Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India

on

Performance Audit of Disaster Management in the State of Jammu and Kashmir

for the year ended 31 March 2016

Government of Jammu and Kashmir

Report No. 4 of 2016
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PREFACE

The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has been prepared for submission to His Excellency the Governor, State of Jammu and Kashmir, for submission to the State Legislature under Article 151 (2) of the Constitution of India.


The instances mentioned/cited in the Report are those that came to the notice of the audit in the course of instant performance audit in the test-checked sampled districts. The audit has been conducted in conformity with the Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The State of Jammu & Kashmir has witnessed several natural disasters in the recent past such as the Drought of Kharif 2009, the Cloudburst of Leh 2010 and the Floods of 2014 in several parts of the State. The performance audit of disaster management in the State focused on assessing the State Government’s pre-disaster preparedness and management, emergency response and relief, restoration of public utilities and infrastructure and their reconstruction/rebuilding. The audit was conducted between July 2015 and February 2016 and covered the districts of Anantnag, Budgam, Jammu, Leh, Poonch, Srinagar and Udhampur as test-check samples.

Pre-Disaster Preparedness and Management

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, provides for a disaster management framework that envisages a continuous and integrated process of planning, organizing, coordinating and implementing measures for prevention of disasters, mitigation or reduction of their risk and severity, capacity building and preparedness to deal with any disaster, prompt response to disaster and undertaking evacuation, rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Audit identified gaps in establishment and functioning of institutional mechanisms and implementation of policies that inhibited the ability of the administrative machinery to prepare and implement cohesive disaster management plans that would have enabled rapid response to disasters and mitigate their impact on loss of lives and property. These included the following:

- The State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA), though established in April 2007, was not fully constituted as its full time members were yet to be appointed as of July 2016. Further, as against the stipulation of holding at least one meeting in a year, the SDMA had met only once in 2012 in the last six years.
- The State Advisory Committee (SAC) responsible for making recommendations on issues relating to disaster management had not been constituted.
- The State Disaster Management Policy, approved in February 2012, had not been fully implemented.
- No Disaster Management Authority had been constituted at the divisional level (Jammu and Kashmir).
- While Disaster Management Authorities had been constituted at the district level, they were non-functional. District Disaster Management Plans had not been formulated except in Leh district. Even the Leh district plan that had been approved in May 2011 had neither been implemented nor reviewed.
The risk of inadequate disaster preparedness due to weak institutional structures was aggravated by shortcomings in the Government’s pre-disaster preparedness and management activities as below:

- The State Disaster Response Force (SDRF) was not only short of its sanctioned strength by 28 per cent but 69 per cent of its available manpower was deployed for duties not connected to disaster relief or response. Further, the bulk of the Force had not undergone the mandatory orientation and specialized training courses necessary for them to effectively carry out their functions in the event of a disaster.

- Government had not conducted assessment of hazards, vulnerabilities and risks in the State and did not prepare risk maps for 13 multi-hazard districts despite ₹20 lakh having been released by Government of India in June 2014 under the Capacity Building grants for this purpose.

- Scheme for Improvements to Flood Spill channel by way of construction of central cunnette (2008-09) was taken up to deal with the reduced carrying capacity of the Jhelum River due to accumulation of sediments from various nallahs. This was subsumed in the “Flood Threat to River Jhelum Scheme” (2010-11). Under the first scheme only about 81 per cent and under the second scheme only 68 per cent of the total targeted flood spill channels were treated. Further, ₹1.98 crore under the first scheme and ₹9.20 crore under the second scheme were utilized for the purposes not related to the scheme objectives. Had the two schemes been progressed and implemented as per their Detailed Project Reports, the impact of the floods of September 2014 would have been mitigated.

- The State Disaster Management Policy envisaged that the National Buildings Code and other codes prescribed by the Bureau of Indian Standards for seismic zones IV and V would be followed by all departments. However, earthquake resistant seismic designs had not been made mandatory for private buildings and disaster resistant designs and retrofitting techniques were not ensured in re-construction of houses damaged during the floods of September 2014. Hence, the constructions remained vulnerable to earthquakes despite being in a seismic sensitive zone.

- Disaster forecasting and early warning and alert systems were not established despite release of ₹20 lakh for early warning systems. The amount was surrendered.

- Emergency Operation Centres were not established though ₹2 crore was earmarked by the State Executive Committee (2013-14) for the purpose.

- State Government had not undertaken capacity building activities including public awareness and preparedness as envisaged in the Disaster Management Act and ₹10.21 crore out of ₹12 crore released
by Government of India remained unutilized. Further, ₹25.24 lakh was utilized for procurement of vehicles during 2014-15 instead of capacity building.

**Post-Disaster Activities and Management - Financial Arrangements**

The State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) was the primary source of funding disaster related activities. An amount of ₹1,571.35 crore\(^1\) was available with the State in the SDRF during 2010-15. Of this, ₹1,369.16 crore was spent on disaster related activities during the same period. Additionally, ₹1,000 crore was received as Special Plan Assistance (SPA) during October 2014 from the Government of India for restoration/re-building damaged infrastructure. Furthermore, ₹833.44 crore was received from the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (PMNRF) and ₹88.29 crore from Chief Minister’s Relief Fund (CMRF).

Audit observed the following:

- ₹26.52 crore was released from the SDRF during 2010-14 for relief and restoration without declaration of disaster in terms of the State Disaster Management Policy.
- As per the guidelines for management of the SDRF, the balance in the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) as on 31\(^{st}\) March 2010 was to be transferred to the SDRF. However, the balance of ₹47.88 crore in the CRF was lying under Reserve Funds not bearing interest. This resulted in loss of interest of ₹55.49 crore during 2010-15.
- The guidelines also envisage investment of SDRF funds in Central Government securities, treasury bills and interest bearing deposits and certificates with scheduled commercial banks. However, no such investment was done and opportunity to augment resources that could be devoted for disaster preparedness and relief was forgone. Government stated that the funds were utilized for normal operations of the Government.
- ₹37.08 crore was lying (August 2015) in the bank accounts of seven District Commissioners (DCs) of the test-checked districts. ₹1.02 crore was not accounted for in the cash book of DC Leh raising the risk of mis-utilization of funds.
- ₹5 crore released to the State Government from the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund for procurement of one lakh blankets for distribution among flood affected families remained unutilized.

Hence, there remained scope for more efficient management and utilization of SDRF to both augment available resources and ensure effective relief and rehabilitation.

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\(^1\) Opening balance as on 1\(^{st}\) April 2010: ₹438.21 crore; GoI: ₹857.65 crore; State Government: ₹95.29 crore; Interest: ₹180.20 crore
Drought of Kharif 2009
A review of the post-drought management and administration of relief in the wake of the drought of Kharif 2009 brought out mismanagement and delay in disbursement of assistance and utilization of assistance for purposes other than relief to actual beneficiaries as below:

- Against a total of `26.55 crore released by the Government to the test-checked districts, `18.77 crore (71 per cent) was released by the districts to the 15 affected tehsils. The tehsils could utilize only `12.19 crore (65 per cent) with `5.58 crore remaining unspent (August 2015).
- `16.50 lakh was released from the SDRF to PHE Divisions in Srinagar, Ganderbal and Shopian which were not declared affected by drought and were hence ineligible for such funds.
- Out of `2.14 crore received by Tehsil Udhampur (District Udhampur), only `10.39 lakh was distributed to affected people indicating either unrealistic assessment of losses or denial of assistance to the affected people.
- In Tehsil Surankote (District Poonch), the tehsildar released `1.11 crore to Naib Tehsildars, Patwars, and Girdawars for distribution among drought affected people during December 2011 to October 2012 instead of distributing financial assistance directly to the drought affected persons. However, no records were maintained as to the actual distribution of relief to the victims.
- Against an assessment of `2.18 crore for damage caused to crops in Tehsil Akhnoor (District Jammu), the DC Jammu released (January 2011) `2.66 crore. The excess amount of `48 lakh remained in the bank account (August 2015) and was not refunded to the SDRF.
- Against the norms of relief to be provided within 90 days, relief was distributed to the affected farmers as late as in February 2011 and January 2015 i.e. after a lapse of 13 to 60 months.
- Emergency drinking water was not provided to the drought affected areas as five PHE divisions of Jammu District spent `1.12 crore on repairs and maintenance of existing water supply schemes, purchase of POL, repair of vehicles, etc.

Leh Cloudburst of August 2010
Audit review of post-disaster assessment of damage/loss and distribution of relief and assistance to affected persons brought out deviation from norms as well as delay in disbursement of assistance. There was no assurance that the damage need was assessed and assistance was equitably distributed to all eligible affected persons while `8.10 crore of SDRF funds was utilized for purposes not covered under the Fund guidelines. Audit highlighted the following:
Executive Summary

- Assessment of damages was deficient as it was done by local authorities and not by any technical authority as envisaged under norms approved by Government of India and the assessment was not cross-checked by the district administration with census reports or records of ownership of property. There was consequently a risk that damage and loss assessment might not have accurately brought out the list of eligible damaged houses.
- Test-check of 127 families showed that more than one member of a family was selected for disbursement of relief for fully and partially damaged houses. The amount involved in such disbursements was `2.41 crore.
- Timely relief for next of kin was provided in only 123 out of 216 cases. The delay in making disbursement in the remaining 93 cases ranged between one and 17 months.
- Relief under PMNRF at the rate of `50,000 was not provided to 96 seriously injured persons as the District Administration failed to forward the cases to the Prime Minister’s Office.
- Ex-gratia relief was not provided to 36, 55 and 70 deceased persons under the SDRF, the CMRF and the PMNRF respectively.
- The District Administration Leh had paid `2.27 crore in 201 cases against an originally assessed damage relief of `1.14 crore which was indicative of either excess payment of `1.13 crore or wrong original assessment or distribution of relief to ineligible persons.
- Payment of `1.60 crore for 118 houses was made under PMNRF to persons who did not figure in the list approved by the district administration.

Floods of September 2014

Audit observed that relief and evacuation were not provided to the victims of floods in a timely and effective manner due to the absence of adequate damage and need assessment, lack of effective coordination and monitoring by any nodal agency for procurement, transportation and distribution of relief materials, diversion of funds and irregular spending or spending on ineligible items in contravention of SDRF’s guidelines. Inadequate and inaccurate damage assessment coupled with inefficient management of projects and diversion of funds also hampered restoration and re-building of public utilities and infrastructure damaged by the floods. Audit highlighted the following:

- Assessment of damages was completed in only three out of the six test-checked districts while need assessment had not been conducted in any of the six districts resulting in partial or inaccurate damage assessment. The initial and subsequent assessments varied from 11 per cent to 137 per cent leading to delays in arranging materials and procurement of supplies that adversely impacted provision of timely assistance to the affected persons.
• There was no evacuation plan and relief centres/camps had not been identified in any of the test-checked districts resulting in rescue, evacuation and relief being managed in an *ad hoc* manner.

• Assistance amounting to ₹12.60 crore due to affected families remained undisbursed while material (tents, blankets) valuing ₹3.30 crore remained unutilized or in excess of requirement. Further, gratuitous relief of ₹1.42 crore was disbursed to ineligible families and families not affected by floods. In addition, expenditure of ₹1.30 crore incurred by PWD on lifting of garbage, clearance of drains, etc. in Srinagar city could not be verified by audit as the same work was also reported to have been done by the Srinagar Municipal Corporation.

• In the six test-checked districts, there were delays of three to six months in payment of gratuitous relief to 22,808 cases and of more than six months in 8,452 cases.

• Though Government announced free ration for six months (September 2014 to February 2015) to the affected families, several thousand families received the ration after six months and many even after nine months. Further, ration was not provided as per the criteria to both ration card-holding and non-holding families. In the test-checked districts, 1,99,482 quintals of ration was provided less to 4,53,629 ration card holding families while 87,189 quintals of ration was provided less to 1,20,033 non-card holding families for the six months’ period.

• There was delay in disbursement of gratuitous relief ranging up to more than six months which defeated the very purpose of providing immediate relief. Funds amounting to ₹0.94 crore was disbursed without sanction of the competent authority and additional assistance of ₹8.80 crore was provided as a result of change in status of damages to houses after re-assessment of damages.

• While no assessment of livestock losses and damage to agricultural land and crops had been done in any of the test-checked districts of Kashmir division, ₹4.20 crore of assistance for farmers for input subsidy/compensation for losses of Poonch district was not paid to the affected persons as of August 2015.

• ₹8.90 crore was spent on purchase of ineligible items/equipment which were not related to the floods. There was no record of disbursement/utilization of items valuing ₹14.38 lakh procured for flood related activities and useful life of bio-manure valuing ₹15.44 lakh expired in September 2015.

• Relief materials valuing ₹4.88 crore procured and dispatched by government agencies as well as 18 trucks of relief material received from other States/agencies from outside was not accounted for in the records.
Executive Summary

- Divisional Commissioner Kashmir sanctioned ₹2.51 crore out of SDRF for purchase of 75,000 kgs of whole milk and 5,000 kgs of skimmed milk from M/s Mother Dairy and Vegetables Private Limited, New Delhi through the J&K Milk Producer Co-operative Limited, Milk Plant, Srinagar, for distribution amongst the flood affected people. The Co-operative received the full quantity of whole milk and skimmed milk in September 2014. However, only 7,000 kgs of whole milk was distributed amongst the affected people. While 2,600 kgs of milk was damaged, the balance valued at ₹1.99 crore was either used by the Cooperative as part of its business or was not traceable.

- Out of the 53,298 bags (26,500 quintals) of rice received from Chhattisgarh Government, 5,375 bags (2,675 quintals) were damaged at waterlogged open space at Udhampur Railway Station due to delay in lifting. A further 26,920 bags (13,396 quintals) which were transported to Kashmir for distribution was also damaged/became sub-standard (June 2015) due to delay in distribution by the Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution (CAPD) Department. This resulted in ₹42.74 lakh spent on transportation of the rice being rendered infructuous.

- As required under the Standard Operating Procedures for restoration of public utilities and infrastructure, sanction for expenditure from SDRF above ₹30 lakh was to be obtained from the SEC, up to ₹30 lakh from Financial Commissioner, Revenue, up to ₹20 lakh from Divisional Commissioners and up to ₹10 lakh from Deputy Commissioners. In contravention of these instructions, works implementing agencies did not obtain sanction from any of the aforesaid competent authorities for any of the restoration works.

- Further, a total of ₹27.36 crore of SDRF was spent irregularly or diverted as follows:
  - ₹12.25 crore was utilized on 1,208 works which had been started/were under execution or had been completed before the occurrence of the flood.
  - ₹10.21 crore was utilized on normal repair and maintenance works and ineligible items/works not included in the damage report.
  - ₹4.90 crore was utilized on ineligible works actually ongoing under other schemes/projects and not handed over to the concerned department.

- Due to incorrect projection of span for a bailey bridge in Poonch district, excess material costing ₹4.39 crore was procured which could have been avoided. Further, due to incorrect application of rates by the Irrigation
and Flood Control Division, Srinagar for earthwork in banking in layers and for supply of earth, extra expenditure of ₹2.36 crore from SDRF was incurred.

- 6,369 metres of pipes were issued (January-February 2015) from the store of the Water Works Division Srinagar for 25 restoration works costing ₹23.54 lakh. However, the said works had already been shown completed (October-December 2014), raising doubt as to the actual execution of the work.

- As per the Manual for Administration of SDRF, eligible sectors for which assistance are to be provided are specifically named/categorized. However, ₹31.44 crore was released from SDRF to seven departments/agencies which were not eligible. Out of the said amount, ₹14.97 crore was spent by Estates Department, Tourism Department (including Sher-e-Kashmir International Conference Centre, SKICC) and State Motor Garages on items such as furniture, furnishing, electronic and electrical gadgets and items, renovation of government quarters, which in any case were not associated with flood damage.

- Government of India released ₹1,000 crore as Special Plan Assistance (SPA) for re-building of damaged infrastructure. Audit observed that ₹42.24 crore of SPA funds were utilized on works/items not covered under the SPA guidelines as follows:

  o Expenditure from SPA was subject to the condition, *inter alia*, that SPA should be utilized only for re-building damaged infrastructure. However, 79 works which were not damaged due to the floods were taken up by three departments at a cost of ₹30.48 crore out of which expenditure of ₹23.12 crore had been incurred as of March 2016.

  o Similarly, in contravention of the condition that only such schemes/projects to be taken up which had not been funded under SDRF/State Plan/CSS flexi fund or others, nine lift irrigation schemes started during previous years (2007-08 to 2011-12) and which were funded under CSS-AIBP and State Plan-District Sector Schemes were taken up under the SPA at a cost of ₹2.06 crore and expenditure of ₹1.05 crore has been incurred (March 2016). Similarly, 24 works where ₹1.22 crore had already been spent from SDRF were also taken up under the SPA and an expenditure of ₹3.61 crore was incurred.

  o Further, an amount of ₹14.46 crore was spent for purposes not related to re-building the damaged infrastructure such as removal of silt from *nallahs*, purchase of POL, payment of wages to office casual staff or on construction of works not sanctioned under the SPA.


Recommendations

Based on the audit findings, it is recommended that the State Government should:

- Establish and operationalize the institutional structures and disaster related policies envisaged in the Disaster Management Act, 2005, for efficient and effective management of pre-and post-disaster activities.

- Conduct vulnerability, hazard and risks assessment especially in the 13 multi-hazard districts and prepare risk maps that would enable formulation of informed strategies and prioritization of resources for disaster preparedness including an early warning system.

- Ensure that personnel of the State Disaster Response Force undergo the mandatory trainings in a time bound manner and that they are thereafter used solely for the intended purpose.

- Formulate and implement a time bound plan for capacity building including promotion of general awareness and community training and building capacity to combat disasters as an important pre-disaster activity.

- Strengthen the mechanisms for pre-release scrutiny and post-release monitoring of SDRF funds to ensure that funds are released and utilized only for the purpose of providing relief to persons affected by disasters and are not diverted for other purposes.

- Strengthen mechanisms for monitoring movement and distribution of financial assistance and relief materials to ensure that they reach the intended duly identified beneficiaries. Procedures should also be in place for accountability of administrative officials for any unjustified diversions or avoidable losses.
Chapter - 1

Introduction and Scope and Methodology of Audit
1.1 Disaster Profile of the State

The Disaster Management Act, 2005 was enacted by Government of India (GoI) to provide for the effective management of disasters. It defines disaster as a “catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising from natural or man-made causes, or by accident or negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to and destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area.”

The Act provides for a disaster management framework that envisages a continuous and integrated process of planning, organizing, coordinating and implementing measures for prevention of disasters, mitigation or reduction of their risk and severity, capacity building and preparedness to deal with any disaster, prompt response to disaster, assessing the severity of a disaster and undertaking evacuation, rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Vulnerability to and impact of disasters can be mitigated by risk assessment, pre-disaster warning, hazard mapping and adequate preparedness through adequate and effective policies, institutional mechanisms and adequate financial resources. These pre-disaster activities complement post-disaster activities of emergency response, recovery and relief as well as restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is a multi-hazard State falling in Seismic Zone-V\(^1\) and in Seismic Zone-IV\(^2\). Low lying areas of Kashmir and parts of Jammu are flood prone and upper catchments of all the tributaries of the Jhelum, Indus, Chenab and Tawi rivers are prone to flash floods. Areas in high reaches including Leh and Kargil are prone to avalanches and the hilly areas to cloudburst; areas alongside highways are prone to landslides and most parts of Jammu are prone to drought. In the last ten years, the State has witnessed several disasters as in table-1.1 below:

**Table-1.1: Major Disasters in the State during 2005-14**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Disaster</th>
<th>Impact/Loss of Life</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Snow blizzard at Waltengu Nad (Kulgam District)</td>
<td>175 deaths and 128 families affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Earthquake at Baramulla and Poonch</td>
<td>953 deaths and 418 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Drought 2009 (Kharif)</td>
<td>18 districts affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>Cloudburst at Leh</td>
<td>257 deaths and 424 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2014</td>
<td>Floods in Kashmir and Jammu</td>
<td>304 deaths and 24 seriously injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: State Disaster Management Policy, Annual Report to GoI, Data of Relief and Rehabilitation Department)

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\(^1\) Districts of Srinagar, Ganderbal, Baramulla, Kupwara, Bandipora, Budgam, Anantnag, Pulwama, Doda, Ramban and Kishtwar

\(^2\) Rest of State including whole of Ladakh region and Jammu Division
1.2 Disaster Management Framework

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, lays down the institutional framework for disaster management including Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) at various levels and envisages drawing up of State and district plans for disaster management, requiring departments to fulfill disaster management responsibilities including integrating measures for disaster prevention and mitigation in their development plans and making necessary budgetary provisions. The Act provides for setting up of a State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) under the chairpersonship of the Chief Minister, a State Executive Committee under the chairpersonship of the Chief Secretary and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) headed by Deputy Commissioners.

The Act also provides for the creation of funds for response (State Disaster Response Fund/District Disaster Response Fund) and mitigation (State Disaster Mitigation Fund/ District Disaster Mitigation Fund).

In 2009, GoI formulated a National Disaster Management Policy (NDMP) and subsequently the State Government formulated its State Disaster Management Policy (SDMP) in February 2012.

Earlier, the Revenue Department of the State Government was responsible for management of disaster in the State. Though a separate Department of Relief and Rehabilitation was created in March 2015, the same had not been created at districts level and the implementation of disaster related activities continued to be under the Revenue Department. The disaster management is funded from the State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) which includes funds received from GoI and the State Government. Funds are also made available from the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund (CMRF) and the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (PMNRF) as well as through special packages/assistance from the GoI.

1.3 Audit Objectives

The performance audit was conducted to assess whether:

- disaster management structures, institutional arrangements and policies were in place and were working effectively;
- financial resources were available and were adequate and financial management was efficient and effective for prevention, mitigation, reduction of risk and impact of disaster and intended results were achieved;
- comprehensive risk assessment was conducted to identify the nature, location, intensity and likelihood of major hazards and preparedness to deal with disasters in the future was undertaken;
- relief assistance for construction/repair of damaged houses, rental support and gratuitous relief to next of kin were provided in timely and efficient manner and on the basis of damage need assessment and correct identification of beneficiaries;
procurement, receipt, transportation, storage and distribution of relief/aid material and financial assistance to victims were undertaken in an efficient and effective manner; 

- post-disaster activities with regard to restoration of basic public facilities and utilities were managed and monitored effectively; and 

- an adequate internal control structure was in place.

1.4 Scope and Methodology of Audit

The performance audit was conducted as per the Performance Auditing Guidelines of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India between July 2015 and February 2016 by test-check of records of the two Commissioner Secretaries\(^3\), two Divisional Commissioners (Kashmir and Jammu), seven\(^4\) Deputy Commissioners (DCs) and other line\(^5\) departments of the districts covering the period between 2010-11 and 2014-15. An amount of ₹1,000 crore provided (October 2014) by the GoI under the Special Plan Assistance (SPA) for re-building damaged infrastructure was also covered (upto March 2016) under audit. Though the PMNRF and CMRF do not fall within the audit purview of the CAG, the utilization of financial assistance released from these Funds by the implementing agencies were covered in the performance audit so as to present a holistic picture of post-disaster activities.

Before commencing the performance audit, the scope and coverage of audit, the audit objectives, criteria and methodology were discussed (July 2015) with the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department in an Entry Conference. The audit findings were discussed with the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department in an Exit Conference held on 22 June 2016 and replies of the Government, wherever received, have been suitably incorporated in the report.

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\(^3\) Revenue Department, Relief and Rehabilitation Department

\(^4\) Srinagar, Anantnag, Budgam, Jammu, Poonch, Udhampur and Leh

\(^5\) Roads and Bridges, Irrigation and Flood Control, Public Health Engineering, Power Development and other Government offices/ agencies involved in temporary restoration works
Chapter - 2
Pre-Disaster Preparedness and Management
Chapter-2: Pre-Disaster Preparedness and Management

2.1 Institutional Set-up

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, envisages establishment of designated agencies and dedicated structures with defined role and responsibilities for management of disasters at the State and district levels. Audit found gaps in the establishment and functioning of the institutional mechanisms as summarized in table-2.1 below:

Table-2.1: Institutional Set-up for disaster management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Mandate/ Activities</th>
<th>Audit findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA)</td>
<td>The SDMA was to be administratively functional by appointing full time members supported by core secretariat to lay down policies and plans for disaster management in the State. The SDMA should also meet at least once in a year.</td>
<td>The SDMA, though established in April 2007, was not fully constituted as its full time members were yet to be appointed (July 2016). The SDMA met only once (February 2012) during 2010-15 when State Disaster Management Policy (SDMP) was approved. The SDMP though approved (February 2012) by the SDMA, had not been implemented fully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Advisory Committee (SAC)</td>
<td>The SAC to be constituted consisting of experts in the field of disaster management to make recommendations on various aspects.</td>
<td>The SAC had not been constituted as of October 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Executive Committee (SEC)</td>
<td>To implement the National Plan, State Plan, lay down guidelines for preparation of disaster management plan by the departments and to act as a coordinating and monitoring body for management of disaster in the State.</td>
<td>National Plan and State Plan had not been implemented. Guidelines for preparation of disaster management plan by departments were also not laid down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA)</td>
<td>Divisional Disaster Management Authorities to be created to act as the planning, coordinating and implementing body for disaster risk reduction and management at the divisional level and to provide guidance for the purpose of disaster management to the DDMAs.</td>
<td>Divisional Disaster Management Authorities had not been established as of April 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs)</td>
<td>To prepare the District Disaster Management Plan and to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the National/State Policy and the National/State/District Plan, DDMAs will ensure that the guidelines for prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response measures laid down by the NDMA and the SDMA are followed by all departments at the district level.</td>
<td>DDMAs though constituted, were non-functional. District Disaster Management Plans had not been formulated in the six test-checked districts. District Disaster Management Plan of Leh District approved (May 2011) had neither been implemented nor reviewed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above institutional gaps inhibited the ability of the State Government to prepare cohesive disaster management plans that would enable rapid response to disasters as they occurred and mitigate their impact in terms of loss of lives and property.

In the exit conference, the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department stated that institutional set up for management of disasters had not been functional on the ground.

2.1.1 Disaster Response Force - Training and Deployment

The State Government established (February 2012) the State Disaster Response Force out of existing two battalions of Auxiliary Police. The mandate of the Force was deployment in disaster-like situations, search/ rescue operation in actual disasters and assistance to civil administration in relief and rehabilitation process. Audit observed the following:

(a) No Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) had been prescribed for deployment of Force personnel. Against a sanctioned strength of 1,588, the actual strength of the Force was 1,142 of which only 358 personnel (31 per cent) were actually deployed in its units. The balance 69 per cent of its personnel were utilized for purposes such as parade/quarter guard duties (243), attachment with Home Guard/Civil Defence units (76), various offices (244), attached to political leaders and serving/retired police officers as PSOs/orderlies (86) and with trade duties (36). The balance (99) were on leave/training.

(b) It was mandatory for Force personnel to undergo a basic re-orientation course followed by specialized courses. Only 399 personnel were imparted training on orientation course, 465 personnel were imparted training on disaster management courses and 237 on specialized courses during 2010-11 to 2014-15.

(c) Specialists such as engineers, technicians, electricians, dog squads and medical/ paramedics were not available with the Force.

Thus, not only was the State Disaster Response Force significantly short of its sanctioned strength by 28 per cent, the bulk of the available manpower was neither fully trained nor deployed for disaster relief and rehabilitation thereby defeating the objective of creation of the Force.

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6 Gardener, Carpenter, Plumber, Painter, Barber, Electrician, Washer man, Tailor and Mason
7 Avalanche rescue course (87), Water ship course (30), Biological incident course (16), Advance search and rescue operation (11), Auxiliary Firefighting (09), Flood/ cyclone disaster response (13), Earthquake Disaster Response and Management course (19), Emergency response rail transport accident course (04), Life support basic course (12), Life support advance course (12), Collapse structure search and location course (06), Incident command management system (03), EOC Management (01), Chemical Disaster first responder course (05), Unexploded bombs and explosive safety (04) and Radiological and Nuclear Emergency (05)
In response to the audit observations, the Commandant General Home Guards/ Civil Defence issued (June 2016) instructions for reversion of all personnel of the Force posted in home guard/civil defence district units to Disaster Response Force components and utilization of Force personnel exclusively for rescue duties.

2.1.2 Disaster Risk Assessment

The SDMP (February 2012) emphasizes conducting assessment of hazards, vulnerabilities and risks prevailing in the State and preparation of risk maps on the basis of outcome of the assessment. Accordingly, the State Government was to undertake risk assessment in 13 districts identified as multi-hazard districts. Audit observed that no hazard and disaster risk map of the State had been prepared though ₹20 lakh had been released (June 2014) under ‘Capacity Building’ for this purpose. Data relating to nature, location, intensity and likelihood of possible major hazards and population and assets at risk were not available with the State Government. Consequently, realistic and informed strategies and action plans for disaster risk reduction could not be formulated.

In the exit conference, the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department stated that risk maps would be prepared in respect of each district.

2.1.3 Prevention and Mitigation Measures

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, requires that the State Government should establish a State Disaster Mitigation Fund (SDMF) and District Disaster Mitigation Fund (DDMF) for prevention and mitigation of disasters and for planning, training, capacity building, procurement of equipment, etc. as part of disaster management.

Audit noticed that the Disaster Mitigation Fund had not been established in the State as the SDMP did not stipulate earmarking of funds. In the exit conference, the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department accepted that pre-disaster activities such as mitigation and preparedness were not undertaken in the State and the Department is now focusing on such activities.

2.1.4 Regaining/Restoring Wetland/ Water Bodies/ Flood Channels

In the floods of September 2014, Srinagar and adjoining districts were the most affected areas. The heavy rainfall resulted in huge water discharge in the Jhelum river exceeding the carrying capacity of the river and its flood channels. This combined with blocked flood channels and inadequate flood control measures triggered floods with devastating effect.

The flood spill channels with original carrying capacity of 17,000 cusecs of water had been reduced to a carrying capacity of 4,000 cusecs of water due to accumulation of sediment load from various nallahs which merge with the channel at various points. To address this issue, a scheme for improvement to
flood spill channel by way of construction of central cunnette\(^8\) was taken up (2008-09) by the Irrigation and Flood Control (I&FC) Department at an estimated cost of ₹14.93 crore. Subsequently, this was subsumed (2010-11) under the ‘Flood Threat to River Jhelum Scheme’ at an estimated cost of ₹50.68 crore. Audit examination of records of the two schemes revealed the following:

(i) **Improvement to Flood Spill Channel by Construction of Central Cunnette**

(a) Against 23,501 metres and 6,61,478 cubic metres of flood spill channel required to be treated and excavated respectively as per the Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the scheme, only 19,075.09 metres (81 per cent) and 5,53,511.81 cubic metres (84 per cent) were treated and excavated respectively.

(b) An amount of ₹1.98 crore was utilized for purposes not related to the flood spill channel such as survey and investigation, contingency charges, procurement of cement, Reinforced Cement Concrete pipes, steel, laptops, cameras, gensets, payments necessitated by Court awards, construction of footbridge, drainage, chain link fencing, providing of gates, maintenance and repairs and construction of restoration wall. The Flood Spill Channel Division Narbal stated (March 2015) that project funds were utilized on such items due to non-providing of adequate funds for these items.

(ii) **Flood Threat to River Jhelum**

(a) Similarly, against 11,947 metres and 11,78,331 cubic metres of flood spill channel required to be treated and excavated respectively as per the DPR of the scheme, only 8,087 metres (68 per cent) and 5,05,995.13 cubic metres (43 per cent) were treated and excavated respectively. Inadequate treatment of the channel resulted in blocking of free flow of water in the area.

(b) ₹9.20 crore was utilized on construction of structures at Wullar lake and miscellaneous items which were not approved in the DPR. The Flood Spill Channel Division Narbal stated (March 2015) that works were shifted to Wullar lake on the direction of the administrative department. No approval was obtained from GoI for diversion of the funds.

(c) No Objection Certificate (NOC) was required to be obtained from wetland authorities for execution of construction works in wetland areas falling under the area of implementation of the scheme. The requisite NOC was not obtained prior to start of the work. Consequently, construction of drainage channel covering 1,641 metres, allotted (July 2011) to a contractor for an amount of ₹1.44 crore could not be completed due to objection raised against the construction by the wetland authorities. As a result, 2,07,172 cubic metres of earth could not be excavated from the wetland area and the wetland continued to remain filled with silt despite

\(^8\) A channel of small cross section dug in the bottom of a much larger channel or conduit to concentrate the flow at lower water stages
an expenditure of ₹27.97 lakh incurred on the project. The Flood Spill Channel Division Narbal stated (March 2015) that application is now being processed for grant of permission.

Had the two schemes been progressed and implemented as per the approved DPRs, the impact of the floods of September 2014 may have been mitigated.

2.1.5 Incorporation of Earthquake Resistant Designs in Building Codes

The SDMP approved in February 2012 envisaged that the National Buildings Code and other codes prescribed by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for seismic zones IV and V should be followed by the concerned departments. Following a series of low magnitude earthquakes which took place in the Kishtwar-Doda-Bhaderwah belt in May 2013, the Hon’ble Governor wrote (December 2013) to the Government, suggesting *inter-alia*, the need for retrofitting the existing buildings and mandatory incorporation of earthquake resistant design features for new constructions.

Audit noticed that while earthquake-resistant designs had been adopted for construction of office buildings, bridges, etc. these had not been made mandatory for private buildings. Further, disaster resistant designs and retrofitting techniques had not been ensured in re-construction of houses which were fully or severely damaged during the floods of September 2014 and for which relief was provided by the Government. Hence, the constructions remained vulnerable to earthquakes in a seismic sensitive zone.

2.1.6 Early Warning

The SDMP envisages that a mechanism should be in place to receive forecasting and early warning from agencies such as the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) and the Snow and Avalanches Study Establishment. Modern equipment such as Doppler Radars and satellite based information were to form the basis of accurate forecasting, advance warning and alerts for floods, cloudbursts, snow-storms, etc.

Despite release (June 2014) of ₹20 lakh, the mechanism for early warning systems had not been established and funds were surrendered. In the exit conference, the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department stated that an early warning system would be established very soon.

2.1.7 Emergency Operation Centres

The SDMP envisages establishment of Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) in each district for quick response and effective decision-making during emergencies.

Audit observed that though the State Executive Committee (SEC) earmarked (2013-14) ₹2 crore for establishment of four EOCs in the Districts of Jammu, Srinagar, Leh and Kargil in the first phase, they had not been established.
In the exit conference, the Commissioner Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation Department stated that establishment of EOCs is underway and would be established very soon.

2.1.8 Capacity Building and Public Awareness for Managing Disasters

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, envisages promoting general education, awareness and community training about disasters and building capacity to combat disasters as an important pre-disaster activity. Further, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prescribed by GoI envisaged mock drills by search and rescue teams at State level to test their preparedness.

Audit noticed the following:

(a) GoI allocated ₹20 crore for the purpose of building capacity such as procurement of equipment for rescue and relief, establishment of early warning system in the district headquarters, creation of public awareness for pre-disaster preparedness and for imparting training to various stakeholders. Of this, ₹12 crore was released by GoI. However, the State Government could utilize only ₹1.79 crore. Consequently, balance funds of ₹8 crore were not released by the GoI.

(b) Out of ₹6.02 crore released (June 2014) to the Revenue Department for pre-disaster management activities, ₹29 lakh was utilized as of March 2015 and balance amount of ₹5.73 crore was surrendered. Similarly, ₹32 lakh released through sanction to the Technical Education Department for skill upgradation of workers had not been utilized.

(c) ₹25.24 lakh provided by GoI for ‘capacity building’ for disaster management was spent by the Revenue, Relief and Rehabilitation Department on procurement of vehicles during 2014-15 not covered under ‘capacity building’.

(d) While chapter on disaster management had been included in the academic curriculum by the State Board of School Education and certain initiatives had been taken such as conducting training programs on various aspects of disaster management and training of sarpanches, divisional level officers, engineers and volunteers, no steps were taken to increase public awareness about risk mitigation strategies; and

(e) Mock drills were not organized for any type of calamity/disaster to sensitize the relief machinery as preparedness measures were not reflected in the Annual Reports submitted to the GoI.

Thus, the State Government had not undertaken capacity building activities including public awareness and preparedness as envisaged in the Disaster Management Act and ₹10.21 crore out of ₹12 crore released by GoI remained unutilized. Further, ₹25.24 lakh was utilized for procurement of vehicles during 2014-15 instead of capacity building.
Chapter - 3
Post-Disaster Activities and Management-Financial Arrangements
Chapter-3: Post-Disaster Activities and Management–
Financial Arrangements

3.1 Introduction

Post-disaster activities comprise emergency and non-emergency response to a disaster. The emergency response includes (a) recovery, relief and rescue, and (b) financial, material and medical aids during and in the immediate aftermath of the disaster while non-emergency response includes medium to long term restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

3.1.1 Utilization of State Disaster Response Fund

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the guidelines issued thereunder do not specify measurable or quantifiable criteria for deciding severity of a calamity or declaring a calamity as a disaster. GoI considers\(^9\) nature of a calamity on a case to case basis taking into account, *inter alia*, the intensity and magnitude of the calamity, degree of relief/assistance required, coping capacity of the State Government to tackle the problem and the alternatives and flexibility available to provide succor and relief to the affected people.

According to the SDMP, the Divisional Commissioner on the recommendation of DCs can declare a natural event as a disaster. Audit noticed that neither the DCs of the test-checked districts nor the Divisional Commissioners had declared any event a disaster during 2010-11 to 2014-15.

Assistance totaling `26.52 crore was released from the SDRF during 2010-14 for relief and restoration in the following instances without a declaration of disaster in terms of SDMP:

(a) `1.97 crore were distributed from SDRF as gratuitous relief in individual cases such as burning of houses, animal losses due to lightning, damages to houses and shops due to riots, compensation to Next of Kin (NoK) of persons killed in fire incident in a local hotel, etc.

(b) `3.11 crore was provided for works executed prior to the date of floods, for normal repairs and maintenance works which were not reflected in the damage reports prepared by these departments and for items such as Petrol, Oil, Lubricant (POL) and wages of casual labourers not related to any damages.

(c) `21.44 crore sanctioned (2010-12) out of the SDRF was spent on purposes such as restoration of public utilities of 17 districts not affected by any disasters.

Further, `31.44 crore was released to sectors\(^10\) that were not eligible for assistance as discussed in para 5.1.7 below.

\(^9\) Manual on Administration of SDRF
\(^10\) Estates Department: `16.25 crore; Hospitality and Protocol Department: `2 crore; Tourism Department: `2.01 crore; State Motor Garages: `1 crore; Accounts and Treasuries: `0.08 crore; Advocate General’s Office: `0.10 crore and Construction of pre-fabricated huts: `10 crore
Thus, funds from the SDRF were utilized for purposes that were not in consonance with the objectives and procedure stipulated in the Fund guidelines.

3.1.2 Allotment, Expenditure and Reporting of Post-Disaster Financing

The position of funds received from the GoI and the State Government, interest earned and expenditure incurred under SDRF during the period 2010-11 to 2014-15 is given in table-3.1 below:

**Table-3.1: Funds received from GoI and State Government, interest earned and expenditure incurred under SDRF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Opening balance</th>
<th>Funds received</th>
<th>Total availability</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Closing balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GoI State Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>438.21 77.61 17.25 Nil</td>
<td>533.07</td>
<td>106.36</td>
<td>426.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>426.71 0 Nil 18.11 67.73</td>
<td>512.55</td>
<td>42.24</td>
<td>470.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>470.31 77.61 Nil 4.94</td>
<td>552.86</td>
<td>27.34</td>
<td>525.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>525.52 423.93 28.99 37.74</td>
<td>1,016.18</td>
<td>134.05</td>
<td>882.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>882.13 278.50 30.94 69.79</td>
<td>1,261.36</td>
<td>1,059.17</td>
<td>202.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>857.65 95.29 180.20</td>
<td>1,369.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, ₹833.44 crore was received from PMNRF, ₹88.29 crore from CMRF and ₹12 crore under ‘Capacity Building’ during 2010-11 to 2014-15.

Audit scrutiny of the utilization of SDRF funds revealed the following:

(a) The guidelines on constitution and administration of SDRF required that balance in the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) as on 31st March 2010 should be transferred to the SDRF. Audit noticed that ₹47.88 crore\(^{11}\) under CRF was lying (March 2015) under Reserve Funds\(^{12}\) not bearing interest resulting in interest loss of ₹55.49 crore\(^{13}\) during 2010-15.

(b) Guidelines envisage investment of SDRF in Central Government securities, Treasury Bills and interest bearing deposits and certificates of deposits with scheduled commercial banks. The State Government had not made investment in any of these instruments. The Finance Department stated (May 2015) that the SDRF was not physically available as it was being utilized on normal activities of the Government.

(c) Guidelines envisage that the State Government should pay interest to the SDRF for amounts borrowed from it at rates applicable to overdraft. Audit noticed that the Government had not paid any interest for the borrowed amounts resulting in interest loss of ₹221.02 crore to the SDRF during 2010-15 (September 2014).

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\(^{11}\) M.H. 8223 Famine Relief Fund: ₹8.67 crore; M.H. 8235 Calamity Relief Fund: ₹28.35 crore and Calamity Relief Fund-Investment Account: ₹10.86 crore

\(^{12}\) Reflected in the Reports of the CAG of India on Finance Accounts (Government of Jammu and Kashmir) for the years 2009-15

\(^{13}\) Calculated at the rate of 16 per cent per annum
(d) As per the guidelines for expenditure for items, in case the State Government exceeds the prescribed amount on each approved item of expenditure, the excess expenditure should not be debited to the SDRF or NDRF but should be provided for by the State Government. Against ₹57 crore for distribution of free ration to flood affected families for two months under the SDRF, the State Government announced free ration for six months and released ₹172 crore to the Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution (CAPD) Department resulting in an excess expenditure of ₹115 crore from the SDRF.

(e) ₹37.08 crore\(^{14}\) released to seven DCs for providing relief to affected families was lying unutilized (August 2015) in the bank accounts of the DCs/tehsildars.

(f) ₹9.75 crore received by DC Leh (August 2010 to March 2013) and ₹1.02 crore returned to him by the Assistant Commissioner/Tehsildar Leh was not accounted for in the cash book. The DC Leh stated (November 2015) that there was no requirement for maintenance of cash book. The reply was not tenable as non-maintenance of cash book was in contravention of the financial rules and regulations.

Thus, the SDRF suffered an interest loss of ₹55.49 crore due to not transferring the balance from CRF to SDRF and investing as per SDRF guidelines, while an amount of ₹336.02 crore was due to be remitted by the State Government to the SDRF. Further, ₹37.08 crore remained unutilized and ₹1.02 crore was not accounted for in the cash book raising the risk of mis-utilization of funds.

In addition, ₹5 crore released to the State Government from PMNRF for procurement of one lakh blankets for distribution among flood affected families had been kept unutilized in the CMRF Fund.

It was evident that there remained a scope for efficient management of the SDRF and better utilization of funds meant for disaster relief and management to ensure effective relief and rehabilitation.

\(^{14}\) Earthquake 2005: ₹7.40 crore; Drought Kharif 2009: ₹5.58 crore; Hailstorm 2011: ₹1.18 crore; Windstorm 2012: ₹0.02 crore; Flood 2014: ₹22.90 crore
Chapter - 4
Post-Disaster Activities and Management- Drought of Kharif 2009 and Leh Cloudburst 2010
Chapter-4: Post-Disaster Activities and Management– Drought of Kharif 2009 and Leh Cloudburst 2010

4.1 Drought of Kharif 2009

4.1.1 Assistance for Crop Loss

As per norms approved by GoI, input subsidy may be provided where crop loss due to disasters is 50 per cent and above, subject to a ceiling of one hectare (ha) per farmer and upto two ha per farmer in case of successive calamities irrespective of the size of holding being large.

Funds released from SDRF for crop losses and their utilization in six test-checked districts is given in table-4.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Funds released</th>
<th>Tehsils affected</th>
<th>Funds released to Tehsils</th>
<th>Funds utilized by Tehsils</th>
<th>Unspent funds with Tehsils (31st August 2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.87(^{15})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.55</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Audit observed the following:

(a) A total amount of ₹18.77 crore was released (January 2011 to April 2011) to tehsils by the DCs who utilized only ₹12.19 crore. The balance of ₹5.58 crore was lying unutilized with the DCs/tehsildars (August 2015)\(^{15}\).

(b) Out of ₹2.14 crore received by Tehsil Udhampur (District Udhampur), only ₹10.39 lakh was distributed to the affected people indicating either unrealistic assessment of losses or denial of assistance to the affected people.

(c) As per norms approved by the GoI, relief was required to be provided within a time limit of 90 days from the declaration of disaster. However, relief was distributed to the affected farmers after a lapse of 13 to 60 months from the occurrence of the drought.

(d) Unlike in other tehsils of the State, instead of distributing financial assistance directly to the victims, the Tehsildar Surankote (District Poonch) released ₹1.11 crore to Naib Tehsildars, Patwaris and Girdawars for distribution among drought affected people during December 2011 to October 2012. However, no records were maintained as to the actual distribution of relief to the victims.

\(^{15}\) ₹ One crore deposited in treasury during September 2014
(e) Against assessment of ₹2.18 crore for damage caused to crops in Tehsil Aknoor of District Jammu, the DC Jammu released (January 2011) ₹2.66 crore to the Tehsildar Aknoor. The excess amount of ₹48 lakh released was lying in official bank account as of August 2015 instead of being refunded to the SDRF.

(f) ₹5.37 lakh intended for drought affected families of Tehsil Aknoor (District Jammu) was provided to 90 persons who had suffered losses due to flash floods, to next of kin of the persons killed in house collapse or injured/killed in road accidents and to victims of firing from across the border.

Thus, funds amounting to ₹5.37 lakh was utilized for purposes other than to compensate for crop losses while ₹5.58 crore remained unutilized. There was no record of disbursement of compensation of ₹1.11 crore to actual affected people. This coupled with delay in disbursement of financial assistance undermined the objective of providing immediate financial relief to the persons affected by drought.

### 4.1.2 Supply of Emergency Drinking Water

SDRF norms provide for supply of drinking water to drought affected areas. Audit observed that Public Health Engineering (PHE) Department released (July to November 2011) ₹2 crore under the SDRF to two Chief Engineers (Kashmir: ₹0.70 crore; Jammu: ₹1.30 crore) for providing emergency drinking water in rural and urban areas of the drought affected districts of the State. Out of this, ₹16.50 lakh was released to PHE Divisions of Srinagar, Ganderbal and Shopian, which were not declared affected by drought.

It was further noticed that out of the allotted amount of ₹1.14 crore, five PHE divisions of Jammu District spent ₹1.12 crore on repair and maintenance of existing water supply schemes, POL, repair of vehicles, insurance of vehicles, etc. during the period March 2010 to March 2012 instead of providing drinking water to the drought affected areas during the period July/September 2009. The PHE Mechanical Division North Jammu and South Jammu stated in December 2015 and April 2016 respectively that the funds were required for repair of equipment to supply drinking water to the affected areas. The reply was not tenable as all the repair works were executed during 2010-12 whereas drinking water was to be supplied during July to September 2009. This in fact confirms that funds were not required in these districts for drought relief.

Hence, SDRF funds of ₹1.28 crore was utilized for purposes other than direct relief to persons affected by drought.

### 4.2 Cloudburst in Leh (August 2010)

A series of cloudbursts and heavy rainfall occurred in Leh town and adjacent areas between 4th and 6th August 2010. Seventy one villages with population of
9,000 were affected. Two hundred and fifty seven people lost their lives and 424 were injured. Audit observed the following:

(a) As per norms approved by GoI, a technical authority authorized by the State Government was to certify the extent of damage to residential houses by the natural calamity. Audit noticed that assessment of damages was not conducted by any technical authority. Instead houses were categorized as fully/partially damaged on the basis of reports of patwaris, girdawars, naib tehsildars and tehsildars. There was consequently a risk that damage and loss assessment might not have accurately brought out the list of eligible damaged houses.

(b) Procedure adopted by the revenue authorities for identification of affected persons was deficient insofar as the assessments made were not cross-checked by the district administration with census reports or records of ownership of property in order to verify the genuineness of the beneficiaries.

(c) More than one member of the family was selected for disbursement of relief for fully and partially damaged houses. Test-check of 127 families showed that sons and daughters of the same family were selected for assistance. The amount involved in such disbursements was ₹2.41 crore.

(d) Additional relief was announced from the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund for damaged houses. Out of 669 fully damaged and 998 partially damaged houses, only 658 (fully damaged) and 763 (partially damaged) cases were processed. This resulted in denial of relief to 11 owners of fully damaged houses and to 235 owners of partially damaged houses.

(e) Norms approved by GoI envisages payment of assistance to next of kin of the deceased within 15 days of occurrence of disaster. Audit noticed that timely relief was provided in only 123 out of 216 cases (57 per cent). The delay in making disbursement in the 93 cases ranged between one and 17 months.

(f) No relief was provided to 36, 55 and 70 deceased persons under SDRF, CMRF and PMNRF respectively. Similarly, relief at the rate of ₹50,000 had not been provided under PMNRF to 96 seriously injured persons as the District Administration had not forwarded these cases to the Prime Minister’s Office.

(g) Against originally assessed damage relief of ₹1.14 crore, an amount of ₹2.27 crore was paid in 201 cases thereby exceeding the original assessment by ₹1.13 crore. This was indicative of either excess payment or inaccurate assessment or distribution of relief to ineligible persons. Further, District Administration had made double payment of ₹11.44 lakh in case of three fully and five partially damaged houses.
(h) Payment of ₹1.60 crore for 118 houses was made under PMNRF. However, these persons did not figure in the list approved by the district administration.

(i) ₹8.10 crore meant for immediate restoration of public utilities in Leh was utilized for purposes not covered under SDRF. The Chief Planning Officer Leh stated (November 2015) that there was no alternative funding to meet such expenditure. The reply was not tenable as there was no provision for such expenditure from the SDRF.

As evident from above, there was not only delay in disbursement of assistance to those affected by the cloudburst and flooding, there was no assurance that the damage need was assessed and assistance was equitably distributed to all eligible affected persons. Further, ₹8.10 crore of SDRF funds was utilized for purposes not covered under the Fund guidelines.

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16 Execution of works not provided in the damage reports: ₹2 crore; Execution of new works and on normal repairs: ₹3.16 crore; Clearance of liabilities: ₹0.28 crore; Repair of office buildings, construction of sheds, fuel charges, office expenses, survey charges, procurement of water tankers: ₹1.75 crore and providing gas and central heating systems to newly constructed block of SNM hospital Leh: ₹0.91 crore
Chapter - 5

Post-Disaster Activities and Management-Floods of September 2014
Chapter-5: Post-Disaster Activities and Management– Floods of September 2014

5.1 Introduction

Heavy rainfall between 28th August and 10th September 2014 caused floods in Srinagar and various districts of Jammu Division. The flood caused death of 304 persons (Jammu: 217; Kashmir: 87), damage of 2,40,004 houses and loss of 26,461 livestock as well as losses to standing crop in about 4,91,967 hectares of land.

5.1.1 Damage and Loss Assessment

(i) Emergency Response, Damage and Need assessments

The damage and need assessment carried out by the district administration in the test-checked districts is given in table-5.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Assessment of damages(^{17})</th>
<th>Need assessment(^{18})</th>
<th>Status of disbursement of relief</th>
<th>Extent of difference between initial and final assessment (In percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td>Inaccurate assessment of casualties and damaged houses. Non-assessment of losses to livestock, crops and agricultural land</td>
<td>40 deaths declared and relief sanctioned. 20 death cases pending finalization.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial assessment (October 2014) of damage to 40,678 houses was increased (January 2015) to 76,045 houses which was further increased (March 2015) to 92,289 and 96,579 (October 2015).</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of damage still under process-3,089 (pending applications)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial assessment (October 2014) of damage to 11,874 houses which was increased (March 2015) to 16,933 and further increased (November 2015) to 21,053 houses.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of damage still under process-236 (pending applications)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial assessment (October 2014) of damage to 16,651 houses which was increased (December 2014) to 18,439 and further increased (October 2015) to 18,545.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of damage still under process-2,937 (pending applications)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
<td>Not conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) Assessment of casualties, damaged houses, losses to livestock, losses to crops and losses to agricultural land due to accumulation of debris/ land erosion

\(^{18}\) Assessment of number of affected families and need of shelter, emergency food and water and donations or financial support to the victims
As evident from above, assessment of damages was completed in only three out of the six test-checked districts while need assessment had not been conducted in any of the six districts. This resulted in partial or inaccurate damage assessment as well as consequential delays in arranging materials and procurement of supplies that adversely impacted provision of timely assistance to the affected persons.

(ii) Evacuation Plan and Relief Camps/ Centres

The Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the SDMP require preparation of an evacuation plan and identification of relief centres/camps by the district authorities. Audit noticed that none of the test-checked districts had formulated evacuation plans in case of any disaster. No evacuation/relief centres/camps had been identified in any of the test-checked districts. In the absence of a response and evacuation plan, rescue, evacuation and relief was managed in an \textit{ad hoc} manner and without even a minimum of controls.

(iii) Assistance to Boatmen affected by floods

The District Administration, Srinagar, had hired 504 boats for evacuation of affected people from the flood affected areas at a cost of \textbf{\textcurrency{}1.77 crore} during 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 2014 to 10\textsuperscript{th} October 2014. While it may be difficult to ensure strict compliance with all procedural formalities in an emergency situation, it is nevertheless necessary that minimum controls are exercised to ensure reaching of assistance to the affected persons as well as prevent misuse of funds meant for relief and rehabilitation. The Disaster Management Act stipulates the requirement of authorization by the authority (State/District) for procurements and certificate of utilization by the authorized controlling office. Audit noticed that no record was maintained of decisions taken for hiring of boats, nomination of nodal officers and constitution of committee of officials to monitor the rescue operations. Further, details of rescue operations viz. area/location where the boats were deployed, number of flood affected people rescued, details of areas/camps where these rescued people were sent, details of arrangement of food and lodging in these areas/ camps were not on record.

Audit also noted that \textbf{\textcurrency{}1.77 crore} was paid (October 2015) to the President of the All J&K Shikara Owners’ Association. As per the sanctions, payments were to be made in the range of \textcurrency{}38,000 to \textcurrency{}10,000. Scrutiny of the bank statements of payments made to the boatmen by DC Srinagar revealed less payment of \textcurrency{}30.16 lakh as shown in table-5.2 below:
Table-5.2: Statement showing less payment to boatmen against the sanctioned amount

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases sanctioned (in number)</th>
<th>Amount sanctioned by DC</th>
<th>Amount disbursed by Association</th>
<th>Less disbursement</th>
<th>Total less payment made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>30,400</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>1,67,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>7,17,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>7,41,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>5,04,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>8,29,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>20,800</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>432</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,15,800</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 58 boatmen to whom hire charges of ₹20.02 lakh were sanctioned by the DC Srinagar were not reflected in the bank statement.

Audit check of bank statements of the Shikara Owner’s Association showed that ₹41.68 lakh was paid to persons who were not reflected in the lists of boatmen prepared by DC Srinagar. It was also noticed that ₹9.50 lakh was drawn by the President of the Association on self cheques for disbursement to boatmen. However, no records were available to verify whether such payments were actually made.

Thus, assessment of damages was completed only in three test-checked districts while in other three districts difference between initial and final assessment was in the range of 11 to 137 per cent. Need assessment was not conducted in any of the districts which adversely impacted the provision of immediate assistance to affected people. Rescue, evacuation and relief were managed in an ad hoc manner in absence of response and evacuation plan. Further, the procedure adopted by the DC Srinagar for making payments to boatmen provided no assurance that the funds disbursed actually reached the individual boatmen.

5.1.2 Relief, Rehabilitation and Provision of Basic Services

The National Policy on Disaster Management (NPDM) stipulates that all State Governments, district authorities and line departments should prepare SOPs in consonance with the National and State Disaster Management Plans. The SOPs was adopted by SEC in March 2014.

The SOPs envisaged that the DCs of Kashmir and Jammu would be responsible for arrangement of relief material such as tents, blankets, ration, boats, etc. whenever required. The State Government designated Jammu and Kashmir
Entrepreneurship Development Institute (JKEDI), Srinagar, as centre for storage of relief material received from Jammu and other parts of the country. Relief material was issued to the affected districts from this store.

(i) Temporary Shelters

The State Government authorized (September 2014) the Jammu and Kashmir Industries Limited (JKI) for procurement of tents for providing temporary shelters to families whose houses were fully damaged. JKI procured 20,345 tents at a cost of ₹13.26 crore.

Audit observed that 4,467 tents valuing ₹2.84 crore were lying unutilized and 536 tents valuing ₹34.04 lakh had gone missing during transit from Srinagar to Anantnag and Budgam. Hence, nearly 25 per cent of the tents procured valued at ₹3.18 crore could not be used for the intended purpose.

(ii) Blankets

The State Government also authorized (September 2014) JKI to procure blankets for flood victims. JKI procured 50,000 blankets of approved specification at a rate of ₹290 per blanket from two firms. Of these, 36,000 blankets were issued to the Additional DC Srinagar during September 2014 and 14,000 blankets were issued to five other districts during October 2014.

Audit noticed that an additional 19,105 blankets valuing ₹0.50 crore were also procured by DCs Jammu, Udhampur, Srinagar, Anantnag, Senior Superintendent of Police Kathua as well as the Divisional Commissioner Jammu. Out of this, 5,540 blankets (29 per cent) were procured at rates between ₹350 and ₹700 per blanket. The additional cost from SDRF of 5,540 blankets procured at higher rates worked out to ₹12.29 lakh. The Assistant Commissioner (Central) Jammu stated (May 2015) that the senior officers of different districts procured blankets from different sources and at varying prices in absence of any communication/direction with regard to quantity and medium of purchase.

(iii) Clothing and Household goods

Guidelines for operation of SDRF envisages payment of gratuitous relief of ₹1,300 per family for loss of clothing and ₹1,400 for loss of utensils/household goods to families whose houses were either washed away/ inundated for more than a week or fully damaged.

Audit noticed that relief amounting to ₹12.60 crore was not provided to 46,680 eligible households. On the other hand, gratuitous relief of ₹1.42 crore was provided to ineligible families (₹0.91 crore) and to families not affected by flood (₹0.51 crore).

(iv) Cleanliness and Hygiene in Srinagar City

The Government provided (October/November 2014 and September 2015) ₹2.14 crore under the SDRF to the Srinagar Municipal Corporation (SMC)
for collection of garbage and its disposal at the landfill site located at Acchan (District Srinagar) and for disposal of carcasses after the floods of September 2014. The Corporation incurred an expenditure of ₹1.37 crore on collection of 73,435 Metric Tonne (MT) of garbage and its disposal at landfill site during 17th September 2014 to 15th November 2014.

Audit observed the following:

(a) Records showed that number of tipper trucks and JCBs shown utilized by the SMC for garbage clearance in Srinagar City was at variance with the number verified by the Ward Officers (Sanitary Inspectors). Payment for 441 days, 119 nights in respect of tipper trucks and 102 days and 22 nights in respect of JCBs was made in excess of payments verified by Ward Officers. The amount involved was ₹31.26 lakh.

(b) While the entire garbage (mulba) accumulated due to floods in Srinagar was shown as collected and disposed of by the SMC, ₹1.30 crore provided to four PWD (R&B) divisions20 of Srinagar District from the SDRF for restoration of washed out/damaged roads was also shown spent on lifting of garbage, clearance of drain, etc. in Srinagar City between October 2014 and November 2014. The details of vehicles utilized by the Divisions for disposal of garbage/mulba, including the details of agencies from whom they were hired, were not on record. While the PWD claimed that the sanitation work done by them supplemented the work done by the Municipal Corporation, the Financial Advisor and Chief Accounts Officer SMC stated (June 2016) that the entire city had been cleared and no area under SMC was left out or ignored during cleanliness drive. Hence the expenditure of ₹1.30 crore included in the works bills for restoration of roads could not be verified by audit.

Thus, assistance amounting to ₹12.60 crore due to affected families remained undischarged while material (tents, blankets) valuing ₹3.30 crore remained unutilized or in excess of requirement. Further, gratuitous relief of ₹1.42 crore was disbursed to ineligible families and families not affected by floods. In addition, expenditure of ₹1.30 crore incurred by PWD on lifting of garbage, clearance of drains, etc. in Srinagar city could not be verified by audit.

5.1.3 Administration, Management and Distribution of Relief

(i) Gratuitous Assistance

(a) According to the standing instructions of GoI, the gratuitous relief was to be provided within 15 days from the occurrence of a natural calamity. Audit noticed delay ranging up to more than six months in providing gratuitous relief in the test-checked districts which defeated the very purpose of providing immediate relief, as in table-5.3 below:

20 PWD (R&B) Construction Division-I&II, City Roads Division Srinagar, Right River Circular Road Division Srinagar
Table-5.3: Delay in providing Gratuitous Relief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total cases</th>
<th>Within prescribed period of 15 days</th>
<th>Period of payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15-30 days</td>
<td>one to three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>96,622</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>21,053</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>18,554</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>27,123</td>
<td>3,513</td>
<td>7,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>8,182</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>8,516</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Instances were noticed in Poonch District where gratuitous relief in respect of five damaged houses was paid to a single person and relief on account of other four damaged houses was paid to another single person. Audit also found that signatures of victims in token of receipt of relief material did not match with the signatures obtained in respect of payment of gratuitous relief to affected families in test-checked 45 cases of Poonch District making it doubtful.

(ii) Distribution of Free Ration to Flood Affected Families

The State Government sanctioned (September 2014) free ration for six months to families who had suffered loss of life, property, livestock, crops, etc. due to the floods at the rate of 35 kgs per family per month.

Audit of distribution of ration in the six test-checked districts revealed the following:

(a) The Revenue Department based on information from DCs approved 4,26,640 flood affected families in the six test-checked districts. However, the District Administration subsequently communicated 7,21,275 families to CAPD Department for free ration as detailed in table-5.4 below:

Table-5.4: Distribution of Ration in Six Test-checked Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of families approved by Revenue Department based on information from DCs</th>
<th>Number of families communicated by District Administration to CAPD</th>
<th>Excess families provided free ration by CAPD over the number of families approved by the Revenue Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>2,52,097</td>
<td>2,52,097</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>28,204</td>
<td>1,64,912</td>
<td>1,36,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>91,414</td>
<td>1,57,538</td>
<td>66,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>33,763</td>
<td>79,562</td>
<td>45,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>11,504</td>
<td>50,339</td>
<td>38,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>9,658</td>
<td>16,827</td>
<td>7,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,26,640</td>
<td>7,21,275</td>
<td>2,94,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The additional cost involved for the increased number of families was ₹86.62 crore. Such large variation (69 per cent) casts doubt as to the efficacy of the mechanism adopted by the Administration for determining the actual number of families affected due to the floods.

(b) Going by the above-mentioned rate, 1,99,482 quintals of ration was provided less to 4,53,629 ration card holding families for six months from September 2014 to February 2015. Similarly, 87,189 quintals of ration was provided less to 1,20,033 non-card holding families for the same period of six months.

(c) A total of 1.82 lakh quintals of ration valued at ₹25.53 crore had been released to CAPD for distribution to the non-ration card holding families affected by the floods. However, CAPD had not conducted any assessment/survey for identification of such non-ration card holding flood affected families. Details of non-ration card holding flood affected families (name of family head, residential address and number of family members) were not available in the test-checked districts. As such, Audit could not ascertain the authenticity of 1,51,217 non-ration card families selected for free ration.

(d) Ration was not provided to the flood affected people during the months of September and October 2014 when it was required most and the major part was provided after three months of occurrence of the floods as in table-5.5 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total ration provided</th>
<th>Provided within three months</th>
<th>Provided within six months</th>
<th>Provided within nine months</th>
<th>Ration provided after nine months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>4,00,529</td>
<td>1,70,455</td>
<td>2,02,737</td>
<td>27,337</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>3,14,567</td>
<td>1,27,784</td>
<td>1,37,346</td>
<td>49,437</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>2,97,867</td>
<td>1,14,662</td>
<td>1,41,844</td>
<td>41,361</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>79,190</td>
<td>42,798</td>
<td>32,380</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td>1,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>72,932</td>
<td>17,020</td>
<td>29,082</td>
<td>26,830</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>3,349</td>
<td>8,714</td>
<td>3,899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) Assessment and Relief for Damages to Houses

According to the SOPs for disaster management, claims in respect of damage to private property (immovable) need to be assessed by a Committee under the Chairmanship of Additional District Development Commissioner (ADDC) along with the Assistant Commissioner (Revenue), concerned Tehsildar and Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B) as members.

Audit noticed that case files relating to fully, severely and partially damaged houses containing application of the victims, recommendations of the sarpanch, reports of the patwari, girdawar, naib-tehsildar and tehsildar, copies of First Information Report filed, and photographs of damaged houses were prepared only in Poonch.
and Udhampur districts. In other four districts of Jammu, Srinagar, Anantnag and Budgam districts, cases were finalized on the basis of lists prepared by the Revenue Department and no detailed information were kept on record. Audit noticed that even residential address of houses shown as damaged within the limits of Jammu Municipal Corporation was not indicated.

Further, SOPs were not in place for categorization of damage caused to houses due to floods as fully, severely and partially damaged. Extent of damage caused to houses was categorized by the department without any benchmarks. Assessment of damage was not conducted by any engineer of the PWD (R&B). Non-formulation of SOPs for categorization of fully, severely and partially damaged houses resulted in irregularities in assessment of damages to houses as discussed below:

(a) Change of status of damaged houses

After finalization of cases of damaged houses by the District Administration and after making payment of assistance to the affected families, the cases were re-assessed. District authorities of three test-checked districts (Srinagar, Anantnag and Budgam) changed the status of damage in respect of 4,114 houses21 between December 2014 and October 2015 after lapse of periods ranging from four months to one year after the occurrence of the floods. The status of 50 fully damaged **kutcha** houses was changed to fully damaged **pacca** houses while 10 partially damaged **pacca** houses was changed to fully damaged **kutcha** houses. This involved an extra expenditure of `8.80 crore from the SDRF. Either the original assessment carried out by the Committee under the Chairmanship of ADDC was not correct or change in the status of damaged houses was unjustified.

(b) Assistance paid in unapproved cases

In Srinagar and Budgam districts, payment of assistance was made in respect of damage to residential units which was not sanctioned by the District Administration. Tehsildars of Srinagar and Budgam districts provided assistance for 1,107 and 490 damaged residential huts respectively against a sanction of only 423 and 140 huts respectively. In Budgam district, assistance was also provided for 2,022 damaged cattle sheds against a sanction of 1,879 sheds. Details of these huts/cattle sheds were not on records. Thus, assistance of `33.16 lakh was provided by tehsildars of these districts without sanction of the District Administration.

It was also observed that SDRF norms do not have category of ‘other huts’/residential sheds. However, 2,638 huts were sanctioned under the category

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21 Severely damaged Pacca to Fully Pacca: 703; Fully Kutch to Fully Pacca: 50; Partially Pacca to Severely Pacca: 3060; Partially Pacca to Fully Pacca: 191; Huts to Partially Pacca: 76; Severely Pacca to Fully Kutch: 05; Severely Kutch to Fully Kutch: 03; Partially Kutch to Severely Pacca: 01; Partially Pacca to Fully Kutch: 10; Partially Kutch to Severely Kutch: 01; Non-Residential to Severely Residential: 01; Non-Residential to Fully Residential: 01; Fully Kitchen Sheds to Fully Damaged House: 03; Severely Damaged Kitchen shed to severely damaged residential house: 05; Fully Damaged Shed to Fully Damaged Kutch House: 03 and Residential Shed to Fully Damaged Pacca House: 01
‘other huts’ and assistance of ₹0.61 crore at the rate of ₹2,300 per hut were provided under SDRF. Thus, assistance of ₹0.94 crore was disbursed from the SDRF for damages to houses without requisite sanction of the competent authority.

(iv) Relief for Livestock and Assistance to Farmers

(a) Relief for losses of livestock

The DCs were empowered to sanction claims for replacement of milch/draught animals subject to authentication of losses by the committee headed by the ADDC with Chief Animal Husbandry Officer (CAHO), District Sheep Husbandry Officer (DSHO) and the concerned Tehsildar as members. Audit observed that ₹0.84 crore was paid for loss of 730 animals in Jammu district without verification of death of these livestock by the concerned Tehsildar/CAHO/DSHO. Further, assessment of livestock losses had not been conducted in any of the test-checked districts of Kashmir division resulting in denial of assistance under SDRF to those who had suffered livestock losses.

(b) Assistance to farmers

SDRF norms envisages payment of input subsidy to small and marginal farmers who had suffered crop loss of 50 per cent and above and cash assistance for damage to agricultural land. It was seen in audit that:

(i) Damage to agricultural land and loss of standing crops due to floods in the most affected districts of Srinagar, Anantnag and Budgam had not been assessed even after 18 months since occurrence of floods.

(ii) In Poonch district, ₹1.83 crore released in March 2015 to five tehsildars for payment of assistance to the affected farmers was not paid to them even after lapse of five months as of August 2015. The amount was lying unutilized in the official bank accounts of the tehsildars.

(iii) Assistance of ₹2.37 crore assessed for land owners of the Tehsil Haveli could not be provided due to non-availability of funds.

Thus, free ration as per the stipulated norms was not provided to ration card as well as non-ration card holding families. The huge variation of 69 per cent between numbers of families eligible for free ration approved by the Revenue Department and that communicated to the CAPD Department by district administration indicated weak mechanism of identification of affected families. This was accentuated by delay in disbursement of ration to the flood affected people ranging from three months to more than nine months.

In addition, there was delay in disbursement of gratuitous relief ranging up to more than six months which defeated the very purpose of providing immediate relief. Funds amounting to ₹0.94 crore was disbursed without sanction of the competent authority and additional assistance of ₹8.80 crore was provided as a result of change in status of damages to houses after re-assessment of damages.
While assessment of livestock losses and damage to agricultural land and crops had not been conducted in any of the test-checked districts of Kashmir division even after lapse of 18 months from the occurrence of the floods, ₹4.20 crore assessed for land damage in Poonch District was not provided to affected persons as of August 2015. Funds amounting to ₹0.84 crore were paid for loss of livestock in Jammu District without verification of death of livestock by the Competent Authority.

5.1.4 Procurement, Hiring and Purchases

The Disaster Management Act, 2005, provides that emergency procurement and purchases of relief items and hiring of vehicles or means of rescue and relief transportation may bypass standard procedures of inviting tenders and other ex-ante controls due to the emergency nature. However, they need to maintain essential records of authorization, payments and those as required by the SOPs. Audit noticed the following irregularities and inefficiencies.

(i) Procurement of material/ hiring vehicles

Details of distribution of items procured/hired at a cost of ₹14.38 lakh by the Additional Superintendent of Police Srinagar were not on record as below:

(a) 235 tents (₹1,000 per day), 125 boats (₹1,700 per day) and 125 tipper trucks (₹2,000 per day) were shown as hired for only one day incurring an expenditure of ₹6.98 lakh. However, deployment of vehicles and boats, details of erection of tents and details of vehicles were not on record; and

(b) Distribution of 10,000 water bottles (Cost: ₹1.20 lakh) to flood affected people and utilization of 2,500 litres of phenyl (Cost: ₹1.50 lakh), polythene (Cost: ₹1.00 lakh), thermocool (Cost: ₹1.20 lakh) and masks (Cost: ₹2.50 lakh) were not on record.

(ii) Procurement of Bio-manure

As per SDRF norms, need of bio-manure for 30 days should be assessed and approval of SEC should be obtained. Audit noticed that the Resident Commissioner J&K, New Delhi, procured (September/October 2014) 90,000 kgs of bio-manure (sanitreat) at a cost of ₹0.62 crore for disinfection of garbage in the flood affected areas. Out of this, 21,620 kgs valued at ₹15.44 lakh was in stock as at the end of September 2015. The stipulated date of expiry of bio-manure is one year from the date of manufacture which expired in September 2015. The useful life of 21,620 kgs thus expired in September 2015.

(iii) Diversion of relief fund for procurement of ineligible items

Approved norms for assistance under SDRF stipulate the items and purposes for which the funds can be utilized such as provision of temporary accommodation, food, clothing, medical care, etc. to people affected, evacuated and sheltered in relief camps. Audit noticed the following:
(a) Bio-manure (Madhyam) is a culture of micro-organisms developed for accelerated aerobic composting of organic waste used for improvement of soil fertility. There is no provision under SDRF norms for procurement of manure for soil fertility. The Resident Commissioner, however, procured 44,995 kgs of bio-manure (Madhyam) at a cost of ₹33.27 lakh which was used for agricultural purpose and not for sanitation/disinfection purposes.

(b) Audit noticed that ₹2.18 crore meant for relief and rehabilitation of the flood affected people were utilized on procurement of materials such as transformer oil (12,810 litres), Mobil oil (1,260 litres), Engine oil (3,150 litres), DG Sets (five in number), 12 volt batteries (180 in number), stationery items, 30 KVA Automatic Voltage Stabilizer for Sainik Bhawan Srinagar; transformer for office of the Chief Canning and Processing Instructor; office automation for office of the Deputy Director Employment; cameras and on repairs and hiring of vehicles, POL, wages of hired computer data operators, lunch/tea, snacks, etc. The Additional DC Srinagar stated (January 2016) that the procured items were essentially required for rescue and relief operations related to floods. The reply was not acceptable as norms did not provide for incurring such expenditure on ineligible items.

(c) In pursuance of a decision taken by the SEC in December 2014, the DC Kashmir sanctioned ₹2.51 crore out of SDRF for purchase of 75,000 kgs of whole milk and 5,000 kgs of skimmed milk from M/s Mother Dairy and Vegetables Private Limited, New Delhi through the J&K Milk Producer Co-operative Limited, Milk Plant, Cheshmashahi Srinagar for distribution amongst the flood affected people. The Co-operative received the full quantity of whole milk and skimmed milk in September 2014. However, only 7,000 kgs of whole milk was distributed amongst the affected people while 2,600 kgs of whole milk was damaged. The quantity of 38,725 kgs of whole milk and the entire quantity (5,000 kgs) of skimmed milk was sold by the Co-operative as part of its business instead of distributing it as relief for flood affected persons. The utilization of the balance, 26,675 kgs of whole milk was not on record. Thus, relief material in the form of milk/skimmed milk valued at ₹1.99 crore was diverted from the intended purpose.

In sum, a total of ₹2.51 crore of funds from the SDRF was used for ineligible items while relief material valued at ₹1.99 crore was not distributed to the flood affected persons but utilized by the J&K Milk Producer Co-operative Limited for its normal business.

(iv) Medical equipment and other items

The District Disaster Management Authority, Srinagar authorized (September 2014) purchase of 24 items of machinery and equipment at a cost of ₹8.96 crore to make the Government Medical College Srinagar and associated hospitals
functional. It was seen in audit that 32 items\textsuperscript{22} valuing ₹3.66 crore which were not damaged in floods and not approved by the District Management Authority were also procured (September 2014 to March 2015) by the Health and Medical Education Department.

Further, without obtaining the sanction of the Disaster Management Authority, as required under the Disaster Management Act, the Director Health Services (DHS) Kashmir submitted (October 2014) a list of 17 items of machinery and equipment as damaged in floods to the Commissioner Secretary, Health and Medical Education Department. Audit noticed that seven items procured by the Department valuing ₹0.74 crore\textsuperscript{23} were not included in the list submitted to the Commissioner Secretary of the Department which indicated that these items were not damaged due to floods.

Thus, funds amounting to ₹8.90 crore was spent on purchase of ineligible items/medical equipment which were not related to flood. There was no record of disbursement/utilization of items valuing ₹14.38 lakh procured for flood related activities and useful life of bio-manure valuing ₹15.44 lakh was expired in September 2015.

5.1.5 Transportation, Storage and Distribution of relief material

(i) Transportation of Relief Materials

Audit noticed that effective control mechanism and monitoring system for safe transportation of relief materials from Jammu to Srinagar and other districts of the State were not put in place. Establishment of checkpoints at various places of the National Highway to monitor transportation of relief materials could have proved effective in plugging leakages/diversion of relief material in transit. Audit noticed the following:

(a) Relief materials valuing ₹4.88 crore dispatched by various agencies was not accounted for in the records of the Central Store established by the State Government at JKEDI Srinagar for receipt and distribution of relief materials. It indicated that either these goods were not dispatched to Srinagar or were diverted in transit.

(b) Relief material dispatched from Jammu to Srinagar in 17 trucks for distribution among flood victims was not accounted for in the receipt register of the Central Store. Audit found that freight of ₹4.86 lakh was paid for the carriage of these 17 trucks by the Special Relief Commissioner Jammu to the State Road Transport Corporation (SRTC). In addition one truck loaded with relief material\textsuperscript{24} dispatched to DC Jammu was not accounted for in records.

\textsuperscript{22} Microscopes, binoculars, Gel cards, micro-debriodar, plasma thawing bath, elisa plate reader, etc.

\textsuperscript{23} Includes ₹29.69 lakh on HD Camera control units procured (July 2014) before occurrence of floods

\textsuperscript{24} Sanitary pads: 10 boxes; Complan refill: 22 cases; Glucon-D: 100 cases; Ghee: 20 cases and Aam panna: 24 cases
(c) Relief materials dispatched for flood victims of districts of Anantnag and Budgam was not accounted for in the books of District Administration of the two districts.

(d) In Jammu, relief materials (dry milk powder, clothes, solar lamps, blankets and medicines) dispatched by the DC Jammu to Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) R.S Pura Jammu were not accounted for in the records.

(ii) Distribution of Relief Material

A review of distribution of relief materials to the affected people in the test-checked districts revealed the following:

(a) Stock registers of receipt of relief materials from both government and non-government sources and issue of material to the flood victims/register depicting acknowledgment of receipt of relief material by the recipients was not maintained by the DC/SDMs/tehsildars of Srinagar, Jammu and Udhampur districts.

(b) Relief materials were distributed to the victims as late as 26th October 2014 to 24th July 2015 and 17th November 2014 to 16th July 2015 in Poonch and Udhampur districts respectively after a lapse of period ranging from 46 days to 10 months from occurrence of floods in September 2014.

(c) Food aid was provided to the affected people of only Tehsil Haveli and 588 families of five Tehsils of Poonch district whose houses were fully damaged in the flood did not get food aid from the Government despite food aid being available with the district administration. Tents, blankets and mattresses were also not provided to 82 flood affected families of Tehsils of Balakote and Mankote whose houses were fully damaged.

(d) In Udhampur district, there were 72 cases where relief material was signed for by the same individual. In addition, there were 20 instances where relief material was provided to ineligible persons.

(e) The Chhattisgarh Government sent 53,298 bags containing 26,500 quintals of rice for distribution among flood affected families of the State. The consignment was received at the Udhampur Railway Station on 16/17 September 2014. Lifting of rice bags commenced after nine days (26 September 2014) and was completed on 3 October 2014. Due to non-provision of required number of trucks by SRTC, the bags remained in open space resulting in rotting of 5,375 bags (2,675 quintals) due to water logging.

Of the remaining 47,923 bags, 26,920 bags of rice (13,396 quintals) were transported to the Central Store of Lethapora Kashmir between

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25 Rice: 05 bags; flour: 05 bags; water: 670 cases; ration kits: 305 kits and 56 bags; tents: 236; Maggi: 15 boxes; Noodles: 50 boxes; edible oil: one box; biscuits: 145 boxes; cloth: 18 bundles; rusk: 05 boxes and sanitary pads: 154 boxes

26 Tent: 300; blankets:600; ration kits: 1140 and glucose: 532 boxes

27 Surankot, Mendhar, Mandi, Balakote and Mankote
30th September 2014 and 25th October 2014 for distribution among the flood affected people. Based on chemical analysis of samples of rice, the Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology (SKUAST) Kashmir intimated (October 2014) that about 90 per cent of the stacked rice at Lethapora godowns can be distributed among the people. However, Director CAPD Kashmir failed to distribute the rice among the flood affected people of Kashmir Division till May 2015 despite lapse of eight months. Chemical analysis (June 2015) of rice revealed that the rice had become sub-standard. As such, expenditure of ₹42.74 lakh incurred on transportation of rice from Udhampur in 116 trucks had also become wasteful.

Thus, relief material valuing ₹4.88 crore and relief material dispatched in 18 trucks were not accounted for in records while expenditure of ₹42.74 lakh incurred on transportation of the rice for the flood affected persons turned out to be infructuous as the rice could not be distributed.

5.1.6 Restoration of essential public utilities/ facilities and infrastructure

The Manual for Administration of SDRF envisaged payment of financial assistance for repair/restoration of specific infrastructure of immediate nature under the item ‘damage to infrastructure’. Such expenditure is normally incurred within a period of 30/45 days in plain areas and 45/60 days in hilly areas from the occurrence of disaster.

Audit noticed that 2,035 restoration works involving an expenditure of ₹15.96 crore were commenced after a gap of two to four months after occurrence of the floods despite release of funds in time. Audit analyzed the procedure for sanctioning restoration works, actual execution of works and time taken by various agencies to restore public infrastructure. The results of audit are discussed below:

(i) Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), Assessment of Damages and Sanction of restoration works

According to the SOPs, powers to sanction restoration works are vested with Deputy Commissioners up to ₹10 lakh, the Divisional Commissioners up to ₹20 lakh and the Financial Commissioner Revenue up to ₹30 lakh. For execution of restoration works above ₹30 lakh, the sanction of the SEC was to be obtained. SOPs also required the claims to be considered by the competent authority only after they are authenticated by a team of officers headed by the Additional District Development Commissioner (ADDC) with concerned Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Tehsildar as other members.

Divisional authorities prepared reports of damaged infrastructure of various sectors28. It was seen in audit that the ADDC and the concerned Tehsildar were not involved in conducting assessment of damage caused to the infrastructure. The damage reports were authenticated by Junior Engineers, Assistant Engineers,

28 Public Health Engineering (PHE), Public Works (Roads & Bridges), Power Development (Electric Maintenance and Rural Electrification) and Irrigation and Flood Control departments
(ii) Works executed prior to floods

(a) An amount of ₹11.96 crore was utilized for 1,206 works in 38 divisions that were actually started/executed prior to occurrence of the floods. Further, date of start and date of completion was not recorded on payment bills of 706 works involving expenditure of ₹4.46 crore.

(b) ₹29.20 lakh was incurred out of SDRF on two works, namely, repair and maintenance of GB Pant Hospital Srinagar and repair/renovation of rooms of Dental College Srinagar which were started before occurrence of floods.

Thus, funds amounting to ₹12.25 crore were utilized on 1,208 works actually started/executed prior to occurrence of floods.

(iii) Expenditure on Repair and Maintenance Works and Ineligible Items

(a) Sixteen divisions spent ₹6.11 crore from SDRF on restoration of 382 works that were not depicted in the damage reports prepared by the divisions. Expenditure incurred on routine repair and maintenance works was incurred from the SDRF.

(b) Expenditure of ₹77.67 lakh was incurred during September to November 2014 out of SDRF on 12 works such as creation of new sub-stations, remodeling/renovation of rooms, construction of forensic laboratory and digging of well, etc. which were not allowed as per norms of SDRF.

(c) ₹26.50 lakh was spent on execution of works such as conversion of hall into auditorium and restoration of gutted OPD block which were not included in the damage assessment report prepared by the Principal, Government Medical College Srinagar.

(d) Thirty two divisions incurred an expenditure of ₹3.06 crore on procurement of POL, hiring of vehicles, payment of monthly wages to casual labourers, etc. which were normal activities of these departments and were not related to floods of September 2014.

Thus, funds amounting to ₹10.21 crore were utilized for purposes not covered under the Fund guidelines.

(iv) Ongoing Works

As per conditions stipulated for the release of SDRF funds, restoration of those works may be taken up which had been completed and taken over by the Department before floods. Records of five divisions showed that ₹4.90 crore released under SDRF was utilized on 105 works which were actually ongoing works of other schemes at the time of the occurrence of floods.

Executive Engineers PHE Udhampur, PHE Poonch, Irrigation Division Akhnoor, PMGSY Udhampur and Right River Circular Road Division Srinagar
(v) Restoration of Damages

(a) Damage report prepared by the PWD (R&B) Division Poonch projected incorrect requirement of 1,049.60 feet span of bailey bridges against the actual requirement of 530 feet. Incorrect projection of span of bailey bridges in the damage report resulted in procurement of 970 feet span of bailey bridges which was 440 feet in excess of requirement resulting in avoidable expenditure of ₹4.39 crore.

(b) 25 restoration works of water supply schemes were started by the Water Works Division Srinagar between 8th September and 24th December 2014 and were completed at a cost of ₹23.54 lakh between 10th October and 30th December 2014. Audit noticed that necessary construction material such as 6,369 metres pipes and allied materials in respect of these works was issued and had passed the gates of store between 8th January and 3rd February 2015. This indicated that works were not executed on ground till at least February 2015 as the works could not have been completed in the absence of these materials though payment had been released.

(c) Without framing detailed estimates, the Irrigation and Flood Control Division Srinagar executed 215 temporary restoration works at a cost of ₹29.40 crore. Audit found that rates ranging from ₹650 to ₹850 per cubic metre were applied against sanctioned scheduled rates of ₹375 per cubic metre for earthwork in banking in layers and ₹500 were applied against sanctioned scheduled rates of ₹350 per cubic metre for supply of earth. Application of rates in the range of 43 to 127 per cent higher than sanctioned schedule of rates resulted in extra expenditure of ₹2.36 crore.

Thus, works implementing agencies did not obtain sanction from any of the competent authorities for any of the restoration works in contravention of SOPs. Funds amounting to ₹27.36 crore of SDRF were utilized on ineligible works and normal repair and maintenance works. Due to incorrect projection of material and inputs for bridge construction and incorrect application of rates for earthwork, an excess amount of ₹6.75 crore was spent on these items which could have been avoided. There was also doubt on actual execution of works by Water Works Division Srinagar, as there were discrepancies in the date of completion of the work and issuance of material, which was later than the completion date.

5.1.7 Expenditure from SDRF by Ineligible Sectors

The Manual for Administration of State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) and National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) provided for payment of assistance under SDRF to sectors such as roads and bridges, drinking water, irrigation, power, primary education, primary health centres, community assets owned by panchayats. Audit observed that ₹31.44 crore was released to seven departments that were not eligible for assistance under SDRF. A further analysis revealed that these ineligible departments incurred expenditure of ₹14.97 crore on items which
were not associated with flood damage as depicted in table-5.6 below:

**Table-5.6: Items/works not covered under SDRF norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Why ineligible</th>
<th>Expenditure (₹ in crore)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estates Department</td>
<td>Procurement of furniture for replacing damaged furniture items of Civil Secretariat and New Assembly/ Council Complex.</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121 works/items for providing/fixing wooden paneling, construction of wardrobes/almirahs, construction of rooms/ boundary walls, brick/wood work, procurement of air conditioners, invertors, batteries, LEDs, refrigerators, heat pillars/ convectors not provided in SDRF guidelines.</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seven works of repair/renovation for six residential quarters and construction of building for housing stores, which were not damaged due to floods as these buildings were not reflected in the damage reports.</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Department</td>
<td>Procurement of DG sets, photocopiers, computers, furniture, wood work, painting and other allied works of houseboat, construction of DG shed at the Tourist Reception Centre.</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eight Works not depicted in the damage reports of Sher-e-Kashmir International Conference Centre (SKICC).</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distempering/painting, re-electrification/ re-illumination of office rooms, staff entry corridors in the basement, painting/polishing of air conditioning control room during March 2015 to May 2015 indicating that these works were not of immediate nature.</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Motor Garages</td>
<td>Purchase of items not related to restoration works such as photocopier, furniture/furnishing items, UPSs, computers and lathe machine, bedding, etc.</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14.97</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.8 **Reconstruction Activities under Special Plan Assistance (SPA)**

Under the Prime Minister’s package for floods, GoI released ₹1,000 crore for re-building damaged infrastructure in the State subject to the following conditions:

(i) To begin with, only such projects/schemes will be taken up for restoration as are costing ₹10 lakh and above;

(ii) Execution of work shall be carried out after completing all codal procedures;

(iii) All the works shall be executed within the proposed amount and there shall be no cost escalation; and

(iv) Only such schemes/projects will be taken up as have not been funded under the SDRF/State Plan/CSS flexi fund or any other source.

Audit noticed that works were taken up under SPA in contravention of the conditions stipulated in the sanction as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

**Irrigation and Flood Control**

(a) 57 works sanctioned under SPA in four divisions\(^{30}\) at an estimated cost of ₹14.04 crore were not depicted in the damage reports prepared by the

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30 Irrigation Division-II Jammu, Flood Control Divisions Jammu, Anantnag and Srinagar
Department. An expenditure of ₹10.31 crore was incurred on these works as on March 2016.

(b) Nine Lift Irrigation Schemes (estimated cost: ₹2.06 crore) of Akhnoor were sanctioned under SPA despite the fact that these schemes had started during 2007-08 to 2011-12 and were under implementation under Centrally Sponsored Scheme (AIBP)/District Sector Schemes at the time of the floods. An expenditure of ₹1.05 crore was incurred (March 2016) on these schemes and none of the schemes were completed as on March 2016.

(c) Funds of ₹1.20 crore meant for re-building damaged infrastructure were utilized on *mulba* clearance, POL, payment of wages to casual labourers, construction of pre-existing schemes and payment of consultancy charges. The Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division Akhnoor stated (March 2016) that provision of contingency five per cent was made in the Detailed Project Report and such expenditure was incurred out of this contingency. The reply was not tenable as wages of labour and watch and ward, transfer of amount/ material to other schemes was not covered under provision of contingency.

Thus, expenditure of ₹12.56 crore was incurred from SPA on works/items not covered under its conditions.

(ii) **Roads and Bridges**

(a) Against cost of ₹9.54 crore of seven projects shown in the damage report prepared by the Department, ₹12.38 crore was projected by the department resulting in approval of extra cost of ₹2.84 crore. An expenditure of ₹12.38 crore was incurred on these projects and five projects completed as on March 2016. The Executive Engineer, R&B Division Poonch stated (June 2016) that project cost reflected in the Damage Report was tentative and increased in the Detailed Project Report.

(b) Audit noticed that payment of ₹2.08 crore which pertained to the expenditure incurred on the construction of a bridge before floods was debited to SPA.

(c) Out of funds of ₹1.27 crore sanctioned for five bridges in two divisions (Executive Engineer, Left River Circular Road (LRCR) Division Srinagar and City Roads Division Srinagar), ₹0.67 crore were diverted and incurred on 20 works such as construction of drains, road surface, footpaths, fencing of graveyard, etc. which were not related to construction of these bridges.

(d) The work of restoration/ reconstruction of three bridges was sanctioned at a cost of ₹0.69 crore. The work was completed at a cost of ₹35.61 lakh. While ₹15.62 lakh remained unspent as well as un-surrendered, the balance amount of ₹17.60 lakh was used for projects/
miscellaneous items which were not related to the floods or were commenced prior to the floods which was ineligible under SPA.

(e) ₹0.83 crore meant for re-building damaged infrastructure was diverted and utilized on purchase of bitumen, POL, hiring of vehicles, preparation for VVIP visit, Elections 2014, Republic Day 2015, wages of casual labourers, carriage charges of trucks pertaining to period prior to floods and on construction of roads by the test-checked four divisions.

(f) ₹49.03 lakh were utilized by the Executive Engineer R&B Division Budgam on seven works before floods of September 2014. The Executive Engineer (R&B) Division Budgam stated (March 2016) that these works were ongoing works under various programmes/schemes and were also damaged due to floods. The reply was not acceptable as payments were made for such works which were started prior to floods.

Thus, funds amounting to ₹4.25 crore were utilized on works/items not covered under conditions of SPA.

(iii) Public Health Engineering Department

Eight works which were not mentioned in the damage reports prepared by the Divisions were sanctioned for Jammu district under SPA at an estimated cost of ₹11.49 crore. An expenditure of ₹7.86 crore were incurred on these works and six works were completed as on March 2016. Audit noticed that the Executive Engineer PHE City-I Division Jammu spent ₹14.73 lakh received under SPA on repair works not related to permanent restoration works approved under SPA, temporary restoration works, on works executed before floods and construction of compound wall of chowkidar quarters.

(iv) Power

Out of ₹1,000 crore released to the State under SPA for re-building damaged infrastructure, the State Government sanctioned (June 2015) ₹178.42 crore for re-building of infrastructure in the Power Sector for permanent restoration of flood damaged infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir. This sanction was subject to the stipulation that (a) the funds would be utilized as per DPR/Project Reports approved by the competent authority, (b) that there would be no diversion of funds from one scheme/component to another, (c) that the works are carried out after having photographs of site before and after execution and (d) that the works/projects are not funded from any other funds/source.

A scrutiny of the works included in the sanction order revealed that expenditure of ₹9.01 crore included items such as power transformers, hydraulic cranes, excavators, renovation of distribution transformers, repair of workshops/_buildings and normal repairs and maintenance works which were not directly attributable

31 Executive Engineer PWD (R&B) Division Poonch, Udhampur, City Roads Division Srinagar and LRCR Division Srinagar
32 Executive Engineers PHE City-I Division Jammu, PHE City-II Division Jammu and PHE Rural Jammu
to the floods in Jammu region. Audit noted that funds of SPA were being utilized to augment resources and infrastructure rather than on re-building infrastructure directly damaged by the floods which were the objectives of SPA. These works were undertaken without there being any Project Reports/Photographs in support of the sanctioned expenditure.

(v) Estates Department

(a) Expenditure of ₹4.95 crore was incurred (March 2016) on 14 works of renovation of government residential quarters at Jammu and civil works at Civil Secretariat Jammu which were not necessitated by floods.

(b) In deviation from government instructions which stipulated that only those schemes be taken up under SPA which have not been funded from SDRF/State Plan/CSS Flexi fund/any other source, expenditure of ₹3.61 crore was incurred (September 2014 to March 2015) out of SPA on restoration/renovation of 24 residential quarters in Srinagar despite the fact that expenditure of ₹1.22 crore and ₹0.45 crore had been incurred out of SDRF and State Plan respectively on restoration/renovation of these residential quarters. The Executive Engineer Estates Division Srinagar stated (June 2016) that restoration of these quarters were taken up under SDRF/State Plan but could not be completed due to providing of insufficient funds. As such, pending works of these quarters were taken up under SPA.

Thus, funds of ₹42.24 crore meant for re-building damaged infrastructure were utilized on works/items not covered under the conditions of SPA.
Chapter - 6

Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter-6: Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

Despite multi-hazardous risks and occurrence of several disasters in recent past, the steps taken by the State Government to prepare for and mitigate the impact of disasters were not commensurate with the task at hand. There were gaps and deficiencies in institutional arrangements, policy and plan formulation as well as implementation of pre-disaster measures. There was considerable scope for improvement in the management of SDRF funds so as to both augment available resources as well as to ensure its utilization for the intended objectives of disaster preparedness and relief.

The lack of preparedness as well as inadequate institutional mechanisms and processes including internal control and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure efficient and timely relief and rehabilitation on the occurrence of a disaster were self-evident in the disaster relief activities following the drought of 2009, the Leh cloudburst of 2010 and floods of 2014. There were deficiencies and delays in damage and need assessments, diversion of relief funds and delay in reaching relief and assistance to the affected persons/families.

A total of ₹1,369.16 crore had been spent between 2010-11 and 2014-15 from the SDRF. An amount of ₹122.72 crore was diverted from sanctioned works/projects towards or spent on ineligible items/works, ₹62.88 crore remained unutilized, extra expenditure of ₹214.46 crore was incurred on account of excess payment/procurement at higher rate and there was wasteful and unfruitful expenditure of ₹0.86 crore and avoidable expenditure of ₹4.39 crore. Under the Special Plan Assistance, ₹1,000 crore was provided for re-building damaged infrastructure in October 2014. However, ₹4.66 crore was spent in contravention of the SPA conditions and ₹37.58 crore was spent for purposes not related to re-building the damaged infrastructure. Overall, there was a lack of assurance that relief and assistance were provided to the actual beneficiaries in a timely and efficient manner despite availability of financial resources.

6.2 Recommendations

Based on the audit findings, it is recommended that the State Government should:

- Establish and operationalize the institutional structures and disaster related policies envisaged in the Disaster Management Act, 2005, for efficient and effective management of pre-and post-disaster activities.
- Conduct vulnerability, hazard and risks assessment especially in the 13 multi-hazard districts and prepare risk maps that would enable formulation of informed strategies and prioritization of resources for disaster preparedness including an early warning system.
- Ensure that personnel of the State Disaster Response Force undergo the
mandatory trainings in a time bound manner and that they are thereafter used solely for the intended purpose.

- Formulate and implement a time bound plan for capacity building including promotion of general awareness and community training and building capacity to combat disasters as an important pre-disaster activity.

- Strengthen the mechanisms for pre-release scrutiny and post-release monitoring of SDRF funds to ensure that funds are released and utilized only for the purpose of providing relief to persons affected by disasters and are not diverted for other purposes.

- Strengthen mechanisms for monitoring movement and distribution of financial assistance and relief materials to ensure that they reach the intended duly identified beneficiaries. Procedures should also be in place for accountability of administrative officials for any unjustified diversions or avoidable losses.

The audit findings were referred to the Government in May 2016. The response of the Government was awaited (July 2016).

Srinagar/Jammu
The 31st August 2016
(Hoveyda Abbas)
Accountant General (Audit)
Jammu and Kashmir

Countersigned

New Delhi
The 31st August 2016
(Shashi Kant Sharma)
Comptroller and Auditor General of India
Glossary of Abbreviations
## Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Expanded form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADDC</td>
<td>Additional District Development Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bureau of Indian Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Comptroller and Auditor General of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAHO</td>
<td>Chief Animal Husbandry Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPD</td>
<td>Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMRF</td>
<td>Chief Minister’s Relief Fund</td>
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<td>CRF</td>
<td>Calamity Relief Fund</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centrally Sponsored Scheme</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDMAs</td>
<td>District Disaster Management Authorities</td>
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<td>DDMF</td>
<td>District Disaster Mitigation Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Diesel Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Director Health Services</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Detailed Project Report</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DSHO</td>
<td>District Sheep Husbandry Officer</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Executive Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operation Centre</td>
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<td>GMC</td>
<td>Government Medical College</td>
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<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>I&amp;FC</td>
<td>Irrigation and Flood Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
<td>Indian Meteorological Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKEDI</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir Entrepreneurship Development Institute</td>
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<td>JKI</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVA</td>
<td>Kilo Volt Ampere</td>
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<td>Glossary</td>
<td>Expanded form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Light Emitting Diode</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>NDMP</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDRF</td>
<td>National Disaster Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
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<td>NoK</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Personal Security Officer</td>
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<td>R&amp;B</td>
<td>Roads and Bridges</td>
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<td>State Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>SDM</td>
<td>Sub-District Magistrate</td>
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<td>SDMA</td>
<td>State Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
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<td>State Disaster Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>State Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKUAST</td>
<td>Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Srinagar Municipal Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Special Plan Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRTC</td>
<td>State Road Transport Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPSs</td>
<td>Un-interrupted Power Supply Systems</td>
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