Chapter 6 State of Preparation of Indian Railways

6.1 Surprise Inspection of High Risk Railway Stations

With a view to examine the preparedness and alertness of security staff and the security equipments provided at railway stations, Audit conducted surprise check at one station categorised as high risk in each zone on one day in collaboration with officers of RPF in January/ February 2011. The surprise check of 15 stations revealed the following:

- Out of 137 authorised gates there were 41 gates without any DFMDs installed. Out of these 41 gates only 59 per cent were found to be manned by RPF /GRP personnel. Checking of passengers was being carried out in only 3 stations.
- There were 106 unauthorised entry points at these 15 stations. No security personnel were deployed at these entrances except at Sealdah where 10 personnel were deployed against 50 entrances.
- Out of a total of 96 DFMDs provided over 15 stations, 32 per cent were found to be non-functional.
- Baggage scanners were provided at only 5 stations
- Out of a total of 470 CCTVs /Cameras /monitors provided at stations, 76 (16 per cent) were not found to be in working condition. Further, no CCTVs were found provided in 2 stations.

Position checked on some of the important stations is indicated below:-

Sealdah Station of Eastern Railway was inspected on 24-1-2011. Nearly 68 per cent of the DFMDs provided were not working. Against 50 unauthorised entries at this station, only 10 security personnel were deployed.



Unrestricted entry point at Sealdah station in ER

Entry without DFMD and Baggage scanner at Sealdah station in ER

Jharsuguda Station of SE Railway (lies in Maoist affected territory) was inspected on 31-1-2011 has several unauthorised entry points. There were no DFMDs installed since the two provided became out of order and were sent for repair in November 2010. There were no baggage scanners or CCTVs at this station.



Mumbai CST station of Central Railway, which was targeted by terrorists in November 2008 was inspected on 28-01-2011. This station still has 7 unauthorised unguarded entry points. Though it has 28 DFMDs installed, there are only two baggage scanners.



Unrestricted entry at Mumbai station in CR

The Chennai Egmore station of Southern Railway inspected on 24-1-2011, has five unauthorised and unguarded entry points and three gates without DFMDs, out of which only one was manned by security personnel but no frisking was done on that gate too. It was also found that out of 29 CCTV cameras provided at the station, 12 were not working. The TV scanners were also not placed correctly.



Inspection of Surat station in WR on 27-01-2011 revealed that no DFMDs or Baggage Scanners were provided at the entrances. At this station, there were six authorised and six unauthorised entry points, none of which was manned by security personnel. Further, 20 of the 46 CCTV/Cameras/Monitors provided at the station were not working.



Unrestricted entry at Surat station in WR

At Patna station of ECR which was inspected on 28-01-2011 there was no luggage scanner and none of the six DFMDs provided were working. Further 29 of the 48 CCTV/Cameras/Monitors provided at the station were not working.





No baggage scanner at entry point at Patna station in ECR

Gap near DFMD at Patna station in ECR

➢ Hyderabad station in SCR was inspected on 01-2-2011. It was seen that one out of four DFMDs was not functioning and the station had no baggage scanner installed on it. Further, six gates on this station were not equipped with DFMDs and were not even guarded by the security personnel.



Non functional DFMD and gaps near DFMD at Hyderabad station in SCR


Allahabad station of NCR which was inspected on 25-01-2011, had no baggage scanner and DFMD installed and the five unauthorised entry points were not even manned by the security personnel.



Unguarded entry at Allahabad station in NCR

Unguarded/ unauthorized entry at Allahabad station in NCR

Bhubaneswar station in ECoR was inspected on 25-01-2011. The station has four unauthorised and unguarded entry points. At two gates there were no guards or DFMDs. The only DFMD provided at one gate was not working. Further, the station has no CCTV/Cameras/Monitors installed on it.





Unrestricted entry at Bhubaneswar station in ECoR

Entry point without DFMD and baggage scanner at Bhubaneswar station in ECoR

At Jammu Tawi station of NR (inspected on 01-02-2011), two out of four baggage scanners available at the stations were not working. Two out of three DFMDs provided at the station were found switched off at the time of inspection.



Non functional DFMD at Jammu station in NR

Guwahati station in NFR which was inspected on 25-01-2011, had one out of four DFMDs and two out of 16 CCTVs not working. There were two unauthorised entry points which were not even guarded.



Unguarded entry point at Guwahati in NEFR

Ajmer station in NWR was inspected on 24-01-2011 and it was seen that there was no baggage scanner at the station and one out of two DFMDs provided at station was not working. This station was found to be having five unauthorised entry points which were not even guarded by security personnel.





Unauthorised entry point at Ajmer Station in NWR

Unauthorised entry point at Ajmer Station in NWR

Raipur station of SECR was inspected on 24-1-2011. All the five DFMDs provided were not working. Against two unauthorised entry points at this station, no security personnel were deployed. There were no baggage scanners available.







Unguarded entry to platform at Raipur station in SECR

In SWR, at Bangalore station (inspected on 25-01-2011) three out of five DFMDs installed were not working. Further, no baggage scanner was installed at the station and five out of the 40 CCTVs were not working. The station had 17 unauthorised entry points and the same were found to be unguarded.



Entry point without DFMD at Bangalore in SWR (DFMD sent for repair)



Some of the CCTVs not working at Bangalore in SWR

This inspection indicates the lack of seriousness in the approach of the Indian Railways towards security of its passengers. No attempt has been made by

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them to control access to even high risk stations which are the first step towards ensuring security. The surveillance equipment installed is either faulty or incorrectly placed resulting in gaps in the system.

IR in its reply (July 2011) stated that security along with other concerns is one of the priority areas of Railways for strengthening and up gradation. Short Term and Long Term plans have been formulated for infrastructural strengthening and legal empowerment of RPF. Concrete steps have been taken as enshrined in Vision 2020 of Indian Railways for synchronization of technology and human resource to provide effective security over Indian Railways. It further added that the security of passengers is one of the primary concerns of railways and all out efforts are being taken for optimum utilization of available resources to provide adequate security to passengers.

However, keeping in view the results of surprise check, IR need to take concrete steps to plug the loop holes in its security system.

Recommendation

A paradigm shift in the approach towards security by IR is required. Simple low cost measures like closure of unauthorized entry/exit points need to be emphasized. Serious efforts are required to be made for securing entry /exit points and proper maintenance of the existing security equipments installed at the stations in order to ensure safe and secure rail operations.

New Delhi Dated: (T.K. SANYAL) Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General

Countersigned

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