

PREFACE

This Report (No.14 of 2011-12- Performance Audit for the year ended 31 March 2010) has been prepared for submission to the President under Article 151 (1) of the Constitution of India. The report contains results of the review of Security Management in Indian Railways.

The observations included in this Report have been based on the findings of the test-audit conducted during 2009-10 as well as the results of audit conducted in earlier years, which could not be included in the previous Reports.

Abbreviations used in the Report

IR	Indian Railways
CR	Central Railway
ER	Eastern Railway
ECR	East Central Railway
ECoR	East Coast Railway
NR	Northern Railway
NCR	North Central Railway
NER	North Eastern Railway
NFR	Northeast Frontier Railway
NWR	North Western Railway
SR	Southern Railway
SCR	South Central Railway
SER	South Eastern Railway
SECR	South East Central Railway
SWR	South Western Railway
WR	Western Railway
WCR	West Central Railway
RPU	Railway Production Units
FIR	First Information Report
RPF	Railway Protection Force
GRP	Government Railway Police

PREFACE

This Report (No.14 of 2011-12- Performance Audit for the year ended 31 March 2010) has been prepared for submission to the President under Article 151 (1) of the Constitution of India. The report contains results of the review of Security Management in Indian Railways.

The observations included in this Report have been based on the findings of the test-audit conducted during 2009-10 as well as the results of audit conducted in earlier years, which could not be included in the previous Reports.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I Security Scenario on Indian Railways

Incidents of sabotage on the Indian Railways (IR) have increased in frequency and intensity in the last five years. This along with frequent disruptions in rail traffic during agitations has seriously affected the public's faith in the Railway system to provide basic security to its passengers. The rail network spread over 64015 route kilometres with 7030 stations traverses both dense urban areas and sparsely populated rural areas and forest which are difficult to secure. The expenditure per passenger on security worked out to only `2.86 approximately for 2009-10.

Traditionally, the Railway Protection Force has been responsible for the security of railway assets and the state government for the enforcement of law and order. They are responsible for the security of passengers and their belongings as also that of trains, tracks, bridges and railway premises against sabotage. The state government is represented by the Government Railway Police in stations and trains and by the state police outside the station premises. The security of passengers and passenger area was also entrusted to the Railway Protection Force in 2003 through an amendment. The main purpose behind the amendment of the RPF Act was to supplement the efforts of the state governments for ensuring security of passengers.

II Why did we take up this Audit?

The terrorist attack at Mumbai Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal (Mumbai CST) in November 2008 and a couple of major incidents of sabotage in the recent past including the derailment of the Jnaneswari Express in May 2010 (which resulted in the death of 150 passengers) highlight the problems of railway security. The number of accidents on Indian Railways attributed to sabotage increased from six in 2005-06 to fourteen in 2009-10. In view of the increased security threat, Audit felt it necessary to assess the security concerns of Indian Railways.

Security Management in Indian Railways was earlier reviewed by Audit and results included in Paragraph 2.2 of Report No.9 of 2000 (Railways) of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. In this report, Audit had highlighted the need to evolve a unified overseeing arrangement which is absent as RPF, an armed force under the control of the Railways was mainly concerned with protection of railway properties. On the other hand the State Government is responsible for maintaining law and order. The Report emphasised that the system of coordination that existed on paper between RPF and GRP at the operating level and between the Railway Administration and state governments at headquarters level has been weak in implementation. The current Report reveals that many of the issues pointed in the earlier Audit Report still persist.

III Current Report

This Performance Audit was aimed at evaluating the existing system for securing passengers and Railway property viz. tracks, bridges as well as other fixed structures including office buildings, stations etc. This Performance Audit also analyses the strategy to control crimes at railway stations and in running trains. It also assesses the preparedness of the Indian Railways to handle the enhanced threat environment.

This Performance Audit revealed that co-ordination between the RPF and the State Government is inadequate leading to large gaps in the security system of the Railways. The issue of inter-agency coordination had also been highlighted in earlier Audit Report on Security management.

There is a distinct lack of security consciousness on the part of the Railway Administration, despite recommendations of the High Level Committee on Composite Security Plan. Adequate efforts have not been made to control access to railway stations and to decongest even sensitive high risk station, unnecessarily increasing the security risk as in almost all the 74 stations test checked entry into the station premises was unrestricted because of multiple entry/exit points. The Integrated Security System (ISS) formulated in July 2008 still remains to be implemented in any of the zones (March 2011). Progress on installation of state of the art electronic surveillance system viz Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMDs) and baggage scanners, has been slow and not up to international standards. Majority of trains were run without escort and in a number of cases the escort party was unarmed.

Crime against passengers has increased by 15 per cent during the last five years. Further, registration of crime committed on moving trains is plagued by number of problems. FIR forms were still not available with coach attendants, conductors and guards of several trains. Further, non registration of cases received from other State GRPs, general reluctance to take up investigations and considerable overlap of functions existing between the RPF and the State Government agencies handling Railway security has made it difficult to complete the legal formalities besides adding to victim's problems

Indian Railways has also failed to formulate any composite plan in consultation with the State Governments for ensuring security of its assets. Crime rate witnessed a distinct rise in the last five years. Deployment of RPF at Railway Stations, trains and Goods shed/Yards has not been modified despite a considerable increase in crime rate at these places.

Railway tracks are one of the most important Railway assets and their security is of prime importance for securing rail traffic. Security of tracks and bridges is the responsibility of State Governments. As a precautionary measure the Railway Administration carries out patrolling of track in sabotage prone areas. However, patrolling of track was being carried out sporadically on the basis of threat perception and availability of manpower. The State Police have been frequently unsuccessful in preventing large scale disruption to rail

traffic during the periods of agitation by specific groups like the Gujjar agitation and the recent Jat agitation.

Security related crisis on the railways call for better co-ordinating arrangement with other agencies for their expertise to deal with disaster like situation. Control rooms with communication facilities remained to be provided (June 2010) in all divisions of three zones (NR, ER and WR).

There was shortage of manpower to the extent of 13.16 per cent in security forces. The IR failed to redeploy man power prioritizing core operations which could have reduced the requirement of additional manpower. Both the IR and the State Governments did not respond promptly in filling up the existing vacancies for meeting the challenge of increased security threat. Railways were reluctant to outsource security even in non core areas to private agencies. The existing training facilities were frequently underutilized.

This Performance Audit revealed the low priority attached to security by IR as per passenger expenditure on security is only ` 2.86.

IV Major Audit Findings

➤ Audit conducted across the zones indicated that the issues regarding inter-agency co-ordination (between the RPF and the GRP and /or state police) pointed out by audit in its earlier Audit Report are still persisting, despite remedial action taken by the Railways. The increase in the number of accidents due to sabotage and the recent successful Rail Roko agitations indicate the need for greater cooperation and coordination between the IR and the State Governments.

(Para 2.3.1)

➤ There were large gaps in the security system formulated for ensuring passenger security at stations. The Integrated Security System (ISS) formulated in July 2008 for ensuring passenger security at stations had large gaps. Boundary walls/fencing of railway stations and provision of adequate lighting at stations was excluded from its purview. The ISS was to be implemented on 137 station by March 2010 but still remains to be implemented in any of the zones (March 2011).

(Paras 3.2.1, 3.2.3 and 3.2.5)

➤ In the context of enlarging dimensions of terrorist threat to IR's network, Security management on the IR requires a paradigm shift in attitude. No effort has been made to control access to stations. The unauthorised and/ or multiple entry /exit points on railway stations have not been closed. Thus, railway stations remain easily accessible to passengers and non-passengers alike. Even sensitive high risk stations, have not been decongested, unnecessarily increasing security risk. A test check in audit revealed that 30 per cent of the authorised entry points on the 74 stations checked in Audit were not guarded by security personnel. Further, installation of state of the art electronic surveillance system had been slow and not up to international standards. DFMDs and baggage scanners had not been installed at a

large number of exit/entry points at even the high risk stations checked by audit.

(Para 3.2)

- *For protection of railway passengers the IR provides escorts to various trains. However, train escort was provided to only thirty-two per cent of the train services provided per day. A test check by audit revealed that a number of prestigious trains like the Mumbai Rajdhani etc. and even some trains passing through naxalite affected/dacoity prone areas were unescorted. Audit observed that even the escorted trains ran unprotected at several intervals. No norms /guidelines were framed regarding the size of the escort party, whether it should be armed and which trains were to be escorted. The local Railway Administration decided the trains to be escorted based on manpower availability, threat perception, and importance of the train.*

(Para 3.3.4)

- *The present mechanism for handling passenger related crime on a moving train is not effective as the jurisdiction of occurrence of the crime is not identifiable leading to problems in registering of cases. Despite orders of 1997, FIR forms are still not available with coach attendants, conductors and guards of several trains.*

(Paras 3.3.2)

- *Study conducted across the zones indicated that total crime rate has more than doubled in the last five years. Railway Stations, trains and Goods shed/Yards were found to be most vulnerable to crime. However the Railway Administration failed to redeploy the RPF in accordance with the increase in crime rates.*

(Para 4.4.1)

- *Indian Railways has not formulated any composite plan in consultation with the state governments for ensuring safety and security of its assets especially tracks and bridges and Over Head Equipment (OHE). Instructions introducing patrolling in sabotage prone areas (February 2003) in co-ordination with the State Government were not being uniformly implemented. Further, the State Police have been frequently unsuccessful in preventing large scale disruption to rail traffic during periods of agitation. From April to December 2010, there have been 115 cases of 'rail roko' agitations, a few of which were spread over a period of three weeks leading to cancellation /diversion or rescheduling of several passenger and freight trains besides loss of revenue.*

(Paras 4.1.1 and 4.3)

- *Security related crisis on the railways calls for a better co-ordinating arrangement with other agencies for their expertise to handle disaster like situations. Audit scrutiny revealed that full scale disaster*

management exercise was not conducted in SER during 2008-10 except once each at Hatia- Muri section and Rourkela.

(Para 5.1)

- *The shortage of staff in all categories of railway security forces declined from nineteen to eleven percent during the period 2005-10. However, shortages in the GRP increased from six to sixteen per cent during the same period. Though, the number of vacancies remained large, no effort was made to reorganise available manpower prioritizing core areas. The existing training facilities were frequently incomplete and consequently remained underutilized. Upgrading the training facilities was not given serious thought.*

(Para 5.3.1 and 5.4.2)

V Gist of Recommendations

- *Indian Railways needs to evolve mechanism for effective co-ordination between the agencies handling Railway Security viz Railway Protection Force, Government Railway Police and State police.*
- *Since the State Government is responsible for maintenance for law and order, an institutional mechanism needs to be evolved to ensure greater cooperation and coordination with the State Governments.*
- *Urgent steps need to be taken to decongest railway stations especially those in sabotage prone areas and large cities. Stations need to be properly secured by constructing boundary wall /fencing, and restricting unauthorised entry. IR needs to ensure time bound implementation of Integrated Security System (ISS)*
- *An effective arrangement needs to be worked out by the Railway Administration with the State Government Authorities regarding the following issues:-*
 - *For handling railway related crime an effective mechanism needs to be worked out especially where the jurisdiction of crime is not identifiable.*
 - *To ensure that a larger number of trains are escorted, better coordination between the RPF and GRP is required. Coordination between GRP authorities in neighbouring states also needs to be improved to ensure that trains run continuously with escort.*
- *It is essential that IR work out an arrangement with the State Government Authorities for adequate steps to intensify track patrolling and institutionalise the co-ordination mechanism with the State Government authorities to ensure security of passengers and running of trains in sabotage prone areas.*
- *The Indian Railways needs to integrate railway disaster management infrastructure with those of civil authorities, armed forces etc. The*

current arrangement of co-ordination for rescue and relief operations with civil authorities need to be further strengthened. Better use needs to be made of infrastructure available with the armed forces like use of hover craft etc.

- *A paradigm shift in the approach towards security by IR is required. Simple low cost measures like closure of unauthorized entry/exit points need to be emphasized. Serious efforts are required to be made for securing entry /exit points and proper maintenance of the existing security equipments installed at the stations to ensure secured rail operations*

Chapter 1 → Introduction

1.1 Terrorist attacks on the Indian Railway system have increased in frequency and intensity in the last five years. Despite a decline in the number of accidents on the IR between 2005 and 2010, the number of accidents attributed to sabotage has increased. These accidents resulted in death of 67 passengers and injuries to another 253 in 2010 itself.

Systems of surface transportation like buses and trains are systems of mass public transportation and hence need to remain easily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive for the traveling public. Railways have several unique features making them inherently vulnerable to attack. Railway facilities rely on open architecture and easy movement of passengers in the railway stations and to and from trains. Due to large number of passengers, the number of entry and exit points in a railway station is also large. In addition, the railway networks traverse through high density urban areas that offer easy accessibility for attack and easy escape as well as vast rural and forest areas that are difficult to patrol and secure. Disruption in the transportation of freight can lead to a dislocation of supplies in a particular area as well as environmental problems in case of sabotage of rakes used to transport hazardous materials. Features used to secure airports and airplanes like passenger screening, and the elaborate deployments of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosives sniffers, hand searchers, and armed guards cannot be transferred easily to railway stations.

A large number of casualties along with disruptions to transit seriously impact the public's faith in the government's ability to provide basic protection to its citizens. No security system can stop determined terrorists from attacking public places. Nevertheless, good security measures can make terrorist operations more difficult, increase the terrorists' likelihood of being detected and identified and keep casualties and disruptions to a minimum.

1.2 Security Issues on Indian Railways

An Indian railway station is typically overcrowded and easy to penetrate and attack. Substantial casualties can easily be inflicted with a Bomb attack. Further the railway track passes through vast stretches of forests and rural areas. These areas are difficult to patrol and provide protection to. Being a symbol of the central government, the Indian Railways (IR) are the focus of acts of vandalism and are an easy target of a number of agitations against the government –whether the state or the central government. Rail Roko agitations are an integral part of the protest movement of a number of agitations. Terrorists/ agitators perceive substantial psychological benefits in attacking Rail property and passengers. An attack is likely to leave passengers reluctant, however temporarily, to travel on the Railways. Providing security adds both to cost and travel time.

The IR carry around 19 million passengers and around 2.28 million tonnes of freight traffic daily on a network spread over 64015 route kilometres with 7030 stations. It is one of the largest carriers of passengers and freight in the world.

There is a substantial heightened threat perception to the Indian Railways due to increase in frequency of incidents of sabotage on railway tracks by terrorist/naxalite especially in Northeast Frontier/Jammu & Kashmir and Left Wing extremist affected states and numerous acts of agitators to deliberately disrupt rail traffic and hold governments to ransom. A couple of major accidents in the recent past including the derailment of the Rajdhani Express in Bihar in March 2010 due to a bomb explosion and the derailment of the Jnaneswari Express and collision with a goods train running on the opposite track in May 2010 highlight the problems of railway security.


1.3 Security Management System on Indian Railways

Security on the IR is the joint responsibility of three agencies –

- i) Railway Protection Force (RPF) and the Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF- a specialized armed wing). Both these forces are under the administrative control of the Railway authorities. The RPF and RPSF primarily deal with the protection of railway property. Since the year 2003, security of passengers and passenger area has also been entrusted to the RPF.
- ii) Government Railway Police (GRP) which is under the administrative control of the respective State Governments. This is a wing of the State Police which exclusively deals with prevention and detection of crime and maintenance of law and order on station premises/passenger areas and trains.
- iii) The State Police under the respective State Governments. The state police deal with the security of tracks and bridges over the Indian Railways and the law and order problems beyond the outer signals of the railway stations.

Thus active co-operation and co-ordination between the IR and the State Governments is essential to ensure safety and security on Indian Railways.

ORGANISATIONAL CHART



1.4 Other Reports /Studies

Standing Committee on Railways of the 11th Lok Sabha had noted in its report (No.3 of 1996-97) that neglect of safety and security in the trains had been of great concern to the commuting passengers and that there was hardly any co-ordination among different agencies.

The Standing Committee on Railways (2009-10) of the 15th Lok Sabha in its Eighth Report presented to the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in August 2010 observed that the issue of protection and security of Railway property and passengers was of crucial concern and needed urgent coordinated action. The report further stated that utmost priority should be accorded for the protection and security of Railway property and passengers to enable the Railways to achieve the targets they themselves have set, and compete with the best globally so as to provide world class railway services. It recommended that steps be taken to ensure safety of staff and passengers. The report assumes significance in the wake of heightened security scenario in the country, particularly with Terrorists and Maoist guerrillas repeatedly targeting trains.

1.5 Previous Audit Report

Security Management in Indian Railways was earlier reviewed by Audit and results included in Paragraph 2.2 of Report No.9 of 2000 (Railways) of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. In this report Audit had highlighted following weaknesses in the security system of the Railways:-

- The Performance Audit pointed out the need to evolve a strong unified overseeing arrangement which is absent as two distinct agencies are responsible for security on IR. RPF, an armed force under the control of the Railways is mainly concerned with protection of railway properties including booked consignments. On the other hand the state police including the GRP, is responsible for the security of passengers and their belongings as also that of the trains, tracks, bridges and railway premises.
- The Report highlighted that despite orders issued by IR that First Information Report's (FIR) forms are made available on trains; these were not available in over 75 per cent of the checked cases.
- The Performance Audit highlighted the decline in detection of cases involving loss of property. So far as compensation claims cases in respect of booked consignment were concerned, only eight per cent of such cases were registered with RPF for investigation. There was an overall decline in cases registered for dacoity /robbery but a sharp rise in the cases of murder and theft of passenger belongings.
- Implementation of scheme for modernization of RPF involving procurement of metal detectors, wireless communication system, bullet proof jackets, mobile HF sets etc. had made little progress.

In their Action Taken Note on this report, Ministry of Railways stated that by and large, the Security System on the Railways was functioning smoothly. Ministry further added the following:-

- Registration, prevention and investigation of crime cases are the responsibility of GRP. Ministry brought out that regular meetings are held between GRP and RPF authorities. The progress of investigation/prosecution and the disposal of the cases of dacoity/ robbery, murder registered by the GRP is not reported to IR.
- It was brought out that running staff like Coach Attendants, guards, RPF/GRP conduct checks regarding availability of FIR forms on trains in coordination with the commercial branch over all zones.
- Decline in detection of cases involving loss of property was attributed to deterioration in law and order situation. They added that the percentage of detection of cases has improved in the last five years.
- Regarding modernisation of security forces, the Ministry stated that procurement of new weapons, new gadgets like bomb disposal kit, wireless communication system and electronic devices is an ongoing process. The training curriculum of RPF personnel has also been revised and updated to impart new professional skills.

1.6 Budget Allotment and Expenditure

The final grant and actual expenditure in respect of the Security Department for the period 2005-06 to 2009-10 was as follows:

(Figures in crore of rupees)

Year	Final Grant	Actual Expenditure	Savings	Percentage of savings
2005-06	1014.56	959.28	55.28	5.45
2006-07	1029.42	936.47	92.95	9.03
2007-08	1217.98	1099.45	118.53	9.73
2008-09	1820.92	1592.68	228.24	12.53
2009-10	2138.60	2110.73	27.87	1.30
Total	7221.48	6698.61	522.87	7.24

Figures supplied by Zonal Railways

The priority accorded to security in the IR can be inferred from the fact that over the last five years only ` 6698.61 crore has been spent. This includes salary expenditure of ` 5882 crore (89 per cent of total expenditure). It is seen that expenditure incurred on security was more than double in 2009-10 as compared to the expenditure of 2005-06 with the steepest increase occurring in the last two years. Nevertheless, this expenditure comprised only 2.55 per cent of the total expenditure of Indian Railways during the year 2009-10. The expenditure per passenger on security worked out to only ` 2.86 approximately for 2009-10. Further, the Security Department surrendered funds ranging from 1.30 to 12.53 per cent of allotted funds during 2005-10.

1.7 Audit Objectives

Security is the degree of protection against danger, damage, loss and criminal activity. There are structures and processes that provide or improve security. This performance audit covers issues pertaining to security of railway passengers and railway property and covers a period of 5 years from 2005-06 to 2009-10. Audit has attempted an analysis and evaluation of the existing security system, the protection objectives and upgrades required in the security environment. The objectives of the performance audit were to evaluate the security system set up by the IR to obtain reasonable assurance regarding:-

- Adequacy of the follow-up action on the earlier Audit Report; and examination of the legal provisions governing security on IR.
- Protection of passengers and their belongings including strategy to control crimes at stations and in running trains.
- Safety of Railway property viz. tracks, bridges as well as other fixed structures including office buildings, yards, workshops and Production units
- Preparedness of Indian Railways to handle the enhanced threat environment

1.8 Audit coverage of the issue

This Performance Audit covers a period of five years from 2005-06 to 2009-10. This performance audit covers issues pertaining to security of railway

passengers and railway property. Details of the methodology followed and period covered has been indicated in [Annexure I](#)

1.9 Sample selection

While the overall position was reviewed for the Indian Railways as a whole (zone-wise), detailed study was restricted to two/three divisions in each zone as indicated in [Annexure II](#). Details of sample selected is summarised below:-

- Records of a total of 33 divisions were reviewed. Security arrangements provided, such as escorts by armed security personnel in moving trains, arrangement of registering passenger complaints etc., in 10 trains in each zone (total 164 trains) involving mainly night journey were also reviewed.
- Progress of implementation of Integrated Security System has been analyzed in respect of 41 out of 202 stations.
- In addition, a detailed study of security arrangements at 74 important stations on Indian Railways, such as provision of access control system, provision of adequate DFMDs, deployment of security personnel, provision of CCTV etc., was also done.
- Security arrangements at one workshop (19 workshops), GM's Office (15 GM's offices), hospital (17 hospitals), PRS servers (8 PRS servers) and yard (22 yards) in each zone were reviewed.

1.10 Acknowledgement

The audit objectives, scope of study and methodology were discussed with Director General /Railway Protection Force, Adviser /Finance at Railway Board as well as with General Managers /concerned departmental heads in the zones by the Principal Directors of Audit during entry conferences. The inputs provided on various aspects including the suggestions on sample selection and the cooperation extended by railways is acknowledged with thanks. The audit findings and recommendations were discussed with Director General RPF in an exit conference held in July 2011 in Railway Board. Similar exit conferences were also held by the Principal Directors of Audit in the zones, with concerned zonal authorities.

Chapter 2 → Adequacy of the Follow-up action on the Audit Report and legal provisions governing the security agencies

Government of India is responsible for the Railway system as the Railways are included in the Union List of the Constitution of India. However, item 1 and 2 of the State list in Schedule VII of the Constitution of India makes the State Government responsible for maintenance for law and order on IR.

Traditionally, the RPF has been responsible for the security of railway assets and the State Government for maintaining law and order. The responsibility for maintaining law and order within the station premises and on trains is handled by the Government Railway Police (GRP) under the control of the State Police. Law and order outside the station premises is the responsibility of the State Police.

The State Governments share the cost of the GRP equally with the Railways. Thus active co-operation and co-ordination between the IR and the State Governments is essential for the safety and security of Indian Railways. This cooperation is inherent with numerous risks and lack of proper coordination between the concerned agencies. RPF has no control over the functioning of GRP as GRP is controlled by State Government.

2.1 Role of RPF

RPF {including its specialized armed wing Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF)} under the administrative control of Railway authorities primarily deals with the protection of railway property. The RPF was constituted under the Railway Protection Force Act 1957 as amended from time to time. The RPF is empowered under the Railway Act, 1989 to deal with offences such as alarm chain pulling, roof top travelling, touting, ticketless travel, unlawful possession of railway property etc. The RPF Act and the Railway Act were modified by Parliament vide Act 52 of 2003 which entrusted RPF with the following additional duties:

- i) To protect and safeguard railway property, passenger area and passengers.
- ii) To remove any obstruction in the movement of Railway property or passengers and
- iii) To do any other act conducive to the better protection and security of railway property, passenger area and passengers.

The main purpose of the amendment was to empower the RPF to deal with minor offences which directly relate to the Railways and to supplement the efforts of the state governments to reinforce the security of the passengers and passenger area on the IR. The RPF has now been empowered to arrest, investigate and prosecute for offences covered under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act and the Railway Act. The RPF is also empowered to arrest any person without an order from a magistrate and without an arrest

warrant. However, under section 12 of the RPF Act, the person so arrested has to be handed over to a police officer/police station with a detailed report of the circumstances leading to the arrest.

Besides the above duties the salient features of the mission statement and objectives of RPF towards security include:-

- Act as a bridge between the Government Railway Police/local police and the IR.
- Adopt proactively all modern technology, best human rights practices, management techniques and special measures for protection of female and elderly passengers and the children, in pursuit of these objectives.

2.2 Role of GRP /District Police

The role and responsibilities of the security forces under the State Government consisting of both GRP and District Police are divided as follows:

- The District Police is responsible for the law and order problems beyond the outer signals of railway stations. They are also responsible for protecting trains, track, bridges and Railway premises against sabotage.
- The GRP is responsible for the law and order problems between the outer signals of the stations and prevention and detection of crime [not covered by the Railway Property {Unlawful Possession} Act and the Railway Act] on the station premises and on trains. This includes control of passenger and vehicular traffic in station precincts; maintenance of order in passenger trains. In addition GRP is also required to enquire into accidents on railways.

2.3 Coordination between Railways and the State Government

The Performance Audit on Security Management in Indian Railways included in Paragraph 2.2 of Report No.9 of 2000 (Railways) of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India had highlighted the need to evolve a unified overseeing arrangement which is absent as RPF, an armed force under the control of the Railways was mainly concerned with protection of railway properties including booked consignments. On the other hand the GRP which is functioning under the control of the respective State Governments is responsible for the security of passengers and their belongings as also that of the trains, tracks, bridges and railway premises. The Report emphasised that the system that exists on paper for coordination between RPF and GRP at operating levels and between the IR and state governments at headquarters level has been weak in implementation.

In their action take note on this report, Ministry of Railways stated that regular meetings were held between GRP and RPF authorities. It added that the cases of crime on the IR were registered and investigated by the GRP which functions under the concerned State Government. The progress of investigation/prosecution and the disposal of the cases of dacoity/ robbery, murders registered by the GRP were however, not reported to IR.

The current Performance Audit examines the coordination between the IR and the State Government and its agencies. These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs:-

2.3.1 Coordination between RPF and GRP

The existing mechanism of policing is not effective in handling railway related crime, where the affected party (passenger) and the offender are both mobile. Problems exist especially in passenger security as a train passes through many state boundaries in a short time leading to changes in jurisdiction of the GRP and state police and consequent problems in registration of cases and investigation of crime. The RPF being centrally organised does not have any problem of jurisdiction but has no authority in handling security of passengers. Thus the mechanism for handling passenger related crime in a moving train is not effective as jurisdiction of occurrence of the crime is generally not identifiable.

The previous Audit Report on Security Management had pointed that FIR forms were not available on trains in many cases. Audit observed that this problem was still continuing. This issue is discussed in detail in Para 3.3.1.

As per the guidelines of IR, meetings at regular intervals are to be held between RPF and GRP to coordinate their efforts in providing security to passengers. The Action Taken Note of the Ministry of Railways on the previous Audit Report had stated that regular meetings between RPF and GRP were being held. Audit however, observed that in NWR, meetings between RPF and GRP were not held during the last five years. In other zones, though the meetings were being held regularly, minutes of all meetings were not drawn indicating a relaxed attitude towards co-ordination.

Further, there is continued lack of coordination between the GRP and RPF on many issues especially regarding escorting of trains leading to duplicity of manpower deployed. In trains escorted only by the GRP, problem of inter-state jurisdiction arises leading to large gaps in train escort function of the GRP. This issue has been discussed in detail at **Para 3.3.4.**

Due to overlapping functions there is considerable duplicity in manpower deployment as both deploy independently clerks, guards etc. Audit observed that at major railway stations both the RPF and GRP have their police stations (*thanas*). In a test check it was seen that at 525 stations in 15 zones both these forces have their respective thanas. Though, both the RPF and GRP have distinctive functions, to remove confusion and harassment of complainants, only one agency should be made responsible for registration of cases. This will also result in saving of public money to some extent which is being spent on maintenance of double establishments.

In spite of the fact, that 50 per cent of the cost of GRP is reimbursed by the Railways to the concerned State Government, the IR has no control over the functioning of GRP. This indicates a distinct need to evolve a strong unified overseeing arrangement.

IR in its reply stated that coordination mechanism exists for regular meeting between GRP & RPF at the Station, Divisional, Zonal and Board level. Visiting officers of RPF from Board/Zonal Railways hold interaction with State Police Authorities. Issues relating to deployment of Police personnel, security of tracks etc. are discussed during such meetings and follow up actions taken though it may not be possible to issue minutes on all such occasions.

Coordination mechanism with GRP/State Police Authorities and Central Intelligence Agencies has been stepped up with nomination of permanent representative from RPF to attend meetings of Multi Agency Centre (MAC) at central level and State Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) at state level.

Regarding escorting of trains, keeping in view the vulnerability of section, threat perception and other local factors, Zonal Railways, in consultation with concerned GRP authorities have demarcated trains for escorting by RPF and GRP. The trains are either escorted by RPF or GRP in any particular section. Duplicity of resources on this account has been avoided to ensure optimum utilization of available manpower. IR also stated that the worst affected trains are generally escorted by RPF and GRP jointly in vulnerable area which is contrary to what is stated above.

2.3.2 Coordination between RPF and State Government

Cooperation and coordination between the state governments and Railways is essential to ensure obstruction free movement of trains. The previous Audit Report on Security management had highlighted the weakness in coordination between the IR and the State Governments. Audit observed that instructions regarding patrolling of railway tracks and bridges issued by Railway Board in February 2003 in sabotage prone areas directed the Zonal Railways to set up suitable machinery at the Divisional level for institutionalising the co-ordination mechanism with the State Government authorities. These instructions were unevenly implemented even in sensitive areas. Further the large number of successful Rail Roko agitations indicates the dependency of the IR on the State Government to ensure secure rail operations. This in turn points to a need for a greater specification of the responsibility of the State Governments. These issues are discussed in detail at **paras 4.1.1 and 4.3** respectively.

Deposing in front of the Standing Committee (2006-07-Fourteenth Lok Sabha), Ministry of Railways stated that clear demarcation of the duties between the various security agencies is still one issue that remains to be decided. However, in the present security scenario viz. terrorist activities in Jammu & Kashmir, Terrorist attack in Mumbai and ULFA affected area in Northeast, Railways is getting help from the State machinery.

IR stated that as part of the long term security plan they are considering an amendment to the RPF Act to enable them to take over the responsibilities of the GRP. Amendment in the RPF Act proposed by the Ministry of Railways has been concurred by the Ministry of Law & Justice and the matter is presently under examination with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The proposed bill seeks to empower the RPF officer of and above the rank of Sub-inspectors

to exercise powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station in the passenger area.

IR replied (July 2011) that security of railway tracks, bridges & tunnels is the responsibility of respective state governments in terms of Ministry of Home Affairs letter No. D2-65/X dated 13.09.1965 circulated vide No. 27/1/72-Poll.II dated 11.02.1972.

Board's instructions issued in the year 2003 was only an interim and temporary arrangement for patrolling of track in sabotage prone areas. In the year 2004 all the Chief Security Commissioners were advised by Security Directorate of the Railway Board to inform Director Generals of Police of concerned states to deploy State Police for protection of tracks & bridges under their jurisdiction.

IR's reply contains nothing about monitoring the implementation of the instructions for securing tracks and bridges.

2.4 Co-ordination with other Security Agencies

The 15th Lok Sabha Standing Committee on Railways recommended that the Railways should study the feasibility of launching their own intelligence wing as part of the RPF.

The High Level Committee on Composite Security Plan for Indian Railways (set up on recommendation of Committee of Secretaries in January 2007) had also recommended that since most of the Railway security systems in the developed world have active cooperative mechanism between Railway security personnel, Police and Intelligence agencies, such operational mechanism needs to be developed for the Indian Railways.

The Railway Board in March 2010 stated that one officer from RPF is regularly attending the meeting of Multi Agency Centre (MAC) held by Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. These meetings are also attended by the officials from Intelligence Bureau, Defence and other para-

military forces. Intelligence received from field units is shared /discussed. Similarly at zonal level, the RPF attends the state MAC.

It was observed from the records made available to Audit that RPF was alerting the concerned agencies in the field such as local police, local administration etc. about the alert calls received from MAC, intelligence bureau of the Central and State Governments. Presently RPF have 02 Intelligence Wings namely: Crime Wing (or Crime Intelligence Branch) and Special Wing (or the Special Intelligence Branch). Both the above wings have separate structure from field up to Board level.

2.5 Dues of RPF deployed on election duties

RPF personnel are deployed for election duties whenever necessary. Cost of such deployment is to be recovered from the Ministry of Home Affairs by the concerned Railway. It was observed that an amount of ` 20.55 crore was outstanding for the period from 2005-06 to 2008-09 in respect of 12 zones and

one production unit¹. It was also noticed that bills were not raised by ECR for the deployment and in SER no record regarding recovery of claimed amount could be produced by Accounts /Security departments. In NCR the records of claims raised were not made available to Audit.

2.6 Dues of GRP payable by Railways

As per para 856 and 857 of Indian Railway Financial Code Volume I, the cost of GRP would be shared between the State Governments concerned and the Railways on 50:50 basis, provided that the strength of GRP was determined with the approval of the IR. This was again reiterated by the Railway Board vide its instructions of July 1993. A review of the details of dues payable to the GRP revealed that an amount of ` 138.38 crore was outstanding in nine² out of 16 zones for the period 2005-06 to 2009-10. This includes an amount of ` 0.58 crore claimed by Government of West Bengal which was pending with SER due to excess operation of 31 posts of GRP. In respect of six zones and Metro Railway, Kolkata no dues are outstanding while in Northern Railway, no information on this was provided. Keeping huge dues as outstanding could affect the deployment of GRP as most of the State Governments are under severe fund shortage.

IR stated (July 2011) that railway security is presently looked after by 3 agencies viz. Government Railway Police (GRP), District Police and Railway Protection Force (RPF), and in view of the fact that 50 per cent of the budget of concerned GRPs is being shared by railways with State Governments, inclusion of the functioning of GRP within the ambit of Performance Audit on Security Management will help a great deal in assessing the future security requirement of the railways.

2.7 Conclusion

It is observed that the issues regarding inter-agency coordination pointed out by audit in its earlier Audit Report on Security management still persist, in spite of the remedial action taken by the Railways. Considerable overlap of functions exists between the RPF and the State Government and/or agencies handling Railway security. Despite directions from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Railway Board, co-ordination between the RPF and the State Government is not effective leading to large gaps in the security system of the Railways. Though the High Level Committee on Composite Security Plan for Indian Railways had recommended Security system with an effective co-ordination mechanism with the state security /intelligence agencies similar to system existing in developed countries, but IR is yet to achieve that standard.

A meeting of Home Secretaries of States held at Delhi in January 2010 with the IR, also highlighted the problem of non registration of cases received from other State GRPs and general reluctance to take up investigations citing reasons of non fixation of place of occurrence of crime or victim's apathy to complete

¹ SWR-` 20.97 lakh, NER-` 3.16 crore, NWR-` 1.33 crore, ECoR-` 1.32 crore, SECR-` 6.01 lakh, CR-` ,2.57 crore SCR-` 1.93 crore, ER-` 6.12 crore, WR-` 1.74 crore, NFR-` 52.16 lakh, WCR-` 75.36 lakh, NR-` 0.57 lakh, CLW-` 5.55 lakh.

² SR-` 16.86 crore, SWR-` 2.61 crore, NWR-` 1.02 crore, SER-` 0.58 crore, CR-` 77.47 crore, NCR-` 0.02 crore, SCR-` 17.11 crore, WR-` 21.83 crore, NFR-` 0.86 crore.

legal formalities. The problems relating to extremist activities, attacks on railway property during agitations were also discussed.

Recommendations

- *Indian Railways needs to evolve mechanism for effective co-ordination between the agencies handling Railway Security viz RPF, GRP and State Police.*
- *Since the State Government is responsible for maintenance for law and order, an institutional mechanism needs to be evolved to ensure greater cooperation and coordination with the State Government.*

Chapter 3 → Protection of Passengers and their belongings including Strategy to Control Crime

The most important aspect of any security strategy is to ensure the safety and security of its passengers. The Railways are the most preferred mode of transport in India and are spread over a vast geographical area of over 64015 route kilometres and 7030 number of stations. The Citizen Charter of Indian Railways spells out the railways commitment to provide safe and dependable train services to passengers.

3.1 Security of Passengers

The security of railway passengers is interlinked with the security and safety of railway assets used by the passengers viz the railway stations and trains. The GRP by virtue of being a wing of the State Police is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and maintenance of law and order on station premises /circulating areas and trains. The RPF was responsible for the security of Railway property. The security of passengers and passenger area was also entrusted to the Railway Protection Force in 2003 through an amendment in the RPF Act.

To fix yard sticks /norms for the procurement of security related equipments for use of RPF /RPSF personnel, the IR set up a Norms Committee in December 2006. The norms for procurement of security related equipment were issued in September 2007. Consequently the Railways spent a sum of ` 67 crore on procurement of these equipments during 2007-08.

Increasing traffic density and the increase in the threat perception to the Indian Railways called for a paradigm shift from the existing level of ad-hoc preparedness to a readiness to handle any disastrous situation triggered by a security lapse. The norms committee merely fixed the yardsticks for the procurement of security related equipment. No cohesive plan for ensuring passenger safety had been devised and put in place. Thus, the Railways continued to be perceived as a soft target in the domestic arena. Being a state owned asset railways is also a ready target for any terrorist /agitator or extremist desirous of making his presence felt.

The Committee of Secretaries decided in January 2007 that the Ministry of Railways needs to prepare a **Composite Security Plan**. A High Level

Recommendations of High Level Committee

- Installation of state of the art Electronic Surveillance System of International standards covering entry/exit points, Platforms, Waiting Halls, Concourse area, Circulating area, Parking area and vital installations at the Railway Stations.
- A comprehensive communication network with one walkie talkie set for every RPF personnel on duty along with a control room at divisional level for better co-ordination.
- Access control solutions for railway stations for filtering out bonafide passengers from potential miscreants and saboteurs with judicious use of HHMDs, DFMDs and X-ray baggage scanners for random checking in passenger area in adequate numbers.
- Minimise security hazard, a need to decongest the station was emphasised. This included closing of all unauthorised entry/exit points.

Committee on Composite security plan for the Indian Railways (Committee) was constituted (May 2007) under the chairmanship of Additional Director General /RPF to study the requirements of a security system and to formulate a composite plan for the railways. The Committee submitted its recommendations in January 2008. The Committee while analysing the vulnerability of Railway assets classified railway stations as the most vulnerable of Railway assets, followed by trains- both passenger and goods and then railway tracks connecting railway stations including

bridges and crossings. The Committee identified 202 stations all over the country and Metro, Kolkata as sensitive for terrorist/insurgent attack.

3.2 Securing Railway Stations

In the aftermath of terrorist attack on 26th November 2008 at Mumbai Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST) station of CR, the top priority before the IR is to secure their railway stations. Both RPF and GRP are required to be present at railway stations. Most of the large railway stations serve as shelters for homeless and destitute people. The entry of unauthorised coolies, vendors and large number of visitors lead to unmanageable crowds on railway platforms. Security threats are further compounded by the existence of unmanned multi entry and exit points at stations. Low ratios of security personnel to passengers make it difficult for them to provide security. Both GRP and the RPF are involved in this exercise.

Audit conducted a sample check of 74 stations. This sample included 41 stations identified by the High Level Committee as sensitive for terrorist/naxalite attack. The macro view emerging out of the check of these 74 stations is indicated in following table.

Number of stations	Number of entry /exit points	Number of authorised entry points guarded	Number of entry (other than in column 2)points guarded	Number of DFMDs installed	Number of CCTVs	Number of baggage scanners
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41 High risk stations	249	177 (71 %)	34 (35%)	108 (43 %)	26	5
33 other stations	87	54 (62%)	16 (21%)	23 (26%)	12	1

The detailed position as emerging in zones is shown below:-

- (i) Entry points into station premises have been designed with a view to check ticket-less travel. In almost all the 74 stations examined, entry into the station premises is unrestricted as there are multiple entry/exit points. Out of the total 338 authorised entry/exit points at these stations, only 231 (70 per cent) were guarded. Out of the 74 stations test checked, no guards were provided at any of the authorised entry points at 19 stations. This included stations like Kanpur, Siliguri and New Jalpaiguri.
- (ii) Apart from authorised entry/exit points, there were 175 unauthorised entry/exit points (52 per cent of the authorised entry/exit points). Of these only 28 per cent were guarded.



Unrestricted entry-Hazrat Nizamuddin, NR



Unrestricted entry-Sealdah Station , ER


In ECoR, NCR and SCR of the four stations each checked, only three out of the 38 unauthorised entry points were guarded. In WCR, at the four stations test checked there were 19 unauthorised entry points, of which only three were guarded.

- (iii) Persons entering parcel offices have easy access to platforms. At present parcel offices are located adjoining the platform having entry from outside as well as from the platform. These are potential entry points for miscreants into stations unchecked and pose a grave security risk.

- (iv) The Norms Committee had recommended that a Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD) be provided at all authorised entry points /exit points. A test check, however, revealed that Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMDs) were provided at only 131 entry points comprising 39 per cent of the authorised entry points.

Even at the most vulnerable stations like Mumbai CST, New Delhi, Hazrat Nizamuddin, Borivali etc. all the entry points were not secured with DFMDs.

In 28 of the stations checked none of the entry points had any DFMDs installed. This included stations like Bhubaneswar, Puri, Danapur and Lucknow. It was also observed that many of the DFMDs were not working properly. Further, a large number of DFMDs were not manned making their presence irrelevant. There were also huge gaps along side of the DFMDs through which any person could enter the platforms without any check



Unmanned DFMD at Hazrat Nizamudin station



Gaps near DFMD at Church Gate (WR)

- (v) Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras were provided at only 38 out of the 74 stations test checked. However, the quality of pictures emerging in the CCTVs was poor making it very difficult to identify the images.
- (vi) X-Ray luggage scanners were provided only at seven stations. It was noticed that none of the four stations on SER, seven stations in NER, four stations in ECR, 10 stations in NFR, four stations in SWR, four stations in WR, four stations in NCR, four stations in SCR and four stations in NR were provided with luggage scanners.

3.2.1 Integrated Security System (ISS)

As a follow up to the recommendations of the Committee, the Railway Board decided in July 2008 to implement an Integrated Security System (ISS) over Indian Railways for augmenting the existing security system of the Railways at the identified high risk stations. The ISS consists of four broad areas –

- (i) Internet Protocol (IP) based Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance system for watching the movement of people on the platforms.
- (ii) Access Control solutions for filtering out bonafide passengers.
- (iii) Personal and baggage screening system such as DFMDs, HHMDs, x-ray baggage scanners etc.,
- (iv) Bomb Detection and Disposal System (BDDS).

In October 2009, The ISS scheme was slightly modified and separate short term and long term plans were formulated for strengthening the security cover over Indian Railways.

The short term plan was to be implemented over all the zones by March 2010. The Zonal Railways were to provide (i) CCTV surveillance system, (ii) Access control systems (iii) Personal baggage screening system, (iv) Bomb detection and disposal system (BDDS), (iv) Country wide E-networking up to the level of important RPF posts to ensure smooth and speedy flow of information/data in the organization. The scheme included Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD), Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMD), Night vision devices, Walkie-talkie sets, VHF sets.

This plan was to be implemented in two phases. In phase-I, the ISS was to be implemented over 66 stations of 16 zones during 2008-09 and phase-II was to cover 71 stations over 16 zones during 2009-10.

Railway Board in September 2008 circulated the detailed programme for implementation. The Railways were instructed to forward detailed proposals to the Railway Board for necessary re-appropriation from passenger amenity head for 2008-09 for implementing phase-I. Railway Board in June 2009 revised their earlier decision and directed the concerned zones to submit detailed proposals of the ISS for inclusion in the works programme of 2009-10.

3.2.2 Bomb Detection and Disposal squad (BDDS)

Railway Board issued (March 2006) directions to all Zonal Railways to acquire Bomb Detection and Disposal Equipments and form Bomb Disposal Squads in each division as the zones /divisions were dependent on local police and army sources. Railway Board further directed that willing staff be used for the purpose. Further, in Western Railway, 28 officials were trained for this purpose though no squad has yet been formed (March 2011). The Chief Security Commissioner (CSCs) procured equipment valuing Rs 2.24 crore which were distributed to its divisions. The material is, however, lying unused in stores. In Central Railway, seven security personnel were trained for bomb

detection. A BDDS has been set up at Pune (GRP) and one BDDS is planned to be set up at Mumbai (RPF). Other Railways are yet to set up any BDDSs.

3.2.3 Dog Squads

As part of the Integrated Security System, it was envisaged that dog squads be formed and adequate sniffer dogs be provided at recommended railway stations. Sniffer dogs are utilised at important Railway stations for anti-sabotage checks and detection of explosives in trains, reservation offices and platforms. RPF sniffer dogs are also rendering assistance to GRP for anti-sabotage checking and other important works whenever required.

Audit observed the following:

- Though dog squads had been provided at all Zonal Railways and Metro Railway, Kolkata the actual strength was only 292 dogs as against the sanctioned strength of 405 dogs. There was a vacancy of 113 dogs (about 28 per cent).
- Records available in respect of dog squads revealed that though dogs were used for patrolling at stations, in trains and yards and other important



places, no records relating to the results of such patrolling have been made available. From the monthly reports of dog squads in SCR, it was observed that there were no cases of crime detected by dogs during 2005-10, casting doubts about their effectiveness.

- In WR it was noticed that 12 dogs have been hired by Senior Divisional Security Commissioner, Mumbai Central for stations at Churchgate, Mumbai Central, Borivali, Surat and Virar incurring an expenditure of ₹48.13 lakh upto March 2010. Further, Records of Chief Security

Commissioner/WR indicated that the hired dogs were unable to locate and identify gunpowder, explosives etc. as they had no training in detecting explosives. IR, however, stated that Chief Security Commissioner/RPF Western Railway has already been advised to ensure immediate purchase and training of RPF dogs and to stop the outsourcing of dogs.

A review of implementation of the ISS revealed the following:-

- The ISS envisaged covering only 137 stations in both the phases. Even phase I of the short-term plan (covering 66 stations by March 2009) has not yet been implemented in any zone.
- No expenditure has been incurred other than the tender processing cost as of March 2010.
- Audit scrutiny revealed that DFMDs had not been installed at a large number of exit/entry points at even the high risk stations checked by audit.
- Though setting up of BDDS and dog squads was part of the ISS, no action was taken within the scheme to ensure their proper implementation.

Regarding communication facilities, as of now IR have provided Closed User Group (CUG) phones only to officers and supervisors in the field so that the same can be used for rescue and relief work in case of accident /disaster. IR is still in the process of providing other modern telecom facilities to its security staff.

Review in Audit revealed that 18937 nos of walkie talkies and 1248 nos. of VHF sets provided to the security personnel in zones were not evenly distributed. The zones had walkie talkie sets ranging between three to 20 per cent (NR- 20 per cent and ECoR-3 per cent) of the total. Similar uneven distribution of VHF sets was seen over zones ranging between two to 12 per cent. Similarly, the distribution of bullet proof jackets was uneven. Whereas in four zones there was shortage of bullet proof jackets, these are in excess in two zones.

Thus, a scheme which was to be implemented at 137 stations by March 2010 is still at the preliminary stage. IR stated (May and July 2011) that under the Works Programme 2009-10, civil works in the zones have been approved at an estimated budget of ` 353 crore. They added that tenders have been awarded in SR, SCR, NR (Delhi Area Stations) and Kolkatta Metro. The system is under various stages of tendering in the remaining Zonal Railways.

Further, the procurement of DFMDs, HHMDs etc. is still under process and orders placed for night vision devices, Walkie- talkie sets etc costing ` 67 crore are nearing completion. They also stated that the scheme was to be implemented over all the 202 high risk stations identified by the High Level Committee on security.

3.2.4 Implementing the Long Term Security Plan

The Committee had recommended a long term action plan for security. It recommended the following:-

- A. Legal empowerment of RPF
- B. RPF to act as single security agency for railway security
- C. Up-gradation of training facilities in various training institutes
- D. Multi skill training to all RPF/RPSF personnel.

Issues A & B have been dealt with in **Paras 2.1 and 2.3.1** respectively and issues C & D have been discussed in **Paras 5.4.2 and 5.4.3** respectively.

3.2.5 Construction of Boundary Walls

Many of the stations were not secured with either boundary wall or fencing, which gives easy access to miscreants and other unauthorised persons to enter the platform unchecked. Alarmed by the increase in number of track crossings and encroachment cases, Railway Board in September 2008 instructed all Zonal Railways to construct boundary walls along the tracks. Initially the work of construction of boundary wall was included in the Integrated Security System. However, this item was later deleted from the scheme and funds required were to be assessed separately. General Managers were advised by the Railway Board to ensure construction of boundary walls based on threat perception and vulnerability, as assessed by the Zonal Railways.



Open area with no boundary wall at Santragachi station in SER

Open area with no boundary wall at Chennai station in SR

Audit review of the records in Zonal Railways revealed that the works have been completed in ECoR only. In NR, work has been completed only in one Division (Moradabad) while in another Division (Ambala) the same is in progress. In other five zones (NWR, CR, ECR, SCR, SER) works are in progress. In eight³ zones no work has been undertaken so far. It is seen from the progress of work that the zones have not taken up the work compromising the security at stations. IR has intimated (July 2011) that fund constraint is being faced in providing boundary wall in all the sensitive stations.

³ SR, SWR, NER, NCR, ER, SECR, WR, NFR, WCR.

3.2.6 Deployment of Security Personnel

On an average one to ten GRP personnel are deployed at each important railway station to maintain law and order. While the passengers originating were 5725 millions in 2005-06 which increased to 7379.94 millions in 2009-10 (increase of 28.90 per cent), the deployment of GRP personnel was 31259 in 2005-06 which increased to 32312 in 2009-10 (increase of 3.37 per cent). This indicates that deployment of GRP personnel were not adequate.

A test check on the deployment of security personnel at New Delhi and Mumbai CST, two of the busiest and sensitive stations in the country revealed the following:

- At New Delhi railway station during the year 2009-10 about 114 mail/express trains originated/terminated and about 1.86 lakh passengers originated daily besides the passengers disembarking whose figures could not be collected in Audit. As against such huge volume of passenger movements only 375 security personnel (249 RPF and 126 GRP) were deployed to maintain the security at the station.
- Similarly in Mumbai CST, 1258 trains (including suburban trains) originated/terminated daily and the number of passengers originating daily during 2009-10 was 2.40 lakh. As against this the security personnel deployed daily were only 159 (110 RPF and 49 GRP).

The above deployment of security personnel seems to be grossly inadequate for high risk stations like New Delhi and Mumbai CST. The above exercise indicates the need for increasing the deployment of security personnel in improving the security provided for passengers and passenger area.

The 15th Lok Sabha Standing Committee on Railways was dismayed to find that the Integrated Security System has not been effectively put in place. Except for an odd baggage scanner, door frame metal detectors (DFMDs) and the presence of a handful of RPF personnel in the stations, the Committee did not find any noticeable change in the way the security system functions.

The above audit indicates a distinct lack of consciousness on the part of the IR in controlling access to railway stations. Further no action has been taken to rationalise the arrival/departure of trains at important/major stations and to reduce the congregation of passengers.

IR in its reply (May 2011) stated the following:-

- Decongestion in station premises/circulating area require involvement of concerned municipal authorities, state police, GRP and other state agencies. At present measures like extra deployment of security staff and stopping the sale of platform ticket etc. are adopted to decongest stations during specific periods.
- Construction of boundary wall in sensitive/vulnerable stations has been taken up in consultation with finance Directorate of Railway Board.
- Integrated Security System under implementation over Zonal railways envisages surveillance system of international standard over 202 sensitive stations.

- Formation of BD&DS at important and sensitive Railway stations has been taken up under “Integrated Security Scheme”. Till this is finalized, assistance of BD&DS of the concerned States and Army is taken as and when required.
- In July 2011, IR added that as the system (ISS) of this scale is being implemented for the first time in Indian Railways, Zonal Railways are facing problems with regard to availability of eligible vendors, inspection of equipment by competent authorities and availability of fund etc.

Reply of the IR is not conclusive as sufficient measures have not been initiated to decongest stations. Even entry to stations has not been restricted to ticket holders only. Existence of several unauthorised entry points and unguarded as well as sparsely equipped (with modern security gadgets) authorised entry points has rendered the stations vulnerable to attack. Further, ISS has not been implemented in any of the zones. Construction of boundary wall is proceeding very slowly.

No time line has been drawn for completing the action initiated despite IR being aware of the increased threat perception. No fresh targets have been fixed for implementation of the ISS nor is an effective monitoring mechanism in place for ensuring its timely implementation.

3.3 Managing Security on Trains

The maintenance and security of trains is a major area of concern as Railways have a linear territory, traversing inter-state lines. The GRP are responsible generally for the prevention and detection of crime on the Railways within their respective state jurisdictions. This includes maintenance of law and order within Railway premises and on running trains, registration of cases and their investigation. Their duties include prevention of offences against the travelling public and their belongings by patrolling of the platforms and escorting trains.

3.3.1 Reporting of crime

The crime reported against passengers for the period 2005 to 2009 was as follows:

Year	Murder	Attempt to murder	Dacoity	Robbery	Drugging	Theft of Passenger belongings	Total
2005	232	68	126	325	509	10846	12106
2006	240	71	156	359	477	10103	11406
2007	217	78	111	305	649	10939	12299
2008	213	81	98	274	608	11497	12771
2009	245	86	112	392	670	12403	13908

Source:- GRP Records

Despite under reporting of crime, the above figures indicate an increase in all types of crime during 2009 as compared to the previous years. Crime against passengers has increased by 15 per cent during the last five years.

Reports of drugging of passengers and looting of their belongings in trains and at Railway premises have increased. To tackle this menace the DG/RPF

(November 2009) nominated NR as the nodal office for coordinating with the CSC's of the concerned zones (NCR, NWR, WCR and ECR). As a result, joint Anti Drugging Teams were formed for escorting the affected trains and sharing of intelligence between different. Zones has resulted in reduction in cases or drugging of passengers. It was reported that due to the deployment of joint team, incidents of drugging in those trains have been controlled. However, figures available in the above table indicate an increase in drugging cases in 2009.

3.3.2 Problems in Reporting of Crime on trains

The reporting of crime committed on trains is a serious problem. Crimes are generally discovered/ reported only when the passengers reach their destination. Even if a crime is discovered early, the report can only be made at the next station. Here too only serious cases are reported as the victim has little time to file the First Information Report (FIR) with the GRP. Thus there is a tendency for under reporting of crime cases in trains. In most cases the FIR is lodged only at the final destination of the passenger and has to be transferred to the Thana having jurisdiction over the crime. This causes considerable delay in registration and investigation of crime.

The Railway Board in August 1997 issued instructions that FIR forms should be made available with coach attendants, conductors and guards and they should hand over the filled in FIR forms to the GRP for registration of cases. The earlier report (No. 9 of 2000) highlighted that despite orders issued by IR that First Information Report's (FIR) forms are made available on trains; these were not available in over 75 per cent of the checked cases. In the recent review conducted it was observed in Audit that, while display boards indicate that FIR forms are available with guards and coach attendants, in many instances the forms were not available with the coach attendants. Passengers were forced to approach the guards or get down for making complaints. It was further seen that in NCR and SWR forms were not available with the concerned staff. In Northern Railway, FIR forms were available with coach attendants, conductors and guards only in one division (Delhi).

IR in its reply (May 2011) stated that the RPF provides necessary assistance to the victim passengers to lodge FIR with the GRP and guidelines for availability of FIR forms and registration of the case with GRP already exist. It was further stated that Commercial Directorate is being requested to re-iterate the instructions for strict compliance.

The fact remains that it remains difficult for passengers to register an FIR due to non-availability of FIR forms and problems of establishing the jurisdiction of occurrence of crime.

3.3.3 Security Arrangements in Trains

The increase in the incidence of crime and threat from naxalites/terrorists has led to increased requirement of security arrangements in trains. Effective security arrangements on board trains, requires adequate deployment of staff, provision of security equipments to the escort personnel and efficient co-ordination between the RPF, GRP and the commercial staff on board the trains.

Recommendations of High Level Committee

- Increasing the number of uniformed police presence in trains proportionate to the number of compartments.
- Providing appropriate weapons and security gadgets to train escorts,
- Provision of some basic rescue equipments in each train,
- Introduction of public address system in all trains to caution the passengers in case of any eventuality

3.3.4 Train Escorting

Train Escorting is the primary responsibility of the GRP. However, with the amendment of RPF Act in 2003, the mandate of the RPF now includes protection of railway property, passenger area and passengers. The RPF is also escorting trains now both to augment the security in trains and for ensuring passenger safety.

Audit examined the security arrangements provided in ten trains in each zone. The results are as follows:

- Out of the 12709 train services per day (including suburban services) as of 2009-10 a total of 4019 trains (32 per cent) only were provided with escort.
- Out of the 161 trains examined 32 trains were escorted by GRP and 66 by RPF.
- In 28 trains (17 per cent of the test checked trains) both GRP and RPF were escorting the trains.
- The GRP guards were found armed only in 46 trains whereas the RPF guards were found armed in 89 trains.
- 35 out of 161 trains examined were not found escorted either by RPF or GRP personnel. These included prestigious trains like Trivandrum – Hazrat Nizamuddin Rajdhani, Mumbai – New Delhi Rajdhani, August Kranti Rajdhani, Mysore –Chennai shatabdi, Patna Garibrath and five other trains passing through the naxalite affected area and those prone to dacoity.
- As against the total 155 GRP personnel deployed, RPF deployed 523 personnel for escort in these trains. Further, in a number of cases the GRP personnel were disembarking at the end of their State jurisdiction and the fresh set of GRP did not board immediately. For instance in SECR, there

were 33 trains in which GRP escorts of adjoining states did not board the trains immediately after the GRP of the previous state disembarked after completion of their duty. During this interregnum, the trains remain unescorted. Thus the trains are running unprotected at several intervals making it vulnerable for the passengers as many cases of looting and dacoity are reported when the trains are not escorted by security personnel.

- In SECR, the GRP personnel were withdrawn from train escorting duties by the Chattisgarh and Maharashtra State Governments. The reasons for the same are not known to Audit.
- Rajdhani and Shatabdi trains in Southern Railway are not being escorted by security personnel. Further, though the Security Department directed that the security personnel on escort duty report to the train Guard before taking charge, this order was not followed in seven out of ten trains test checked. Further, two of the train crew reported that they had not seen the security staff.

Audit observed that with the increase in the risk perception in their area, both SER and ECR have increased the strength of escort parties by redeploying staff from less sensitive areas. They are also being better equipped with bullet proof jackets/helmets, sophisticated weapons, walkie-talkies, mobile phones etc. The strength of escort parties varies with the vulnerability of trains/section and availability of manpower.

In other zones also escort parties/armed guards are being constituted keeping in view the importance of trains to be escorted, vulnerability of route and the law and order situation of the areas and man-power availability.

Audit observed that despite increased sensitivity to security, many important trains were unescorted and the escorts were unarmed. The size of the escort party varied from zone to zone and frequently the escort party was unarmed. Even trains were left unescorted due to problems of jurisdiction.

IR in its reply (July 2011) stated the following:-

- The strength of train escort party cannot be specified by the Railway Board. It has to be decided by the local authorities considering the crime position.
- As far as RPF is concerned, the strength of RPF escort party should not be less than **1+3**. The strength of GRP is decided by GRP authorities.

However, the crime rate at stations and trains has increased over the last five years. Thus it is essential that a larger number of trains be escorted and the basic norms of size of party and arms to be carried need to be specified.

3.3.5 Impact of Train Escorting

The number of crimes cases in the unescorted trains is likely to be more than that in escorted trains. In fact, the number of crimes registered an increase in non escorted trains (4797 in 2007-08 to 6072 in 2009-10), while the number of crimes registered in escorted trains declined from 2781 in 2007-08 to 2571 in

2009-10. This indicates that escorting of trains by security guards has a positive effect in reducing crime.

Despite intensive escort duty being introduced, in August 2010, three cases of dacoity were reported in Danapur Division of ECR in three passenger trains in which passengers' belongings were looted. However it was noticed that only one train (No.3111 Up) was being escorted by security personnel. Besides these, several cases of dacoity, theft and molestation were reported recently from these areas, including the looting of Sealdah-New Delhi Lal Quila express in August 2010. In the Lal Quila Express though GRP personnel were escorting the train, they were unarmed and were not able to resist the armed dacoits. This shows that adequate *security* is not ensured for the passengers travelling in trains especially in crime *prone areas*.

Above incidents indicate that despite the reported increase in escorting of trains, and other security arrangements, cases of crime against passengers are on the increase. The action, therefore, taken by the security agencies in beefing up security of passengers appears to be grossly inadequate. The 15th Lok Sabha Standing Committee had also directed that the Railways should ensure that adequate armed RPF personnel should be located in trains passing through sensitive areas.

3.4 Mass Rapid Transit System at Chennai

The Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) at Chennai which runs from Chennai Beach to Velachery covering 17 stations was introduced to decongest traffic within Chennai city. In all 14 station buildings were constructed in two phases with a total floor area of 2,11,099 Sq. m. and the remaining station buildings are still under construction though opened for train services.

Due to poor patronage during off peak hours the stations were generally empty posing serious threat to the passengers from anti social elements. Reports of murder, chain snatching and harassment of elderly and women passengers were




frequent. Though there was a proposal for creation of 58 posts for the MRTS in addition to the existing 46 posts of RPF, only 34 posts were created totalling the number of RPF personnel to 80 for the entire route, which are grossly inadequate considering the cases of crime reported.

3.5 Opinion of Passengers

In order to have first hand information from the travelling passengers about the security arrangements in Trains and stations Audit conducted an opinion survey. A feedback form containing a questionnaire was circulated among the passengers randomly. In all 1870 passengers in 16 zones responded. Majority of the passengers felt that a train journey was safe while 17 per cent felt it was unsafe.

The chart above shows opinion of passengers on some important security aspects in train travelling. While 46 per cent of passengers which participated in the opinion survey found that the security personnel in trains were alert/moving, 47 per cent stated that the security personnel were not alert.



Similarly 64 per cent passengers stated that they have not seen any random luggage checking by the security personnel at the enroute stations.

3.6 Conclusion

Despite being aware of the heightened threat perception, Indian Railways has not been able to implement several measures recommended by the High Level Committee for providing security to railway passengers at stations as well as in trains. There were large gaps in the security system formulated for ensuring passenger safety—both at the stations and on the trains. The security arrangements at stations test checked were found to be inadequate. No effort has been made to control access to railway stations and to decongest even sensitive high risk stations. Further, installation of state of the art electronic surveillance system has been slow and not up to international standards. The camera surveillance system installed was unsatisfactory. Care was not taken to install cameras at points which would ensure good visibility

Implementation of ISS on IR should have been viewed in the context of enlarging dimensions of terrorist threat to the railway network. Despite the magnitude of unprecedented terrorist attack on Mumbai CST station in Mumbai, implementation of the formulated plan viz. the Integrated Security System was slow. The ISS was to be implemented by March 2010 and is still to be implemented in any of the zones (March 2011). Boundary walls/ fencing of railway stations were excluded from the purview of the formulated plan viz. the Integrated Security System. Further, good lighting which is essential to deter crime of all types and facilitates surveillance was not considered for inclusion in the ISS.

Opinion of the passengers regarding security issues indicates that the IR need to ensure a more proactive role of the security forces in ensuring the security of its passengers.

The IR failed to frame any guidelines/norms regarding size of the escort party, whether it should be armed or not and which trains need to be escorted. The trains to be escorted were left to the local IR to decide based on manpower availability, threat perception of area and importance of the train. Further, there was no clear demarcation of the trains to be escorted by RPF and GRP staff respectively or whether they are to be escorted by both. In a number of cases the GRP personnel were disembarking at the end of their State jurisdiction and the fresh escort of GRP did not board immediately. Thus the trains are running unprotected at several intervals making it vulnerable to miscreants. In a number of cases the escort party was unarmed making them vulnerable to attack.

There were numerous problems in the registration of crime committed on moving trains. Despite existing orders FIR forms were not available in a large number of trains.

Recommendations

- *Urgent steps need to be taken to decongest railway stations especially those in sabotage prone areas and large cities. Stations need to be properly secured by constructing boundary wall /fencing, and restricting unauthorised entry. IR needs to ensure time bound implementation of ISS.*

- *The Electronic Surveillance System provided at many stations are out dated and do not cover the entire passenger area of the station. Systems of international standards need to be implemented at selected sensitive stations.*
- *Railways need to take necessary action to make available the FIR forms to all coach attendants and ensure that passenger complaints are registered with GRP and properly investigated.*
- *An effective coordinating mechanism needs to be worked out by the IR with the civil authorities regarding following issues:-*
 - *For handling railway related crime an effective mechanism needs to be worked out especially where the jurisdiction of crime is not identifiable.*
 - *To ensure that a larger number of trains are escorted, better coordination between the RPF and GRP is required. Coordination between GRP authorities in neighbouring states also needs to be improved to ensure that trains run continuously with escort.*
 - *It is essential that the IR either forms BD&DS of their own or coordinate with the State Authorities/Army to ensure availability of BD&DS at all stations.*
- *The IR needs to consider framing guidelines/norms regarding size of the train escort party as well as the criteria for escorting of trains with armed guards based on threat perception of the area and importance of the train.*

Chapter 4 → Safety of Railway property viz. track, bridges as well as other fixed structures including office buildings, yards, workshops and production units

Indian Railways is the largest organisation in the country with mostly open, easily accessible and unguarded assets. These include equipments such as signalling, track, open line installations, overhead wires, yards, towers etc.. Control of criminal activity on railway premises and of railway property is important in view of the increasing movement of passengers and freight on Indian Railways. During the past five years the incidence of sabotage on railway tracks by terrorist/naxalites has increased. In 2009 there were 26 incidents of blowing up of rail tracks.

The High Level Committee on security had classified rail tracks as one of the most important railway asset whose security was of great importance. The Committee however failed to give any comprehensive suggestions regarding security of rail tracks and Over Head Equipment.

4.1 Security of Tracks

Rail tracks traverse both dense urban areas and vast rural areas and forests and are typically difficult to monitor and patrol. Maintenance of track is essential to ensure smooth running of trains and is covered under the Railways Way & Works manual. This manual provides for routine patrolling by gang men and patrolling during monsoon and heavy rainfall. As an exceptional measure Security patrolling is to be provided during periods of civil disturbances. The primary duty in this case is to protect trains against any condition of danger such as tampering of tracks or obstruction.

Protection of rail track against tampering or obstructions is the primary responsibility of the state government. The Ministry of Home Affairs clarified in 1965 that the primary responsibility for patrolling of tracks and guarding of railway bridges, vests with the State Government/Union Territories and guarding of other vulnerable installations would be undertaken by RPF. This order has been reiterated from time to time. In March 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs again issued an advisory to all states to increase patrolling along railway tracks.

4.1.1 Sabotage Patrolling

In February 2003, the Railway Board issued instructions to 11 zones⁴ to introduce patrolling in sabotage prone areas as a new domain. These instructions were issued as an interim measure to tackle unforeseen situations by undertaking a precautionary step. These instructions directed the Zonal Railways to set up suitable machinery at the Divisional level for

⁴ CR, ER, ECR, NR, NER, NFR, NWR, SR, SCR, SER and WR

institutionalising the co-ordination mechanism with the State Government to ensure safety of passengers and running of trains in sabotage prone areas. These instructions included formation of a Standing Committee in each division consisting of ADRM⁵ (as Presiding Officer), Sr.DSC⁶ (as Convener), Sr.DEN⁷/Co-ordination (as Member) and Sr.DOM⁸/IC (as Member). This committee was to meet frequently and identify sabotage prone areas. They were to coordinate with the State Government and request them to provide patrolling in these areas and also supplement their efforts. Further, surprise mobile patrolling teams (consisting of both RPF and gangmen) were to be formed in each division. In addition, measures such as reduction of train speed, running of pilot engine ahead of certain trains, running of goods trains ahead of certain trains/group of trains, etc. were to be implemented whenever required.

Audit observed the following:

- Standing Committees had been formed in all divisions of CR, NR, SCR, SR, SER, NER and NFR. In ECR the same had been formed in three out of five divisions. In ER out of the two divisions test checked the Standing Committee had been formed only in one division. No Standing Committees have been formed in NCR and NWR. While regular meetings were being held in SR, SER, NR and NFR, the same were not being held regularly in ECR.
- Regarding patrolling, it is seen that the instructions issued by the Railway Board were not being uniformly implemented. Though joint patrolling was being carried out on the basis of threat perception availability of manpower.
- Joint patrolling is being carried out only in Chunar – Chopan section of Allahabad division of NCR, as it has been identified as sabotage prone area.
- In NR, joint patrolling of the sabotage prone area is being done in one division only and in CR it is being done in two divisions.
- In SCR, the same is being done wherever necessary based on the intelligence wing output.
- Instructions have been issued by WR administration to introduce track patrolling along with the engineering staff in the sabotage prone area. As a precautionary measure, joint patrolling is done in Mhow-Khandwa section and Meghnagar – Dahod section by the joint team of Engineering, RPF and Signalling & Telecommunication departments. Coordination Committee is functioning in Ratlam and Bhavnagar divisions.
- It was noticed that in ECR, NFR surprise night track patrolling was not being done on regular basis due to shortage of staff. In ER, the gang-men

⁵ ADRM-Additional Divisional Railway Manager

⁶ Sr. DSC – Senior Divisional Security Commissioner

⁷ Sr. DEN-Senior Divisional Engineer

⁸ Sr. DOM-Senior Divisional Operating Manager

of engineering department conduct night track patrolling in vulnerable areas. In exigencies, special patrol trains rush to the area immediately.

- In ECoR, patrolling is being done as and when required.
- In SER, patrolling by gang men has however been intensified but no surprise patrolling is being carried out by security personnel as sabotage in Maoist infested areas was normally not in the form of thefts/tampering of railway track fittings/signal gears etc. Track sabotage, normally occurred during pre- announced bandh-calls/protests etc.

4.1.2 Limitations of Track Patrolling

Given the gigantic size of the rail network of the Indian Railways, physical patrolling in motorised trolleys and on foot can be possible only in selective sensitive stretches. Technical solutions for monitor ring railway tracks over a much larger area need to be resorted to in sensitive areas.

4.2 Impact on Safety

Despite the above measures, the incidence of sabotage has increased in the past one year. Railway accidents due to sabotage have increased from 5 in 2005-06 to 14 during 2009-10.

Railways have indicated that there were 26 incidents of blowing of railway track etc. in 2009 as against 11 in 2008. The revenue loss in goods traffic in Eastern Railway alone was ` 25.38 crore during the period 2008-09 to November 2010 due to naxalite/maoist activities.

Two major incidents of train derailment occurred in 2010. The Rajdhani Express was derailed in Bihar's Gaya district in March 2010. The Commissioner of Railway Safety, Eastern Circle, Kolkata concluded that the derailment was due to explosion of bomb on the track.

In another case, the Jnaneswari Express derailed and collided with a goods train running in the opposite direction on the adjacent track on 28 May 2010. 150 passengers (including four staff) died while 168 passengers and two staff were injured in this accident. Complete rail traffic was stopped for two days in the section. The Railway Safety Commissioner (CRS) confirmed that the accident on the Jnaneswari Express was caused by tampering of track and attributed the cause as sabotage.

Examination of records revealed that the Railway Board on 24th and 25th May 2010, had advised the Zonal Railways to take adequate precaution to protect Railway property against any subversive activities in view of the Maoist's call for observance of Kala Saptaha from 28 May to 2 June 2010. Further, specific intelligence reports regarding possible attack on railway property were also received. It appears that the IR had not taken any action to secure the track other than imposing a speed restriction of 75 kmph as a precautionary measure. Despite there being a temporary speed restriction of 75 kmph in the section, the train was running at a speed of 96 kmph. A pilot engine was not run on this

track, though a convoy of trains had passed on this track less than an hour earlier.

Jnaneswari Express Accident and collision with Goods Train



The Railways have incurred an expenditure of ` 5.60 crore towards ex-gratia payment to the relatives of identified dead and injured passengers, besides the loss of revenue due to stoppage of traffic on this section for more than 48 hours.

4.3 Rail Roko Agitations

The Indian Railways is a symbol of the central government and hence is the target of many agitators who have a grievance against the state/ central government. They are frequently successful in halting train movements- both passenger and freight for long periods. This not only leads to loss of revenue to the railways but also holds the local population to ransom due to problems in commuting and shortage of supplies. During the past one year there have been a number of agitations which have targeted the railways and led to disruption of rail traffic for long periods. This includes cancellation\ diversion of trains leading to loss of substantial revenue.

The State Police have been frequently unsuccessful in preventing large scale disruption to rail traffic during the periods of agitation by specific groups like

the Gujjar agitation and the recent Jat agitation. From April to December 2010, there had been 115 cases of 'rail roko' agitations few of which were spread over a period of three weeks. More than 1500 passenger trains had to be cancelled, and another 1500 diverted over longer routes and more than 3500 re-scheduled on account of such disruptions. During 2010 the railways have lost about ` 504.62 crores on account of these agitations.

IR in its reply in May 2010 stated that it is the statutory responsibility of the State Government concerned to ensure smooth and safe running of trains. Further, IR also brought out that Standing Committees consisting of ADRM, Sr.DSC, Sr. DEN & Sr. DOM are functioning at Divisional level of the Zonal Railways. IR stated (July 2011) that presently, security of tracks, bridges and tunnels in the Jammu & Kashmir and affected sections of Northeast Frontier Region and Left Wing extremist affected area is undertaken by respective state governments.

Audit observed that the secured running of trains is not being ensured at all times indicating a greater need for cooperation with the state governments. Further, Audit observed that Standing Committees have not been set up in all the divisions in ECR, ER, NCR and NWR.

4.4 Security in Railway Establishments

With the heightened threat perspective in Indian Railways, all Railway establishments are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks. A review in Audit of the security arrangements in some of the important establishments like General Manager (GM)'s office, Railway Hospitals, Workshops, Yards, Passenger Reservation System (PRS) servers etc. of the Zonal Railways revealed the following:

- Out of 15 General Manager's offices checked, security guards were posted at all the entry points in only ten⁹ zones and Metro Kolkata. In the remaining zones all the entry points were not guarded. Armed guards were posted only at four zones (SR, NER, CR & ER) and Metro Railway. Private security guards were provided at three zones (SECR, SCR & NCR). In SCR both private security and RPF guards were deployed at the GM's office building. No proper screening of visitors was taking place as DFMDs were provided only at five zones (NER, CR, SCR, NFR & NR) and Metro Kolkata.
- No guards were deployed in five zones (SWR, NER, NWR, WR & ECR) out of 17 Railway hospitals examined. Security guards were not armed in any zone except in NFR. Though private security guards were deployed in six zones (ECoR, SECR, NCR, SCR, WCR & NR), they were not armed. In NR the Central Hospital at New Delhi was being guarded by both private security and RPF.

⁹ SR, NER, SER, SECR, SCR, ER, ECR, NFR, WCR, NR.

- Similarly in 19 workshops and 22 yards in the Zonal Railways examined by audit it was noticed that though RPF guards were deployed, in most of the places they were found unarmed.



Ghorouri Yard. Pune open from all sides

Further, some yards were found open from all sides with no fencing and boundary wall at all.

4.4.1 Criminal cases on Railway Premises

As per the RPF Act the protection and safeguarding railway property and railway premises is entrusted to RPF. The table below gives the position of the crime reported on railway premises.

Year	Work shop/ Prod. Units	Yard/ Goods Shed	Construction sites	Cash Duty	Railway Stations	Admin. Buildings	Residential colonies	Others	Total
2005-06	280	1972	1	14	5368	16	11	18295	25957
2006-07	162	1500	16	4	7348	13	7	24256	33306
2007-08	153	2108	31	11	8998	18	17	34156	45492
2008-09	140	1867	31	9	8852	22	6	36455	47382
2009-10	96	1748	5	7	9201	8	15	42924	54081

Source:-Figures furnished by Zonal Railway

From the above table it seen that the total crime rate has more than doubled in the last five years. The places most vulnerable to crime are Railway Stations and Goods shed/Yards. However the deployment of RPF at these places has not been modified in accordance with the increase in crime rates. The deployment at workshops and production units was 2366 in 2005-06 and was only slightly

reduced to 2279 in 2009-10 (reduction of only four per cent), while the crime rate in workshops and production units declined by 65 per cent in 2009-10. Similarly the crime rate at Railway stations increased from 5368 in 2005-06 to 9201 in 2009-10 (increase of 71 per cent), whereas the deployment of RPF at stations was 9345 in 2005-06 which increased to only 10687 in 2009-10 (increased by 14 per cent only).

Though the RPF is empowered to investigate and raid the suspect's premises and arrest culprits, the detection of theft/pilferage cases is not very satisfactory. The details of theft cases and their detection available in fifteen zones (ER, SR, SCR, NFR, NWR, ECoR, WCR, NCR, NER, NR, SWR, WR, ECR, SER and CR) and Metro/Kolkata for the last five years are as follows:

Sl.No.	Year	No. of cases registered	No. of cases detected	Percentage of detection on cases registered	Value of property stolen (in crores of `)	Value of property recovered (in crores of `)
1	2005-06	9214	5334	57.89	3.33	2.35
2	2006-07	7846	5409	68.93	4.05	3.00
3	2007-08	8142	5489	67.42	3.43	2.42
4	2008-09	7317	4990	68.20	5.39	3.47
5	2009-10	5540	4018	75.53	3.66	2.64

It is seen from the above table that the percentage of detection of cases ranged only between 58 per cent and 76 per cent. A further review revealed that the percentage of detection of cases had never gone beyond 39 per cent in ER in the last five years. Similarly full value of the property could not be recovered in any of the years.

4.5 Compensation Claims

As per the Railways Act, 1989, the IR is responsible for the loss/destruction, or non-delivery of animals or goods delivered to the administration for carriage by railway. Their loss/destruction not only involves claims for compensation but also results in loss of public goodwill. Audit observed that all cases lodged with the Railway Claim offices were not registered with the RPF. Out of 81834 claim cases lodged with Railway claim offices in nine¹⁰ zones only 1341 cases (1.64 per cent) were finally registered with the RPF and the same were investigated. In other zones the position of cases registered with RPF were not made available. It is evident from the above figures that all the claim cases were not registered with the RPF. The reasons for not registering all the claims lodged with the RPF are not clear.

As per Para 2101 of Indian Railway Commercial Manual, reduction in claims is one of the indices of efficiency of the Railways and every efforts should be made to reduce the Railway claims bill. The compensation paid by Railways

¹⁰ SR, SWR, SER, SECR, CR, NCR, SCR, WR, NFR.

during the period 2005-10 for death and injury in train accidents as well as for the damage /theft of goods carried by it is indicated below.

(` in crore)

Year	Compensation paid by Railways for	
	Death /Injury in train accidents	Loss of goods carried
2005-06	2.22	17.59
2006-07	5.01	14.71
2007-08	1.21	9.85
2008-09	2.66	6.40
2009-10	4.85	13.99

Source:-Year Book Indian Railways

It is seen that the compensation paid by Railways has been fluctuating widely. During 2009-10 payment of compensation increased substantially for both death/injury cases and loss of goods carried indicating a decline in one of their efficiency indices.

4.6 Disposal of empty cartridges

Railway Board issued guidelines in September 2006 elaborating the procedure for disposal of empty fired cartridges lying with RPF. The empty cartridges were to be disposed off with the approval of standing committee consisting of Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer, Controller of Stores/Chief Materials Manager and CSC/RPF. The review of records revealed that in four zones¹¹ a total quantity of 36640.53 kgs and in eight zones¹² and two production units a quantity of 6380904 Nos of empty cartridges had not been disposed. Delay in disposal leads to non realisation of revenue on scrap and also unnecessary expenditure on security and custody of the scrap.

4.7 Conclusion

The Standing Committee on Railways of the 15th Lok Sabha had observed (August 2010) that the Indian Railways is the lifeline of the nation, but when the life of passengers and the property of the Railways themselves become a casualty in the wake of accidents etc. it is a cause of worry which warrants serious introspection.

The IR's primary responsibility is to ensure safe and smooth running of trains – both passenger and freight. For this a secure and obstruction free rail track is essential. High Level Committee had also recommended that technological solutions need to be found for ensuring better surveillance of tracks in sensitive areas. However, it has been observed that the IR has not formulated any composite plan in consultation with the state governments for ensuring safety and security of its assets especially tracks and bridges and Over Head Equipment (OHE).

¹¹ SR-17393.08kg, SCR-6706.02kg, ER-9374.44kg, NR-3167kg.

¹² NER-238390 Nos., ECoR-328284 Nos.,SER-1777788 Nos., SECR-102513 Nos., CR-1320715 Nos., WR-1310062 Nos., ECR-492317 Nos., NFR-648208 Nos., CLW-154969 Nos., DLW-7658 Nos.

Controlling of crime on railway premises/of railway property is the responsibility of the RPF. In the last five years there has been a distinct rise in the total crime rate at railway premises indicating that the RPF needs to upgrade the level of security provided at railway premises.

Recommendations

- *It is essential that the IR work out an arrangement with the State Government Authorities for adequate steps to intensify track patrolling and institutionalise the co-ordination mechanism with the State Government authorities to ensure security of passengers and running of trains in sabotage prone areas.*
- *Railways should register all claim cases with the RPF for proper investigation and apprehension of culprits.*
- *With the rise in the crime in railway premises, it is essential that RPF upgrade the level of security provided.*

Chapter 5 → Preparedness of Indian Railways to handle the enhanced threat environment

Security is the degree of protection against danger, damage, loss and criminal activity. A security system leads to a high-performance system. When used together it is sufficient to ensure adequate levels of protection and is capable of handling disasters in the minimum possible time frame and least number of casualties. Another important aspect is the reduction of disruption to the systems of rail transportation ie the time taken for the railway system to start operating again.

5.1 Preparedness for Crisis Management

Crisis management is the process by which an organization deals with a major event that threatens to harm an organization or its stake holders. It consists of skills and techniques to handle a situation after it occurs to the point that recovery starts. Crisis management in the context of the railways would focus on minimising the loss of life and reduction in disruption in the operation of the Railways.

Crisis /Disasters confronting the Indian Railways can be classified into four main types:

- National level crisis which is specific to railways and is required to be managed with the help of other Ministries
- National level crisis which affects the country including the railways and different ministries have to help each other viz Earthquake, Cyclone etc. The Ministry of Home Affairs will assist railways in security related crisis situation like sabotage, bomb blast etc.
- Crisis situation which is not a national level crisis and is required to be managed with the help of other Ministries. Chemical explosions, fire in trains etc are covered under this type.
- Crisis situation which is not a national level crisis and can be managed with the help of internal resources of the railways.

For security related national level crisis, the Ministry of Home Affairs plays the lead role. For other crisis, railways are required to prepare its own crisis management plans. To deal with a crisis situation, the following Committees become activated.

- (i) National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC)–Apex body of Government of India to deliberate on national crisis. For security related crisis member Staff and Member Traffic are members.
- (ii) Crisis Management Group- This is the executive authority responsible for handling the crisis and will work under the broad directives issued by NCMC and will co-ordinate with the zonal management group. For security related crisis DG /RPF is the convener.

- (iii) Zonal Management Group –This group is the same for all crisis and is established at the zonal level. This group is convened by the Additional General Managers and includes the representatives from safety, security and Engineering departments.

During any security related crisis, the railways may need the help of other agencies for their expertise. In these cases the instructions contained in the Railway accident manual /Disaster Management plan become applicable. The disaster management plan at the zonal level plays an important role and has to be dovetailed with the disaster management plan of the State Government and District Administration. In cases of sabotage the GRP and the State Police play an important role as they investigate the criminal cases relating to sabotage /explosion.

Chapter 1 of report No. 8 of 2008 of the C&AG of India (Railways) on Disaster Management on Indian Railways had reviewed emergency preparedness across Indian Railways in handling disasters. While verifying the action taken note of the Ministry of Railways it was observed that full scale disaster management exercise was not conducted in SER during 2008-10 except once each at Hatia- Muri section and Rourkela. IR stated (July 2011) that since there is a lot of traffic and accidents in SER and actual full scale disaster management exercise takes place very often so there was no need to conduct mock disaster management exercise during the period.

The Public Accounts Committee of 15th Lok Sabha in its Sixteenth Report (2009-10) on Disaster Management, noted that achieving rapid access to the accident sites still remains a major hurdle as rescue operation during the Golden Hour cannot be achieved with conventional provision of Accident Relief Train (ART), Accident Relief Medical Van (ARMV) and Self Propelled Accident Relief Train (SPART) etc. In this context, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) stated that the Indian Railways require a paradigm shift in their approach and integration of railway disaster management infrastructure with those of civil authorities, armed forces etc.

5.2 Restoration of Commercial Traffic

An analysis of restarting of movement of trains after an accident was done by the safety directorate in Railway Board. It observed that after the track is declared fit there are considerable delays in restoring the movement of commercial trains after the restoration subsequent to an accident. Restoration of commercial traffic after “Track Fit¹³” took time ranging from one hour to 20 hours in 171 cases, whereas restoration after ‘OHE Fit’ took 13 minutes to four hours in 25 cases.

5.3 Man Power Management


Manpower management focuses on the accurate identification of human resource requirements (in terms of both quantity and quality) necessary to

¹³ Track fit condition is the state when track is declared fit for running trains after carrying out repair to the damage caused due to accident /sabotage

perform specific tasks and in which they will be most efficiently and economically used.

5.3.1 Man power shortage

The manpower position as of 1st April for the period 2005-06 to 2009-10 is given in [Annexure-III](#). It is seen that in all the five years there was a shortage of staff in all the categories. The combined vacancies of the railway security forces declined from 19 to 11 per cent during the period 2005-10. In GRP, the vacancy position increased from seven per cent in 2005-06 to sixteen per cent in 2009-10. The shortfall in manpower in RPF, RPSF and GRP is depicted below:



In the aftermath of the bomb blasts in trains in Mumbai during July 2006, the Railway Board in August 2006 called for comprehensive proposals for creation of additional posts so as to strengthen the security in Zonal Railways. In response to this the Railways (including Metro/Kolkata) sent their proposals for additional man power totalling to 23655 personnel¹⁴.

Audit observed that in South Central Railway, the assessment of requirement for additional man power was defective. In July 2006 it was decided that Zonal Railways should not deploy RPF at goods sheds, train examination points etc. which had either been closed or reduced. However, SCR continued deployment of RPF in these areas and the deployment was disproportionately higher than the requirement. RPF personnel were also deployed as safaiwalas and cooks despite the decision that such works be outsourced. The requirement was also worked out without taking into account the deployment made by GRP for train escorting. This position is likely to be persisting in other zones also. It is thus

¹⁴ SR-2008, SWR-1171, NER-1298, NWR-2671, SER-731, SECR-294, CR- 2638, NCR-737, SCR-1136, ER- 827, WR-5072, ECR-2879, NFR-367, NR-1532, ECoR-150, Metro-.144

essential that the sanctioned strength be re-estimated in all zones based on the above directions issued by Railway Board.

Railway Board instructed the zones to outsource the security duties of non-core activities to private parties. Out of 16 zones, Metro Railway and six production units, only in 9 zones¹⁵ and one production unit the security of some sections (Dongaposi section of SER) administrative buildings, hospitals etc. was outsourced. Out of this, in SCR security of GM Building and in NR security of Central Hospital, New Delhi was being guarded done by both RPF and private security personnel.

Thus it is evident that Railways are reluctant to outsource security even in non core areas to private agencies. Audit attempted a comparison of cost of security arrangements provided by RPF in Carriage Workshop, Perambur (SR) with the cost of engaging private security at Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Terminal, Korukkupet, Chennai. It was noticed that the average cost per RPF personnel was `24273 whereas the average cost per private personnel at IOC terminal was only `13970. This shows that if the Railways had engaged private security personnel at non core areas they could have saved substantial amounts, besides utilising the RPF personnel for core areas.

Though the manpower position shows that there were a large number of vacancies in the RPF/RPSF, it is felt that if available manpower had been reorganized prioritizing core operations the assessed staff strength required may have declined. Despite proposals for creating more than 25,000 posts, the creation of posts was slow. The use of efficiency multipliers like DFMD's etc. also needs to be factored in before assessing the staff strength required.

The proposals for creation of additional posts were sent to Railway Board during the period 2006 to 2009. The Security Directorate of Railway Board informed Audit in January 2011 that 5134 posts had been created and the recruitment process is underway. Though threat perspective had increased from every angle - terrorist attack or naxalite/maoist attack - the Railways and the State Governments appear to be very slow in filling up the existing vacancies or redeploying man power for meeting the challenge of increased threat.

5.4 Training and Capacity Building

5.4.1 Training facilities

The High Level Committee on security for Indian Railways recommended that training and capacity building in terms of Man – Machine and procedures to counter anti social/extremist activities are required. The Committee brought out the following requirements:

- General sensitization of 100 per cent staff on Composite Security Plan to inculcate a professional attitude/ an instinctive response to threat assessment, response skills and post event execution through booklets, Capsule/Short term and specialized courses in a phased manner.

¹⁵ NWR, ECoR, SER, SECR, NCR, SCR, ECR, WCR, NR and DLW Varanasi.

- Facilities at Zonal RPF Training centres to be suitably upgraded to meet the requirements and each zone should have at least one training centre as each zone had its own peculiar problems.
- Every CSC should have his own independent training apparatus and curriculum.

Continuous training to upgrade knowledge levels to handle improved security systems, arms and ammunition is essential. The 15th Lok Sabha Standing Committee on Railways had also recommended that the officers and staff should be provided intensive training at regular intervals followed by refresher courses. There are 13 training centres for imparting training to RPF/RPSF staff over Indian Railways.

Audit reviewed the training programmes conducted in 15 zones (except NFR where the records were not made available). Audit examination revealed that 4112 training programmes were conducted for the officers and staff of RPF during the period 2005-10. Out of the 32622 staff nominated for the training programmes, 1122 staff did not attend the trainings due to various reasons. It was further observed that out of 302 officers in the rank of DSC/ASC nominated, 56 did not attend due to administrative reasons. Since training is an integral part of duties non-attendance on the ground of administrative reasons is not justified.

5.4.2 Up-gradation of training facilities

The Railway planned to upgrade the training facilities provided at the 10 recognised training centres of RPF over various Zonal Railways and to transform the Centralised Training Institute (CTI) at Lucknow in to a World Class training centre. They also planned to add three more training centres at Kanchrapara (ER), Nasik Road and Chinkhill (CR).

Audit observed that the existing training facilities were frequently incomplete and consequently remained underutilised. Regarding upgradation of training facilities at RPF training centres a budgetary allocation of ` 11 crore has been made. However, no expenditure has been incurred and no time frame has also been given for upgrading the training facilities. Thus, even after three years of submission of report by the committee its recommendation remains largely unimplemented. IR stated (July 2011) that phase wise up gradation of training centres is being done.

5.4.3 Multi skill training to all RPF /RPSF personnel

The IR planned to provide training to RPF /RPSF personnel in unarmed combat, disaster management and commando training at par with other paramilitary forces like CRPF, BSF etc. IR stated that slots have been allocated for RPF at NISA Hyderabad for training of trainer's course in disaster management, counter insurgency and jungle warfare for gazetted officers and subordinate officers at SSB/GWALDUM, and Police commando instructor course at NSG. Efforts are being made to get further slots in reputed training centres for specialised courses.

IR mentioned (May 2010) that RPF staff were/are being sent for Training of Trainers of Disaster Management at NISA, CISF, Hyderabad & Military Engineering College, Pune from time to time. Besides, Disaster Management courses are also conducted at JR/RPF/Academy to tackle the emergent situation. IR's contention is not acceptable as existing training facilities remained underutilised. Further training programmes were not attended by many of the security personnel on the ground of administrative reasons.

Thus, it is seen that the long term action plan for improvement in the security system of the Railways has not yet been implemented. In some of the cases even though action has been initiated no concrete results are yet visible.

5.5 Conclusion

In some of the zones in Railways full scale disaster management exercise was not conducted and the control rooms with communication facilities also remained to be provided. IR was neither able to rapidly access the disaster sites nor could they provide organised rescue and relief during the Golden Hour with the conventional ART, ARMV and SPART etc. Further, considerable delays were observed in restoring the movement of commercial trains after "Track Fit /OHE Fit.

Despite the fact that threat perspective had increased from every angle - terrorist attack or naxalite/maoist attack - the Railways and the State Governments did not respond promptly in filling up the existing vacancies or redeploying man power for meeting the challenge of increased threat.

The existing training facilities were frequently incomplete and consequently remained underutilised. Further non-attendance of training programmes on the ground of administrative reasons was indicative of casual approach of security personnel towards their duties.

Even though action has been initiated for implementing long term action plan no concrete results are yet visible.

Recommendations

- *The Indian Railways needs to integrate railway disaster management infrastructure with those of civil authorities, armed forces etc. The current arrangement of co-ordination for rescue and relief operations with civil authorities need to be further strengthened. Better use needs to be made of infrastructure available with the armed forces like use of hover craft etc.*
- *In view of the huge additional staff required for discharging their duties it is essential that the IR re-assesses the staff required for manning its core operations taking into account all efficiency multipliers.*
- *To handle the substantially enhanced risk environment, the competence of the departments handling disaster management needs a substantial upgrade. A comprehensive training programme needs to be framed to synergise the security forces and improve their response capabilities.*

Chapter 6 State of Preparation of Indian Railways

6.1 Surprise Inspection of High Risk Railway Stations

With a view to examine the preparedness and alertness of security staff and the security equipments provided at railway stations, Audit conducted surprise check at one station categorised as high risk in each zone on one day in collaboration with officers of RPF in January/ February 2011. The surprise check of 15 stations revealed the following:

- Out of 137 authorised gates there were 41 gates without any DFMDs installed. Out of these 41 gates only 59 per cent were found to be manned by RPF /GRP personnel. Checking of passengers was being carried out in only 3 stations.
- There were 106 unauthorised entry points at these 15 stations. No security personnel were deployed at these entrances except at Sealdah where 10 personnel were deployed against 50 entrances.
- Out of a total of 96 DFMDs provided over 15 stations, 32 per cent were found to be non-functional.
- Baggage scanners were provided at only 5 stations
- Out of a total of 470 CCTVs /Cameras /monitors provided at stations, 76 (16 per cent) were not found to be in working condition. Further, no CCTVs were found provided in 2 stations.

Position checked on some of the important stations is indicated below:-

- Sealdah Station of Eastern Railway was inspected on 24-1-2011. Nearly 68 per cent of the DFMDs provided were not working. Against 50 unauthorised entries at this station, only 10 security personnel were deployed.



Unrestricted entry point at Sealdah station in ER



Entry without DFMD and Baggage scanner at Sealdah station in ER

- Jharsuguda Station of SE Railway (lies in Maoist affected territory) was inspected on 31-1-2011 has several unauthorised entry points. There were no DFMDs installed since the two provided became out of order and were sent for repair in November 2010. There were no baggage scanners or CCTVs at this station.



- Mumbai CST station of Central Railway, which was targeted by terrorists in November 2008 was inspected on 28-01-2011. This station still has 7 unauthorised unguarded entry points. Though it has 28 DFMDs installed, there are only two baggage scanners.



Unrestricted entry at Mumbai station in CR

- The Chennai Egmore station of Southern Railway inspected on 24-1-2011, has five unauthorised and unguarded entry points and three gates without DFMDs, out of which only one was manned by security personnel but no frisking was done on that gate too. It was also found that out of 29 CCTV cameras provided at the station, 12 were not working. The TV scanners were also not placed correctly.



- Inspection of Surat station in WR on 27-01-2011 revealed that no DFMDs or Baggage Scanners were provided at the entrances. At this station, there were six authorised and six unauthorised entry points, none of which was manned by security personnel. Further, 20 of the 46 CCTV/Cameras/Monitors provided at the station were not working.



Unrestricted entry at Surat station in WR

- At Patna station of ECR which was inspected on 28-01-2011 there was no luggage scanner and none of the six DFMDs provided were working. Further 29 of the 48 CCTV/Cameras/Monitors provided at the station were not working.



No baggage scanner at entry point at Patna station in ECR



Gap near DFMD at Patna station in ECR

- Hyderabad station in SCR was inspected on 01-2-2011. It was seen that one out of four DFMDs was not functioning and the station had no baggage scanner installed on it. Further, six gates on this station were not equipped with DFMDs and were not even guarded by the security personnel.



Non functional DFMD and gaps near DFMD at Hyderabad station in SCR

- Allahabad station of NCR which was inspected on 25-01-2011, had no baggage scanner and DFMD installed and the five unauthorised entry points were not even manned by the security personnel.



Unguarded entry at Allahabad station in NCR



Unguarded/ unauthorized entry at Allahabad station in NCR

- Bhubaneswar station in ECoR was inspected on 25-01-2011. The station has four unauthorised and unguarded entry points. At two gates there were no guards or DFMDs. The only DFMD provided at one gate was not working. Further, the station has no CCTV/Cameras/Monitors installed on it.



Unrestricted entry at Bhubaneswar station in ECoR



Entry point without DFMD and baggage scanner at Bhubaneswar station in ECoR

- At Jammu Tawi station of NR (inspected on 01-02-2011), two out of four baggage scanners available at the stations were not working. Two out of three DFMDs provided at the station were found switched off at the time of inspection.



Non functional DFMD at Jammu station in NR

- Guwahati station in NFR which was inspected on 25-01-2011, had one out of four DFMDs and two out of 16 CCTVs not working. There were two unauthorised entry points which were not even guarded.



Unguarded entry point at Guwahati in NEFR

- Ajmer station in NWR was inspected on 24-01-2011 and it was seen that there was no baggage scanner at the station and one out of two DFMDs provided at station was not working. This station was found to be having five unauthorised entry points which were not even guarded by security personnel.




Unauthorised entry point at Ajmer Station in NWR



Unauthorised entry point at Ajmer Station in NWR

- Raipur station of SECR was inspected on 24-1-2011. All the five DFMDs provided were not working. Against two unauthorised entry points at this station, no security personnel were deployed. There were no baggage scanners available.



Entry point without DFMD and Baggage scanner at Raipur station in SECR



Unguarded entry to platform at Raipur station in SECR

- In SWR, at Bangalore station (inspected on 25-01-2011) three out of five DFMDs installed were not working. Further, no baggage scanner was installed at the station and five out of the 40 CCTVs were not working.

The station had 17 unauthorised entry points and the same were found to be unguarded.



Entry point without DFMD at Bangalore in SWR (DFMD sent for repair)



Some of the CCTVs not working at Bangalore in SWR

This inspection indicates the lack of seriousness in the approach of the Indian Railways towards security of its passengers. No attempt has been made by

them to control access to even high risk stations which are the first step towards ensuring security. The surveillance equipment installed is either faulty or incorrectly placed resulting in gaps in the system.

IR in its reply (July 2011) stated that security along with other concerns is one of the priority areas of Railways for strengthening and up gradation. Short Term and Long Term plans have been formulated for infrastructural strengthening and legal empowerment of RPF. Concrete steps have been taken as enshrined in Vision 2020 of Indian Railways for synchronization of technology and human resource to provide effective security over Indian Railways. It further added that the security of passengers is one of the primary concerns of railways and all out efforts are being taken for optimum utilization of available resources to provide adequate security to passengers.

However, keeping in view the results of surprise check, IR need to take concrete steps to plug the loop holes in its security system.

Recommendation

A paradigm shift in the approach towards security by IR is required. Simple low cost measures like closure of unauthorized entry/exit points need to be emphasized. Serious efforts are required to be made for securing entry /exit points and proper maintenance of the existing security equipments installed at the stations in order to ensure safe and secure rail operations.

**New Delhi
Dated:**

**(T.K. SANYAL)
Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General**

Countersigned

**New Delhi
Dated:**

**(VINOD RAI)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India**

Annexure I
(Para No. 1.8)
Audit scope and methodology

This Performance Audit covers a period of 5 years from 2005-06 to 2009-10. This performance audit covers issues pertaining to security of railway passengers and railway property. The Security related issues and the measures taken by the Railways for the period beyond 2009-10 were also checked wherever possible to make the observations current. The methodology followed included the following:-

- The Performance Audit programme commenced with an entry conference in June 2010 with the Security Directorate at Railway Board level. At the zonal level a separate entry conference was held with the Chief Security Commissioners of the Zonal Railways. The audit Objectives, Scope etc. were discussed in the entry conference.
- The records of Security Department in the offices of Railway Board, Chief Security Commissioners, Divisional Security Commissioners and outposts of RPF were examined.
- In addition, the position of deployment of GRP, the crime reports of GRP and the records relating to payments to State Governments for GRP were reviewed.
- Before undertaking the Performance Audit, a pilot study was also undertaken in two zones – Central Railway and South Central Railway – to gather information on the security arrangements and the preparedness of the Railways to meet the present day security challenges.
- Based on the results of the pilot study and information collected at the Railway Board level, guidelines were prepared and circulated to all Principal Directors of Audit at the zonal level. The Performance Audit was conducted based on the guidelines in all zones and at the Railway Board level.
- An attempt has also been made to assess the preparedness of the railways in handling the crisis /disaster occurring due to the extremist /terrorist attack.
- Surprise check of one station in each zone was also conducted in collaboration with security officers to assess the alertness of security personnel and equipments installed.

**Annexure II
(Para No. 1.9)**

Sample size

Details of Sample selection done by the zones								
Zone	Divisions	Stations	Workshop	Hospital	Yard	Trains	PRS server	GM Office
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
CR	Mumbai, Nagpur, Pune	CSTM, Kalyan, Nagpur, Wardha, Pune	Matunga	Byculla Hospital	Trombay, Ajni, Ghorpuri	2167, 1027, 2105, 1093, 1057, 1017, 2322, 1015, 2141, 2163	CSTM PRS	GM Office, CSTM
ER	Howrah, Sealdah	Howrah, Brdwan, Sealdah, Naihati	Liluah	B.R.Singh Hospital	Bandel Yard	2305, 2303, 2321, 2311, 2019, 3071, 2351, 3049, 3051, 3153	PRS Kolkata	GM Office, Fairlie Place
NR	Delhi, Moradabad	Morabad, Dehradun, New Delhi, H.Nizamuddin	CB Workshop	Central Hospital, New Delhi	TKD	2425, 2032, 2137, 2230, 1078, 1449, 4041, 4553, 5013, 9106	Delhi	GM Office, New Delhi
SR	Chennai, Salem	Chennai Central, Jolarpettai, Coimbatore, Erode	Golden Rock	Hqrs Hospital, Perambur	Jolarpettai	2431, 2008, 2621, 2323, 2686, 2633, 2672, 6525, 6222, 1028	Chennai	GM Office, Chennai
WR	Mumbai Central, Ahmedabad	Borivali, Vapi, Ahmedabad, Viramgam	Sabarmati	Railway Hospital, Valsad	Mahim Scrap Yard	2951, 2953, 2955, 2961, 9143, 4708, 9017, 9115, 2480, 9131	Nil	GM Office, Churchgate
SCR	Secunderabad, Hyderabad	Kazipet, Vikarabad, Kachiguda, Nizamabad	Lallaguda	Central Hospital, Lallaguda	Ramagundam Yard	2429, 2703, 2728, 2737, 2797, 2763, 7002, 7057, 8463, 7604		
SER	Kharagpur, Chakradharpur	Kharagpur, Santragachi, Tatanagar, Jharsuguda	Kharagpur	Central Hospital, Garden Reach	Nimpura, Tatanagar	2443, 2022, 8615, 2020, 2860, 2833, 2703, 2815, 315, 2884	Nil	GM Office, Garden Rach

NER	Lucknow (LKO), Izatnagar (IZN)	LKO, GKP, CPR, Gonda, Kathgodam	Izatnagar	Badshahnagar	Gonda	2541, 2555, 2534, 2511, 5014, 5008, 5308, 5009, 5004, 2559	Nil	GM Office, GKP
NFR	Lumding, Katihar	Guwahati, Lumding, New Jalpaiguri, Katihar	New Bongaigaon	Central Hospital, Maligaon	Marshalling Yard, NJP	5604, 4056, 2424, 5691, 5959, 2506, 2344, 2345, 2502, 5610	Guwahati	GM Office, Maligaon
NCR	Allahabad (ALD), Agra Cantt(AGC)	ALD, CNB, AGC, MTJ	Jhansi	Central Hospital, ALD	Govind Puri Yard	2001, 2137, 1077, 2724, 2616, 2417, 2398, 2354, 2424, 2427.	Nil	GM Office, ALD
ECR	Sonepur, Danapur	Patna, Danapur, Sonepur, Barauni	SPJ Workshop	Divisional Hospital, Danapur	Rajendra Nagar Terminal	2309, 3201, 2296, 2150, 2948, 2352, 2360, 3288, 3330, 8623, 2355, 2142, 8184, 8450	Patna	
ECoR	Kurda Road, Sambalpur	Bhubaneswar, Puri, Sambalpur, Titlagarh	Mancheswar	Central Hospital, Mancheswar	Cuttack Station Yard	2840, 2801, 2838, 2841, 2863, 2443, 8377, 8410, 8452, 1019	BBS	GM Office, BBS
SECR	Bilaspur, Raipur	Durg, Champa	Raipur	Central Hospital, Bilaspur	Bilaspur	2833, 2807, 2853, 2809, 8239, 6327, 8207, 8203, 405, 8236	Nil	GM Office, Bilaspur
SWR	Hubli, Bangalore	UBL, VSG, SBC, HUP	UBL	UBL	RCD Yard, SBC	2429, 2627, 2629, 2780, 6221, 6517, 6590, 6592, 7415, 7416,	Nil	GM Office, UBL
WCR	Jabalpur, Bhopal	JBP, Katni, Bhopal, Bina	Kota	Central Hospital, JBP	Scrap Yard, Kota	2121, 2412, 2001, 2156, 2189, 2191, 1472, 8233, 5010, 2181	JBP	GM Office, JBP
NWR	Jaipur, Jodhpur	Jaipur, Rewari, Jodhpur, Merta Road	Jodhpur	Jaipur	Kanakpura	2464, 2965, 2980, 0234, 2983, 9781, 2462, 2974, 2976, 2968	Nil	GM Office, Jaipur
RPU/ Metro	Nil	Dum Dum, Mahanayak Uttamkumar	CLW & DLW, Metro workshop Noapara	Metro Hospital, Tollygunge	Nil	Nil	Nil	GM Office, Metro Bhavan, Kolkata

Annexure-III
(Para No. 5.3.1)
(Man power position)

Year	Sanctioned Strength				Shortage (per cent)			
	RPF	RPSF	Total RPF & RPSF	GRP	RPF	RPSF	Total RPF & RPSF	GRP
2005-06	52515	7500	60015	33432	8811 (16.78)	2378 (31.71)	11189 (18.64)	2173 (6.50)
2006-07	53658	8377	62035	33489	7373 (13.74)	2433 (29.04)	9806 (15.81)	2617 (7.81)
2007-08	53990	8375	62365	33610	5703 (10.56)	1302 (15.55)	7005 (11.23)	2349 (6.99)
2008-09	54568	8880	63448	36662	6108 (11.19)	788 (8.87)	6896 (10.87)	4052 (11.05)
2009-10	54902	9128	64030	38647	6358 (11.58)	816 (8.94)	7174 (11.20)	6335 (16.39)

Abbreviations used in the Report

IR	Indian Railways
CR	Central Railway
ER	Eastern Railway
ECR	East Central Railway
ECoR	East Coast Railway
NR	Northern Railway
NCR	North Central Railway
NER	North Eastern Railway
NFR	Northeast Frontier Railway
NWR	North Western Railway
SR	Southern Railway
SCR	South Central Railway
SER	South Eastern Railway
SECR	South East Central Railway
SWR	South Western Railway
WR	Western Railway
WCR	West Central Railway
RPU	Railway Production Units
FIR	First Information Report
RPF	Railway Protection Force
GRP	Government Railway Police