

## Chapter 6

### Implementation of schemes

The flagship schemes of Government of India like the National Food Security Mission, *Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana* and Support to State Extension Reforms which were under implementation in the State during 2006-11 were reviewed by us and the audit findings are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### 6.1 National Food Security Mission

The National Food Security Mission (NFSM), a hundred *per cent* centrally sponsored scheme, was launched in 2007-2008 with the main objective of increasing production of rice, wheat and pulses by ten, eight and two million tonnes respectively at the national level by the end of Eleventh Plan (2007-12) through area expansion and productivity enhancement on sustainable basis in the identified districts.

In Odisha, two components viz. NFSM (Rice) and NFSM (Pulses) were implemented (2007-08) in 15 districts and 10 districts respectively; the coverage of districts covered for pulses increased to 30 in 2010-11. The Institute on Management of Agricultural Extension (IMAGE) was the nodal agency for implementation of the scheme under the overall steering and monitoring of the State Food Security Mission Executive Committee (SFSMEC). Scheme funds were released by GoI in favour of IMAGE and after allocation of funds by the State Executive Committee; the same were released by the IMAGE to the District level authorities of the Agriculture Department. The DAOs were to submit progress reports and utilisation certificates (UC) to the nodal agency for onward transmission to the nodal department (Agriculture Department) for submission to the GoI after approval by the State Executive Committee. In the first meeting (March 2008) of the State Executive Committee, the State monitoring team headed by the Director of Agriculture was constituted for monitoring the activities of the Mission.

GoI released scheme funds of ₹ 195.50 crore which were utilised in full during 2007-11. This was a very good development from the point of view of implementation. However, we noticed several deficiencies in implementation of the scheme as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

##### **6.1.1 Shortfall in achievement of targets for production under NFSM (rice and pulses) for the State**

Keeping in view the targets fixed by the GoI for the country as a whole, the Department set a target of increase of production of rice and pluses by eight lakh metric tonnes and 87000 tonnes respectively by the end of 2011-12 over the production of 2006-07. The achievement of rice and pulses production during 2007-11 is given in the **Table 7** below:

**Table 7: Achievement production of rice and pulses under NFSM in the State during 2007-11**

Year	Rice (lakh MT)	Pulses (lakh MT)
2006-07 (Base year)	26.46	8.66
2007-08	30.22	9.08
2008-09	26.92	9.94
2009-10	26.05	9.62
2010-11	27.97	10.01

(Source : Records of the Director of Agriculture)

It could be seen from the table that production of rice in 15 districts covered under NFSM had remained almost at the same level during 2007-11 compared to the production of the base year 2006-07 and it was far away from the set target of 34.46 lakh metric tonnes i.e., production of 26.46 lakh metric tonnes during 2006-07 plus eight lakh tonnes increase targeted by the Department. However, the Department surpassed the targeted increase in production of 87,000 metric tonnes of pulses during the above period as the production increased from 8.66 lakh metric tonnes in 2006-07 to 10.10 lakh metric tonnes in 2010-11.

### 6.1.2 Shortfall in production and distribution of hybrid rice seeds

The scheme emphasised popularisation of hybrid rice cultivation through production, demonstration and distribution of hybrid rice seeds to the farmers to boost production. On proposal sent by the State Government, the GoI allocated ₹ 1.93 crore for this purpose during 2007-11 against which ₹ 1.43 crore were spent during the period. The details of production, distribution and demonstration of hybrid rice seeds during 2007-11 is given in the **Table 8** below

**Table 8: Production, demonstration and distribution of hybrid rice seeds during 2007-11**

Name of the intervention	Target	Achievement	Shortfall	percentage of shortfall
Production of hybrid rice seeds (in quintal)	200	0	200	100
Demonstration of technology (in numbers)	4688	4532	156	3
Distribution of hybrid seeds (in quintal)	2500	334	2166	87

(Source: Annual Progress Reports of the Mission Director, NFSM)

As indicated in the table above, there was shortfall in achievement under hybrid rice seed production (100 per cent), demonstration (three per cent) and distribution (87 per cent) during 2007-11.

#### 6.1.2.1 Failure to produce hybrid certified rice seeds by OUAT

As per the scheme, the State Executive Committee was to decide the activities to be undertaken. The Committee decided (December 2007) to take up hybrid rice seed cultivation in three stages viz. (i) supply of breeder seeds<sup>21</sup> to OUAT by the Central Rice Research Institute (CRRI), Cuttack, (ii) production of foundation seeds by the OUAT out of breeder, and, (iii) supply of foundation seeds by OUAT to OSSC for production of certified seeds for ultimate distribution to the growers.

We noticed that the OUAT could not provide foundation seeds to the OSSC owing to failure in producing such seeds despite supply of breeder seeds by the

<sup>21</sup> Breeder seeds: Breeder seeds of a particular variety area produced by the research institutions of the State/Centre to be introduced for greater production

CRRI, Cuttack to them during *Rabi* 2008-09 due to non-synchronous flowering of the parental lines<sup>22</sup>. Subsequently, it was decided in the Mission Advisory Committee Meeting (March 2010) that the OSSC would procure breeder seeds directly from the CRRI, Cuttack and produce certified varieties under the technical supervision and guidance of the CRRI so as to make the State self sufficient in hybrid seed production. OSSC made an attempt to produce hybrid seeds on experimental basis at Bargarh Farm by procuring breeder seeds from the CRRI, Cuttack but failed as the required technical supervision and guidance of CRRI was not taken.

Thus, due to failure in monitoring the activities by the monitoring team headed by the Director and in which representatives of CRRI and OUAT were members, no production of hybrid rice seeds could be effected during the entire four year period 2007-11 depriving the farmers of the benefits of hybrid seeds.

**6.1.2.2 Shortfall in distribution of hybrid rice seeds:** Demonstration of hybrid technology was to be followed by distribution of hybrid rice seeds to farmers in the adjacent areas to facilitate adoption of the technology by them. There was also shortfall in distribution of hybrid rice seeds by 87 *per cent* as the OSSC could procure only 334 quintal of seeds from outside State against the targeted quantity of 2500 quintal during 2007-11 as:

- Supply order was not placed on Karnataka State Seed Corporation despite availability of the required variety of seed (KRH-2) with them during 2007-08; no reasons for the same were available on record.
- Only 290 quintals out of 731.80 quintal of hybrid rice seeds (KRH-2) procured during 2008-09 could be utilised due to delayed procurement by the OSSC.
- Only 44 quintals of hybrid rice seeds were procured during 2009-10, despite availability of the same with other State Seed Corporations while no procurement was effected during 2010-11 due to non-finalisation of tender.

Thus, lack of advance planning, delayed action and inaction on the part of the OSSC where the CCO was a member of the Board of Directors led to shortfall in distribution of hybrid seeds thereby failing to popularise hybrid rice cultivation in the State. Due to less distribution of hybrid seeds, the objective of boosting production was not fulfilled.

### **6.1.2.3 Demonstration vis-à-vis distribution**

Demonstration of improved package of practices for hybrid rice was to be conducted in the farmers' field to create awareness about the improved practices followed by distribution of hybrid rice seeds to the farmers. Against the targeted 4688 demonstrations, the achievement was 4532 (97 *per cent*) during 2007-11. Scheme guidelines envisaged that each demonstration was to be carried out over 0.04 hectares for coverage of 100 hectares of neighbouring farmers and distribution of 15kg of seeds per hectare. During 2007-11, there

<sup>22</sup> Non-flowering of male and female plants at the same time

were 4532 demonstrations which were meant for coverage of 4.53 lakh hectares requiring distribution of 67980 quintal of hybrid seeds. However, we observed, only 334 quintal of seeds (0.5 per cent) was distributed resulting in shortfall of 99.5 per cent under distribution due to (i) smaller target of 2500 quintals proposed for 2007-11 against requirement of 67980 quintal of hybrid seeds for carrying out 4532 demonstrations<sup>23</sup>, and, (ii) less procurement of hybrid rice seeds by OSSC.

We further observed that the targets under demonstration during 2008-09 was increased to 2475 from 285 while that of distribution drastically reduced to 300 quintal from 500 quintal, reason for which, although asked for by the Government of India (February 2009), was yet to be furnished by the Department (March 2012). Thus, the implementation of the project was a complete failure in the State as the Department placed more importance on demonstration activities rather than distribution leading to unfruitful expenditure of ₹ 1.35<sup>24</sup> crore on 4510 demonstrations due to non-distribution of seeds.

### **6.1.3 Utilisation of older varieties of seeds**

The guidelines envisaged use of recently released varieties of seed (i) not older than five years for demonstration and supply of mini kits for rice and (ii) less than 10 years for pulse varieties to boost production.

It was, however, noticed that each year during the four year period (2007-11), the Department went on seeking approval of the GoI for relaxation of the age limit of seeds to beyond 15 years for demonstration and distribution and up to 15 years for supply of mini kits which were ultimately approved by the GoI. The reason cited by the Department was that the older varieties were in demand by the farmers. This indicated that the CCO and the Director and their field functionaries like VAWs and AAOs engaged in extension services failed to motivate the growers for adoption of recently released varieties.

We are of the opinion that this assumed importance in the context of reduced production of rice under NFSM particularly during 2009-2010, when the total production went down to 26.05 lakh MT as compared to 26.46 lakh MT in 2006-2007.

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<sup>23</sup> The 4532 demonstrations required distribution of 67980 quintals (4532 x 100 hectare X 15 kg per hectare) as per the norms prescribed for demonstration and distribution.

<sup>24</sup> Total distribution of Hybrid seed- 334 quintal or say 33400Kg. Area for which distributed-33400 kg/15 kg=2227 hectares, area for which not distributed: 453200 hectares-2227 hectares= 450973 hectares, Number of demonstrations involved= 450973 hectares/ 100 hectares =4510 demonstrations, Cost of demonstration for 4510 demonstrations = 4510 X ₹ 3000 = ₹ 13530000 or ₹ 1.35 crore.

### 6.1.4 Awards in favour of the State

The State received two awards from GoI under National Food Security Mission scheme viz. (i) Best performing State in the eastern region for 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 and (ii) *Krishi Karman* award as best performing State in food grain production during 2010-2011. We feel that the production of rice would have got a further boost had the focus been on production and distribution of hybrid rice seeds as contemplated under the NFSM scheme.

### 6.1.5 Expenditure on micronutrients

Deficiencies of micronutrients like zinc, boron, copper in soils have proved to be a major constraint to production and productivity. To obviate this it was envisaged in the NFSM guidelines to give assistance up to a maximum of ₹ 500 per hectare for two hectare to each farmer whose soil was deficient and had the micronutrient content below the critical limit as defined by the All India Soil and Land Use Survey (AISLUS). The above GoI organisation was declared as the nodal agency for identification of priority area for application of micronutrients in the identified districts of the State. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the National Bureau of Soil Survey and Land Use Planning, Nagpur and the Indian Institute of Social Science, Bhopal would also be involved in identification of priority areas. Based on the report of the AISLUS, GoI issued (2009) a guideline for use of micronutrients for correction of individual nutrient deficiency and for arresting its further spread in the following deficient districts of the State.

**Table 9: Details of micronutrient deficient districts in Odisha**

Sl.No	Micronutrient	Deficient districts
1	Zinc	Bolangir, Boudh, Kalahandi, Nawarangpur, Keonjhar
2	Boron	Bolangir, Baragarh, Cuttack, Ganjam, Jajpur
3	Copper	Kalahandi
4	Iron	No deficiency reported anywhere

(Source: Guidelines for use of micronutrients, soil ameliorants and integrated nutrient management practices in NFSM States)

It was noticed that during 2009-11, contrary to GoI guidelines, there was expenditure of ₹ 1.74 crore on assistance for micronutrients under Rice and Pulse components in several non-deficient districts (*Appendix-4*). This action might have disturbed the micronutrient balance already existing in these non-deficient districts as unnecessary use of one ingredient induces deficiency in other ingredient(s) as indicated in the GoI guidelines (2009) affecting future agricultural growth in these districts.

The Director stated (July 2012) the micronutrients were applied on recommendation of State Agriculture University according to which soils of Odisha are deficit in Boron and Zinc. The reply was not convincing since the deficiency of micronutrients were noticed only in the above identified districts by the AISLUS under NFSM.

## 6.2 Implementation of *Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana* (RKVY)

The RKVY, a State Plan Scheme fully funded by the GoI, has been under implementation in the State from 2007-08 with the objective of providing incentives to the State for increasing public investment in agriculture, achieve the goal of reducing the yield gaps in important crops, maximise returns to the farmers and bring about quantifiable changes in the production and productivity of various agriculture and allied sectors etc. The eligibility of GoI assistance under the scheme depended on the amount provided in State plan budget for Agriculture and allied sector over and above the baseline percentage of expenditure incurred by the State Government on the sector prescribed on the basis of certain parameters. Scheme guidelines prescribed at least 75 per cent of the allocated amount was to be proposed under Stream–I for specific projects and up to 25 per cent was available to the State under Stream–II for strengthening the exiting State sector schemes and filling specific the resource gaps.

The scheme guidelines provided the Agriculture Department as nodal department which was to effectively co-ordinate with other departments and implementing agencies for preparation, appraisal of projects, implementation, monitoring and evaluation at regular intervals. The GoI released assistance to Institute on Management of Agriculture Extension (IMAGE), the nodal agency for implementation of the programme in the State. The State Level Sanctioning Committee (SLSC) headed by the Chief Secretary was responsible for sanctioning and monitoring the progress of sanctioned projects/scheme. After approval of projects by SLSC, IMAGE released funds to implementing agencies (IAs) for the implementation of projects and received utilization certificates from them along with quarterly progress reports for onward submission of the same to GoI through the nodal department.

### 6.2.1 *Submission of inflated Utilisation Certificates*

The State Government received GoI assistance of ₹ 547.93 crore during 2007-11 for taking up projects under the scheme. Of the above, an expenditure of ₹546.63 crore was incurred and utilisation certificates (UC) sent to GoI as of December 2011. The expenditure included ₹ 300.02 crore incurred by the Director of Agriculture for implementation of 55 projects of which only 41 projects were completed by him and the remaining 14 projects were in different stages of completion (December 2011). However, audit scrutiny revealed that in respect of 20 approved projects, against the release of ₹ 96.55 crore, UCs for only ₹ 55.11 crore were submitted and UCs for the balance ₹41.44 crore were not submitted by the implementing agencies as of February 2012 as detailed in *Appendix-5*. This indicated that the UCs sent to GoI by the Department were not based on the actual expenditure incurred and UCs furnished by the implementing agencies.

In reply the Director, IMAGE stated that the UCs were submitted after release of funds to the implementing agencies with the intention of receiving further central assistance (RKVY) from GoI. This indicated that the CCO did not exercise any further control to revalidate the UCs resulting in submission of inflated UCs to GoI. This was a patently irregular practice of financial reporting

and is prone to diversion and misutilisation of funds being overlooked or remaining undetected for long.

### **6.2.2 Non-utilization of RKVY funds**

The SLSC sanctioned (2009-11) ₹ 5.82 crore for implementation of eight projects relating to improvement of poultry farm, infrastructure development in OUAT, cold chain management, horticulture mechanisation, construction of market yard etc. The IMAGE placed the funds with the implementing agencies during October 2009 to June 2010. However, due to non-initiation of the projects by the implementing agencies, the SLSC withdrew the sanction orders and sanctioned (2011-12) the funds for utilisation under a new project "Bringing Green Revolution in Eastern India (BGREI)". The Director, IMAGE received back the funds between December 2011 and January 2012 from the implementing agencies after they had retained the same with them for periods ranging from 16 to 25 months. The details are given at the *Appendix-6*.

Thus, due to poor planning and failure to coordinate the implementation of the projects by the Department and the IMAGE, scheme funds amounting to ₹5.82 crore remained unspent with the implementing agencies for about two years depriving the State of contemplated infrastructure and research benefits for which the funds were initially sanctioned.

### **6.2.3 Profiling of secondary and micro nutrients in soils**

The SLSC sanctioned (March 2009/October 2009) the RKVY project "Profiling of secondary and micro-nutrients in soils of Odisha" involving collection of soil samples and soil testing. It envisaged preparation of soil fertility maps up to gram panchayat level that would help to formulate appropriate nutrient management strategy for sustainable crop production and to act as a guiding tool for improvement of soil health. The project was to be taken up at a cost of ₹ 1.45 crore in a mission mode by the Joint Director (Extension), State Nodal Officer, to be completed in two years.

Scrutiny of the records of the Director revealed that against the target of collection of 60,000 soil samples from all over the State, only 49,110 samples (82 *per cent*) were collected and analysed after incurring an expenditure of ₹ 1.65 crore. There was shortfall of 10,890 samples (18 *per cent*) of the target fixed; the project remained incomplete due to vacancy of post of Analyst and non-functioning of instruments in the laboratory for some time and delay in collection of samples.

The Director stated (February 2012) that the project was likely to be completed by August 2012. Since its outcome would be of significant benefit to the state's efforts to develop a balanced micronutrient regime for different soil types in the State, the Department should complete the work without further delay..

### **6.2.4 System of Rice Intensification - shortfall in conducting training**

Under RKVY, the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) scheme was introduced (2007-08) by the State Government in partnership with NGOs as an innovative programme, with a view to promoting a new method of paddy cultivation requiring lower seed rate and less utilisation of water and pesticide. Under this scheme, the SLSC sanctioned ₹ 2.60 crore during 2007-09 and the entire

amount was utilised by the concerned DAOs. The scheme initially focussed on demonstration-cum-training in farmers' fields.

Up to March 2011, demonstrations over 94,420 hectares (1.6 per cent of cultivated area under paddy<sup>25</sup>) were carried out and 232450 farmers were imparted training. The SRR of paddy also improved from 6.40 per cent in 2006-07 to 19.07 per cent in 2009-10. We further observed that in 29 test-checked agriculture districts, out of 95140 farmers trained through demonstrations, 66977 (70 per cent) farmers adopted the system which was pretty encouraging considering that this was an innovative approach being introduced in the agriculture sector for the first time in the State. However, the following deficiencies were noticed with some of the DAOs:

- **Belated training:** Three DAOs (Sambalpur, Karanjia and Jashipur) received ₹ 8.70 lakh during 2010-11 for conducting training of 360 farmers for two days, i.e. one day before land preparation and another day after seven days of transplanting in *Kharif* season. However, these trainings were held with delays ranging from one day to two months by which time, land preparation and transplanting were already completed. Besides, impact evaluation of the training was not conducted despite requirement under the programme guideline and instructions (January 2010) of the Director. The delay was attributed by the concerned DAOs to difficulty in arranging trainings with limited staff. But in view of the fact that such staff limitation was already known to the DAOs; they should have taken contingent measures.

- **Soil testing before and after demonstration not done:** The SLSC (RKVY) headed by the Chief Secretary in their meeting (21 October 2010), made soil testing in each demonstration mandatory to ensure that application of nutrients would be as per the requirement of the crop. Guidelines of SRI also required soil testing to be conducted before and after demonstration to evaluate the extent of consumption of fertilizer, chemical use etc. But three DAOs, (Ghatagaon, Sonapur and Jagatsinghpur) did not conduct any such soil testing despite utilising ₹ 22.15 lakh on SRI demonstration and training during 2009-11. Thus, the entire exercise was infructuous as the technique of scientific application of fertiliser to reduce consumption sought to be established by adopting this innovative approach was not demonstrated to the farmers.

The DDOs could not justify the reason for not conducting soil testing. In reply, the Director assured (November 2011) to issue necessary instructions to the field officers to avoid any such deficiencies in future. The replies of the Director appeared casual and vague since he had not even enquired about the reasons for such a situation and would therefore not be able to take proper and adequate corrective action. The CCO-cum-Principal Secretary has not furnished any reply (July 2012).

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<sup>25</sup> 60.44 lakh hectares cultivated area in 2010-11.



### **6.2.5 Absence of information on sector-wise fund flow including SC, ST and women category**

In the SLSC meeting (18 October 2008) of RKVY decision was taken for giving priority to women and weaker sections of the society while implementing RKVY projects. Besides, the GoI also required (24 April 2009) that the State Government maintain a database reflecting allocation of RKVY resources amongst Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) and women beneficiaries separately for monitoring purposes.

Accordingly, the Director instructed (27 July 2010) all executing agencies and State nodal officers to submit reports on programmes, targets and achievements showing flow of RKVY funds among the above categories of beneficiaries as this was essential for programme planning, execution for achieving social justice, parity and equality and to ensure upliftment of the under privileged social segments. But no such information/database was available with the Director for the projects implemented during 2007-11 (March 2012). Thus, despite instructions of the SLSC and the GoI, the CCO / Director failed to monitor the important issue of targets and achievements relating to the SC, ST and women category of the population.

### **6.2.6 Incomplete Agriculture market infrastructure**

SAP 2008 envisaged establishment of market yards under the Regulated Marketing Committee within the next three years covering 118 Blocks in the State which did not have market yards. During 2007-11, under RKVY, ₹ 7.35 crore was placed with the Co-operation Department for establishing 12 market yards including cotton markets and maize *mandi* in different districts. Utilisation certificate for ₹ 6.38 crore was submitted (October 2011) by Regulated Market Committees (RMCs) functioning under Cooperation Department. The maize *mandis* at Umerkote and Raigarh and Cotton Market yards at Parlakhemundi and Digapahandi were completed and made functional during 2009-11. Remaining eight market yards (Bahadajhola, Banki, Boudh, Digapahandi, Gunupur, Parlakhemundi, Rahama and Udala) were not completed (October 2011). Though Odisha State Agricultural Marketing Board (OSAMB) was responsible for monitoring the infrastructure development aspects undertaken by the RMCs, yet the progress of construction was monitored neither by OSAMB nor by Director of Agriculture.

The Director could not furnish any reply on the plea that these matters were being dealt with by the Co-operation Department (November 2011). This argument was not acceptable since the money was given to Co-operation Department by the Agriculture Department and the granter had every right to monitor the pace of progress of the projects being undertaken through these grants. Not doing so was indicative of ineffective monitoring of one of the crucial activities for development of agriculture and farmer's welfare in the State.

### 6.3 Support to State Extension Reforms

Under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme of "Support to State Extension Programmes for Extension reforms" launched in 2005-06 with 90 per cent central assistance, an autonomous institution 'Agriculture Technology Management Agency (ATMA)' was to be set up in each district. The governing body of the Agency was to provide overall policy direction for implementation of extension reforms by way of imparting training to farmers through extension functionaries (VAWs and AAOs) involving them in exposure visits, demonstrations, exhibitions etc. for capacity building of farmers. The Management Committee of ATMA was to look after implementation of the scheme. District Farmers' Advisory Committee has to be set up in each district to provide farmers' feedback for district level planning and implementation including preparation of strategic research and extension plan through dedicated staff. Besides, *Krushak Sathi* at village level and wherever available Agri-Entrepreneurs were to be encouraged for these activities and farm schools were to be set up as a mechanism for farmer-to-farmer extension at three to five focal points in every Block. The Department received ₹ 71.30 crore under the scheme (including ₹ 7.05 crore state share) 'Support to Extension Reforms' during 2006-11 of which ₹ 65.86 crore (92 per cent) were utilised.

We reviewed the extension reform activities in the test checked agriculture districts and noticed the following deficiencies / good achievements.

#### 6.3.1 *Absence of adequate manpower support to Agriculture Technology Management Agency (ATMA)*

ATMAs were set up (2005-08) in all the 30 districts of the State, registered under Society Registration Act 1860. As per the revised guidelines<sup>26</sup> (June 2010) of the GoI each ATMA unit at the district level was to be constituted with a core staff of five officials viz., (i) Project Director (one), (ii) Deputy Project Directors (two), (ii) Accountant-cum-Establishment clerk (one) and (iv) Computer programmer (one). We noticed that the DDAs of concerned districts were declared as Project Directors (PD), ATMA. Besides, out of the sanctioned strength of 60 Deputy PDs, 30 were not filled up (January 2012). Similarly, the posts of Accounts clerk and Computer Operator, though permitted under the scheme to be filled up on outsourcing basis, were not filled up (January 2012). Instead, a clerk of the DDA's office was entrusted with accounting and other support responsibilities in each ATMA, in addition to his own duties. As a result, ATMAs failed to really take off in discharging its assigned duties and block and district level effective strategic plans as required could not be prepared by them; besides affecting the demonstration of modern technology and dissemination of package of improved agricultural operations in the field.

#### 6.3.2 *Training of farmers*

Training to farmers are provided by the departmental officials for upgrading their knowledge in agriculture technology and capacity building. Under this programme farmers training is organised by the Department through the extension functionaries and experts at the village, block, district and State level. At the village level the training are provided to the farmers as required under

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<sup>26</sup> Support to State Extension Programmes for Extension Reforms Scheme 2010 of GoI

various schemes like NFSM, RKVY and Work Plan schemes. At the Block level, capacity building of farmers was carried out by the Block Farmers Advisory Committee and at the district the Agriculture Technology Management Agencies (ATMA) and at the State level, trainings are organised by the IMAGE through the Departmental officials. During 2006-11, 11.78 lakh farmers were trained at an expenditure of ₹ 11.12 crore against a target of 3.71 lakh farmers.

- **Shortfall in establishing farm schools:** The SAP 2008 laid emphasis on promoting farmer to farmer learning by setting up farm schools in the field of progressive farmers. For providing on-site training to other farmers by way of demonstration during 2008-11, against a target of 1736 farm schools, only 1235 (70 per cent) were established utilising ₹ 4.87 crore. Reasons for shortfall was stated (September 2011) by the DDOs to be want of funds. Similarly, there was a target of 1200 farm schools in 173 blocks in the 27 test checked DAOs for providing on-site training to 32,595 farmers. As against this, 1096 (91 per cent) such schools were set up during this period and 31781 (98 per cent) farmers could be trained. This was a good achievement from the point of view of educating farmers on better agricultural practice for improved yield.

- **Unfruitful practical training without agricultural implements:** In the Regional Institute of Training and Extension, Bolangir, 2132 extension staff were trained during 2007-10. Though the training institute was having adequate physical infrastructure, yet the practical training on modern methods in agriculture was imparted to the trainees without any agricultural implements / machinery. When we pointed this out (June 2011), the Principal of the training institute requested (June 2011) the Director to supply the required implements for use in training. In reply, the Director assured (November 2011) to supply the required implements to the training institute soon. Both these actions indicate the sloppy manner in which the organisation treated the serious issue of practical training of extension staff.

### 6.3.3 Shortfall in achievement of establishment of Farm Information and Advisory Centres in Blocks

As per SAP 2008, one Farm Information and Advisory Centre (FIAC) was to be set up in each of the 314 blocks of the State which would function as knowledge centres for dissemination of information on latest technology including package of practices for boosting agricultural production and productivity. Each FIAC would have two wings, i.e., Block Farmers Advisory Committee (BFAC) and Block Technology Team (BTT). Block Technology Manager was to act as the team leader of the BTT and was to consult BFAC for the preparation of Block level strategic agriculture plan.

We noticed that though 314 Block Technical Managers and 628 Block Level Technical Assistants were sanctioned for all the centres of the State, yet no such manpower was provided to FIACs of any block as of January 2012.

We also noticed that against the requirement of 314 such centres, buildings for only 200 were targeted for construction at a cost of ₹ 60 crore under RKVY scheme for which only ₹ 31.33 crore was paid to Executive Engineers (Agriculture). As of March 2011, ₹ 27.97 crore was utilised and buildings for only 87 centres had been completed. Out of this, only 61 buildings were handed

over to the DAOs/AAOs as of April 2012. The shortfall in establishing 13 FIACs was attributed to non-finalisation of sites owing to local problems while the remaining 100 FIACs were under construction.

During physical verification of two buildings (Barkote and Jharbandh) by Audit along with the concerned AAE / AAO, both were found to be idle due to want of electrification and pending court case respectively. Thus, due to lack of infrastructure and staff, the interventions contemplated under the agriculture policy remained largely unachieved or under-achieved.

#### **6.4 Evaluation and impact assessment of schemes implemented**

The NFSM guidelines (August 2007) provided for concurrent evaluation every year by the State Statistical Department to assess the performance of the scheme. We noticed that in March 2010 i.e., more than two years after first evaluation became due, Director took up the matter with Bureau of Economics and Statistics to conduct such evaluation. Records indicating such evaluation taken up by the latter was not available on record. After lapse of further one year, the Director entrusted (May 2011) the evaluation study for the years 2009-10 and 2010-11 to a Delhi based firm for completion within 90 days. However, no such evaluation report was received as of March 2012 despite the firm being reminded by the Director in November 2011.

The guidelines of RKVY scheme required the SLSC to initiate evaluation studies from time-to-time as may be required. Keeping this in view the SLSC in its meeting, (21 May 2010) instructed the Agriculture and P&C Departments to put in a third party monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Accordingly, the Department assigned sector wise impact evaluation of implementation of the scheme engaging third party monitors. The final report on the Horticulture sector alone was received by the Department, as reports on other sectors like command area development projects of Water Resources Department, extension of distribution system of lift irrigation projects, popularisation of agricultural implements/pump sets, power tillers were in draft stage. The reports on farmer oriented activities like capacity building (Agriculture sector), development of watersheds (Soil Conservation sector) and projects on Animal Husbandry sector were yet to be received (August 2012).

The Centrally sponsored plan scheme 'Support to Extension Reforms' guidelines required that third party monitoring and evaluation was to be got done annually by engaging suitable State Agencies of the State and the evaluation reports sent to the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, GoI. The State Government conducted the impact assessments of the implementation of the Extension Reforms during 2006-08 and 2008-10 and a concurrent evaluation during 2008-09. One of the major constraints pointed out by the evaluation studies was lack of personnel for the posts of Project Directors and Deputy Project Directors in the ATMA offices. Although the GoI had provided funds for posting of exclusive project Directors and two Deputy Directors, only one post of the Deputy Director for each ATMA has been filled and the post of Project Director could not be filled due to lack of suitable officers.