 16.466 hectare land was actually available. As the required land was not available Department decided to complete the works of Phase-I on the available land i.e., 16.466 hectare. However, the available land was also not sufficient for construction works of Phase 1.

Audit further noticed that due to the required amount of land not being available for execution of Phase-I works, the construction of 12 corner watch towers were not taken up for execution and as high tension electricity line were also not shifted, construction of residential building (five Type-IV and one Type-V) was not possible. Construction of Hospital building was started but not completed and was rescheduled to be complete in Phase-II. GoUP sanctioned (September 2015) revised cost of ₹ 98.99 crore for completion of works of Phase-I. The funds were released to UPRNN (March 2016). Audit noticed that an expenditure of ₹ 82.49 crore has been incurred against the original sanctioned cost of ₹ 70.00 crore but the physical progress was only 88 *per cent* (March 2016), even after three years of schedule date of completion (September 2013). This Phase-1 of the CTS is still under execution (September 2016) with a cost overrun of ₹ 12.49 crore.

Furthermore, the works of Phase-II i.e., simulation halls, indoor sports hall, sewer treatment plant, dog kennels, transit hostel, residential buildings, CCTV system, access control system etc., which are essential for the CTS to attain full functionality have also not been taken up for execution as the land required for construction of these works has still to be acquired.

In reply, the Government stated that construction of works under Phase-I have been completed by the executing agency on the available land of 16.466 hectare. Acquisition of required land of 27.576 hectare for Phase-II works is in process. However, the fact remains that the establishment of CTS has been considerably delayed as the land was not available.

### **Establishment of Commando Hubs and Counter Insurgency and Anti-terrorism School**

Establishment of four Commando Hubs at Agra, Lucknow, Meerut and Varanasi where commandos were to be deployed after completion of their trainings for commando operation, as and when required; and establishment of Counter Insurgency and Anti-terrorism School (CIAT) at Mirzapur for Naxal/Jungle warfare training have still not been taken-up and even land acquisition process has not been started for required land for Hubs (25-25 hectare) and 75 hectare for CIAT.

Hence, establishment of Commando Training School at Lucknow, Counter Insurgency and Anti-terrorism School at Mirzapur and four commando hubs at Agra, Lucknow, Meerut and Varanasi could not be completed even after five years due to Government's failure to acquire land and ensure timely construction by the construction agency. Delay in execution/construction of work would led to considerable cost overruns. Such lackadaisical attitude of

the State Government in the matters of building capacities and ensuring preparedness for taking effective anti-terrorist measures and counter insurgency operations may seriously risk the safety and security of the people of the State in situations of terrorist/naxal attacks.

In reply, the Government stated (February 2017) that the proposal for sanction of posts, construction of buildings, procurement of vehicles, procurement of arms & ammunitions etc., is pending with GoUP.

### **8.1.2 Temporary Commando Training School:**

Until the CTS was established and became functional, it was decided (January 2010) that a temporary commando training school be started at New Police Line, Kalli, Lucknow in a Barrack, one block of 12 Type-I residences and one block of 5 Type-II residences. Commando training comprises:

- Pre Induction Course (four week);
- Army Attachment (four week);
- Basic Induction Course (14 week); and
- Advance Course (eight week)

Audit, however, noticed that not a single personnel got full commando training required for becoming a commando. Training in only Pre Induction Course was provided to 228 personnel during 2009-12 whereas no training was provided during 2012-16. Thus, adequate numbers of Commandos have not been trained as planned to effectively handle difficult security situations, such as terrorist attacks etc.

In reply, the Government stated that the required training for commandos have been provided to 228 personnel. Reply is not acceptable as the government did not provide the documentary evidence in supports of its reply.

### **8.1.3 Establishment of commando unit**

At the time of establishment of ATS, it was decided (November 2009) that one company of PAC was to be provided to ATS to support it in performing its assigned duties. At the time when the above decision (November 2009) was taken, four companies of PAC were working as commando companies comprising 508<sup>22</sup> personnel on an *ad-hoc* and interim basis.

Audit, however, observed during audit that proposed commando strength of 2000 was still not sanctioned by the GoUP and only 79 PAC personnel were working with ATS (September 2016) in temporary CTS. Further, only 43 personnel (42 personnel<sup>23</sup> trained in 2009-10 and one constable trained in 2011-12) were working with ATS but no commando who had been trained in temporary CTS was working in either the STF or Security branch.

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<sup>22</sup> Company Commander:1, Platoon Commander:10, Head Constable:88 and Constable:409.

<sup>23</sup> Head Constable:14, Constable:28.

In reply, the Government stated that 103 commandos are posted with ATS. The Government reply itself confirm the audit observation made in this respect.

#### 8.1.4 Manpower

GoUP had sanctioned manpower strength of 264 for ATS when it was established in November 2007. Subsequently, ATS in November 2009, demanded enhancement of its sanctioned strength from 264 to 892 (*Appendix 8.1*) to provide for ATS, CTS and CIAT.



Audit, however, observed that the proposal for increase in manpower was still pending with the Government as of September 2016. Further, in ATS, there were only 217 officials posted against the sanctioned strength of 264. Vacancies were mainly in the cadre of Dy. SP (67 per cent), SI (47 per cent), Constable (20 per cent) and Stenographer (93 per cent) whereas no manpower has been deployed in field unit comprising Junior Scientific Officer, Head Constable (Proficient) and Explosive Expert (*Appendix 8.2*). Such deficiencies in sanctioned manpower of ATS and failure of Government to take a decision on the proposal to strengthen ATS for seven years could have negative security implications.

In reply, the Government confirmed the facts as provided in the audit observation.

#### 8.1.5 Availability of Arms and Requirement of ammunition:

Arm and ammunition are the most crucial requirement for operational activities of a special force like ATS. Audit, however, noticed that ATS did not get ammunitions as per their requirements of ATS. Arms like 9mm MP5, 12 Bore PAG, Hand Grenade, Stun Grenade and UBGL were provided first time to ATS during 2013-15 but ammunition for these weapons were not provided except hand grenade which was also not as per requirement. Further, ammunition for .303 CTN LMG was provided in 2010-11 without availability of the weapon, which resulted in ammunition lying in stock even up to March 2016 (*Appendix 8.3*).

Thus, due to (i) CTS not having been established at Lucknow; (ii) CIAT not taking off at Mirzapur; and (iii) absence of four 'Hubs', the objective to establish a commando unit in the State on the line of National Security Guard (NSG) to combat terrorism is yet to be achieved. Further, not sanctioning manpower, not providing ammunition for weapons etc., indicate that establishment of commando unit on the line of NSG to combat terrorism in the State was not given due priority and seriousness by the Government, which may have negative security implications. Hence, modernisation and strengthening of ATS was not achieved as envisaged and the State remained vulnerable to terrorist activity.

In reply, the Government stated that there are no shortage of arms and ammunition in commando training school. Reply is contradictory to the fact that no commando training has been organised during the last three years.

## 8.2 Provincial Armed Constabulary

Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) was created by UPPAC Act 1948 by amalgamation of military police and special armed constabulary which was meant to deal with extreme cases of violence, communal riots etc. After 1948, PAC was used as parallel force on the pattern of quasi-military force in maintaining law and order. PAC is divided into three zones, seven sections and 33 battalions with 273 companies but only 200 companies are functional at present.

### 8.2.1 Manpower

Availability of manpower 2015-16 in group A officers, Group B Gazetted officers and Group B Non-Gazetted personnel was 42, 57 and 30,216 against the sanctioned strength of 47, 147 and 36,898 respectively. As such, there were shortages of 61 per cent in group B Gazetted officers and 18 per cent in group B non-Gazetted personnel in 2015-16. Availability of manpower decreased from 32,406 in 2011-12 to 30,315 in 2015-16. There was an overall shortage of 18 per cent in PAC. Group 'B' had maximum shortage of 61 per cent and the shortage in Sub-Inspectors level was 72 per cent (*Appendix 8.4*).



No reply to the audit observation was furnished by the Government.

### 8.2.2 Deployment of Manpower


Against the sanctioned strength of 273 companies only 200 companies are functional as on date. Audit noticed that in respect of the remaining 73 companies, 19 companies have not been raised at all and 54 companies though raised have not been functional. It was found that despite large vacancies in the PAC, 246 excess personnel were deployed at Security Head Quarter (782 PAC men were deployed here against sanction of 591). Further, PAC personnel deployed in CBCID, Training institutes, ATS and STS were 143, 797, 86 and 8 against sanctioned strength of nil, 594, nil & nil respectively. 68 PAC personnel (Constable & Head Constable) were deployed for general security as security guards for securing buildings at Lucknow under UP Special Zone Security Vahini since March 2010 without sanction for continuing these posts. PAC Head Quarter had been demanding return of these personnel in view of shortage of manpower.

Acute shortage of PAC manpower against sanctioned strength and deployment of PAC manpower for tasks other than those prescribed for striking force could not only affect the efficiency and morale of the forces but also increase dependence on central para-military forces.

No reply to the audit observation was furnished by the Government.

### 8.2.3 Shortage of vehicles

Mobility is vital for efficient and effective performance of police force and deficiency in mobility should be minimal so that the forces reach the crime spot in the shortest possible time. Scrutiny of records revealed that there were shortages of 145 vehicles (12 per cent) in different categories of vehicles (*Appendix 8.5*). Out of shortfall of 145 vehicles, maximum shortage was in the category of Tata Truck (which was 130). Further, out of available 819 trucks and 276 buses, 322 trucks (39 per cent) and 186 buses (67 per cent) had completed their prescribed life of 15 years but as vehicles were not purchased, PAC was still using these obsolete old vehicles beyond their scheduled life period. Hence, a major part of the fleet of PAC was obsolete and needed replacement/modernisation.



Government in its reply stated (February 2017) that after receipt of 33 vehicles from police headquarter, Allahabad shortage in vehicles was only 112.

### 8.2.4 Funds for procurement of equipment

During 2011-16, an amount of ₹ 43.71 crore was allotted to PAC under MPF Scheme, out of which only ₹ 31.55 crore were utilised. As a result, many sanctioned items could not be procured. Details of allotment, utilisation and surrender were as follows:

**Table 8.1: Allotment and Expenditure**

(₹ in crore)

Year	Demand	Allotment	Expenditure	Surrender
2011-12	NA <sup>24</sup>	20.95	8.95	12.00
2012-13	59.80	13.47	13.45	0.02
2013-14	49.30	3.16	3.15	0.01
2014-15	127.34	5.39	5.29	0.10
2015-16	64.50	0.74	0.72	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>300.94</b>	<b>43.71</b>	<b>31.56</b>	<b>12.15</b>

(Source: PAC Headquarter)

<sup>24</sup> Demand for the year 2011-12 was not provided.

The above table shows that 57 per cent (₹ 12.00 crore) of allotted funds were not utilised and substantial surrender was noticed in 2011-12.

Important equipment viz., body protector with shin elbow guard, polycarbonate shield, polycarbonate *lathi*, bullet proof jacket, bullet proof helmet, 06 lane simulator etc., necessary for the force to maintain law and order were not purchased in 2015-16 although the demand of ₹ 64.50 crore was sent to PHQ for purchase of these equipment. At the end of 2015-16, availability of these important equipment was very low against the need as given in the table below.

**Table 8.2: Shortfall in PAC equipment**

Sl. No.	Equipment	Need	Availability	Shortfall (%)
1.	Body protector with shin guard	30,297	26,916	3,381 (11)
2.	Polycarbonate shield	29,321	28,815	506 (02)
3.	Polycarbonate lathi	27,488	26,078	1,410 (05)
4.	Bullet proof jacket	10,080	1,913	8,167 (81)
5.	Bullet proof helmet	10,080	209	9,871 (98)
6.	Lane simulator	32	1	31 (97)

(Source: PAC Headquarter)

Non-availability of important protective items such as bullet proof jackets, bullet proof helmet, body protector and other equipment would not only reduce the efficiency of the PAC *jawans* in a riot or other violence situation but could also put their life at a risk.

No reply to the audit observation was furnished by the Government.

### 8.2.5 Shortage of Arms

Information regarding availability of arms provided by the PAC Headquarter revealed that there were significant shortages in the main category of Arms. Shortage in 5.56 INSAS LMG, Anti-Riot Gun, Tear Gas Gun, 51 mm mortar and AK 47 Rifle ranged between 33 to 68 per cent (**Appendix 8.6**).

No reply to the audit observation was furnished by the Government.

### 8.3 Special Task Force

Special Task Force (STF) was constituted<sup>25</sup> (May, 1998) with a view to control organized criminals and *Mafias* in coordination with district police. To achieve the assigned objective, STF has the power to collect information regarding crime from any branch of the police and also has the same powers of search, seizure, arrest, custody and other activities as the police officers possesses under the Criminal Procedure Code and other laws.

<sup>25</sup> Vide Government Order no.1889/chh:-pu-2—98-1100(35)/98 dated 4.05.1998.



Special Task Force

### 8.3.1 Shortage of manpower

Scrutiny of records revealed that more than 50 *per cent* of the sanctioned posts were vacant in STF. Total number of sanctioned posts were 472 against which only 234 officers/officials were posted as of March 2016 (*Appendix 8.7*). Such shortage of man power in STF would limit the STF's capability to check and control the organized criminals and mafia activities in the state.

On this being pointed out, Government replied (February, 2017) that consolidated proposal to enhance the sanctioned post has been sent vide letter no. STF-P-34/2016 dated 30.05.2016. So the reply by the Government itself is acceptance of the audit observation.

Further, to take action against *mafias* and organized criminals as envisaged in the Government Order 1998, posts of Superintendent of Police, Additional Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Inspector, sub-Inspector, Head Constable and Constables were created. STF have the availability of only 165 persons (53 *per cent*) against the sanctioned strength of 313 for operational action against Mafias and organized criminals. Scrutiny of the records of STF headquarter revealed that availability of arms against the person in position was more than 260 *per cent* and availability of even single item of pistol/ revolver was more than 170 *per cent*.

Thus, due to acute shortage in functional staff for operation against Mafias and organized criminals arms were lying idle and the objective of the special force was being compromised.

On being pointed out, Govt. replied (February, 2017) that a committee has been constituted to consider the utility/quality of available Arms and small weapons and also regarding the procurement of ultra-modern small weapons. Reply of the Govt. itself is an acceptance of audit observation.

### 8.3.2 Action against *Mafia* and organized criminals:

Government order<sup>26</sup> of 1998 provided that Director General of Police would prepare detailed guidelines to operationalize the general directions given in the

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<sup>26</sup> No.1889/chh:-pu-2-98-1100(35)/98 dated 04.05.1998.

Government Order for functioning of the Special Task Force to take action against mafias and organized crime/criminals.

Audit, however, observed that no guidelines in this regard have been prepared and operationalized by DGP for effective implementation of the Government order (May 1998) to take action against mafias and organized crime/criminals. On being pointed out, STF Headquarter stated that STF was operating as per GO (May 1998) and no detailed guidelines had been prepared by Director General of Police. Hence, even after 18 years of establishment of STF, the detailed guidelines for operationalization of Government Order remain to be prepared and implemented.

On being pointed out, Government did not give any reply (February, 2017) to the audit observation.

### **8.3.3 Deficiencies in weapon management:**

Scrutiny of records of STF Headquarter revealed that Sub-Machine Gun: 20 in May 2013 and Glock Pistol: 16 in Jun 2014 were provided by PHQ to STF without service cartridges. Senior Superintendent of STF raised demand for 2480 service cartridges in August, 2014 and December 2015, but PHQ could not provide the service cartridges as of January, 2016 because these were not available in central reserve at Sitapur. Failure to provide service cartridges for new weapons even after two years indicate serious flaws in the system of procurement and supply of ammunitions to special police forces.

#### ***Recommendation:***

- *The commando training centre (CTS) at Lucknow, Counter Insurgency and Anti-terrorism School (CIAT) at Mirzapur and 'Hubs' should be completed as planned at the earliest by expediting land acquisition and speeding up the progress of construction.*
- *Required manpower, advance weapons and ammunition to ATS should be provided without delay.*
- *Obsolete vehicles of PAC must be replaced.*
- *Procurement of equipment should be expedited by streamlining the procurement process and allocating adequate funds to provide necessary protective items and other arms and ammunitions to PAC to modernise and equip the force adequately to handle riots and other violent situations effectively.*
- *Detailed Guidelines should be prepared to operationalize the Government Order issued in 1998 at the inception of the Special Task force, so as to render it effective.*
- *Deficiencies of man power and arms and ammunitions of STF should be met on priority to modernise and strengthen the force for ensuring effective check and control on organized criminal and mafia activities in the state.*