

Chapter - 6
Conclusion
and
Recommendations

Chapter-6: Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

Despite multi-hazardous risks and occurrence of several disasters in recent past, the steps taken by the State Government to prepare for and mitigate the impact of disasters were not commensurate with the task at hand. There were gaps and deficiencies in institutional arrangements, policy and plan formulation as well as implementation of pre-disaster measures. There was considerable scope for improvement in the management of SDRF funds so as to both augment available resources as well as to ensure its utilization for the intended objectives of disaster preparedness and relief.

The lack of preparedness as well as inadequate institutional mechanisms and processes including internal control and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure efficient and timely relief and rehabilitation on the occurrence of a disaster were self-evident in the disaster relief activities following the drought of 2009, the Leh cloudburst of 2010 and floods of 2014. There were deficiencies and delays in damage and need assessments, diversion of relief funds and delay in reaching relief and assistance to the affected persons/families.

A total of ₹1,369.16 crore had been spent between 2010-11 and 2014-15 from the SDRF. An amount of ₹122.72 crore was diverted from sanctioned works/projects towards or spent on ineligible items/works, ₹62.88 crore remained unutilized, extra expenditure of ₹214.46 crore was incurred on account of excess payment/procurement at higher rate and there was wasteful and unfruitful expenditure of ₹0.86 crore and avoidable expenditure of ₹4.39 crore. Under the Special Plan Assistance, ₹1,000 crore was provided for re-building damaged infrastructure in October 2014. However, ₹4.66 crore was spent in contravention of the SPA conditions and ₹37.58 crore was spent for purposes not related to re-building the damaged infrastructure. Overall, there was a lack of assurance that relief and assistance were provided to the actual beneficiaries in a timely and efficient manner despite availability of financial resources.

6.2 Recommendations

Based on the audit findings, it is recommended that the State Government should:


- *Establish and operationalize the institutional structures and disaster related policies envisaged in the Disaster Management Act, 2005, for efficient and effective management of pre-and post-disaster activities.*
- *Conduct vulnerability, hazard and risks assessment especially in the 13 multi-hazard districts and prepare risk maps that would enable formulation of informed strategies and prioritization of resources for disaster preparedness including an early warning system.*
- *Ensure that personnel of the State Disaster Response Force undergo the*

mandatory trainings in a time bound manner and that they are thereafter used solely for the intended purpose.

- *Formulate and implement a time bound plan for capacity building including promotion of general awareness and community training and building capacity to combat disasters as an important pre-disaster activity.*
- *Strengthen the mechanisms for pre-release scrutiny and post-release monitoring of SDRF funds to ensure that funds are released and utilized only for the purpose of providing relief to persons affected by disasters and are not diverted for other purposes.*
- *Strengthen mechanisms for monitoring movement and distribution of financial assistance and relief materials to ensure that they reach the intended duly identified beneficiaries. Procedures should also be in place for accountability of administrative officials for any unjustified diversions or avoidable losses.*


The audit findings were referred to the Government in May 2016. The response of the Government was awaited (July 2016).

Srinagar/Jammu
The 31st August 2016


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Countersigned

New Delhi
The 31st August 2016


(Shashi Kant Sharma)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India